Wittgenstein, konserwatyzm i możliwość krytyki

Abstrakt

Wittgenstein, conservatism and possibility of criticism

In this paper I criticize conservative interpretations of Wittgenstein’s concept of “following the rule” FR, which deny FR the potential of social criticism. I start with the interpretation of FR by P. Winch, and then juxtapose it with the critique of rationality by J.C. Nyiri and M. Oakeshott. Despite a certain level of general agreement between the two interpretations in their understanding of human rationality, I discern an important difference between them. While conservative interpretations of FR deny the presence of reflection in FR, hence the possibility of criticism, Winch’s interpretation allows us to find critical potential in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I argue that this potential can be found in Wittgenstein’s analysis of FR, in which understanding is a condition of knowing the rule. Wittgensteinian critique according to Winch does not consist in critiquing others’ language games from the outside, but in “expanding the abilities of understanding” the rules presiding over one’s own language games.