Słuszność zasad zamiast koncepcji dobra czy słuszność zasad jako koncepcja dobra — nierozstrzygnięty spór we współczesnej filozofii polityki
The rightness of principles instead of the concept of good or the rightness of principles as the concept of good— the unsolved dispute in the contemporary political philosophy
This paper concerns the twilight of the concept of common good and the rise of the idea of rightness over the conceptions of good. J. Rawls differentiates between the extensive doctrines under which various conceptions of good are formulated and the principles of justice, which deliberately avoiding the issue of good, stop at the level of what is right. The rightness allows for pluralism of various broad doctrines that can last, grow and compete with one another within and under the protection of a liberal and democratic state. But we have to admit that there is no escape from the question of good and bad while considering the social and political issues being moral issues in some important sense for us. The defence of the principles of justice by means of pointing out their rightness and distinguishing them from various conceptions of good is — at the level of politics and political philosophy — reasonable and purposeful because of the values that we cherish together, as well as in order to avoid certain damages which we fear, but it is still a kind of conception of good. The stability of liberal society lies in the ability to promote the right conception of justice which is referred to as thin conception of good. The normative content does not evaporate from the principles of political life, but it is retained — the primary concern of the state is justice, fairness, equality, etc.