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## Cognitive Axiological Remarks on the Verb-to-Noun Conversion

### 1. Introduction

The main goal of the present paper is to account for the axiological differentiation between English verbs and suffixless deverbal nouns which form an input and output of Verb-to-Noun conversion respectively. Despite significant efforts to clarify the process of conversion undertaken among others by Bauer (1983), Hammond and Noonan (1988), Cetnarowska (1993), Twardzisz (1997), linguistic literature still lacks detailed semantic explanations of axiological characteristics of the complex process of conversion, that is regarded by Marchand (1969, cited in Szymanek 1993) as a *zero-derivation* or by Twardzisz (1997) as a *semantic extension*. The fact that the semantic change of a converted lexical entity, as Szymanek (1993: 82) clarifies, has nothing to do “with any change on the expression plane” induces the author of the paper to opt for the comprehension of *conversion* in terms of a semantic extension. The paper attempts, at least partly, to fill in the gap in the cognitive axiological descriptions of Verb-to-Noun conversion. The present paper does not constitute a complete study on axiological properties of the process in question, but it only outlines the issue of axiological consequences of Verb-to-Noun conversion by addressing the following problems: 1) the axiological concordance and discordance between the most salient senses of verbs and nouns involved in Verb-to-Noun conversion, 2) axiological consequences of metaphorical extensions which draw on Verb-to-Noun conversion, as well as 3) preliminary remarks on axiological properties of specialized senses of suffixless nouns resulted from Verb-to-Noun conversion.

The analysis, from which the present paper results, have been conducted on material provided by 40 native speakers of English which includes examples of sentences with given verbs and deverbal suffixless nouns, as well as on examples coming from the random selection of 50 most common uses of given verbs

and nouns from *The British National Corpus*: all examples from the corpus are presented with their numerical references in brackets. That means that 90 uses of each lexical entity were taken into account. These uses refer to sentences presenting various contexts in which given verbs and their derivatives, i.e. deverbal suffixless nouns, were used. The material was analysed by means of Fundamental Axiological Matrix (Krzeszowski 1997), preconceptual image schemata (Johnson 1987, cited in Krzeszowski 1997), schemata of axiological formulae according to Laskowska (1992), as well as cognitive semantics terms provided by Langacker (1991), such as: a cognitive/conceptual domain, the process of profiling, a scope of predication, the notion of a trajector and landmark. Besides aforementioned notions, the distinction between two terms, i.e. type of value and axiological load understood as a positive or negative sign of valuation bears particular significance in the paper, since they constitute basic terms for the axiological description of the lexical items in question. The paper, thus, falls within the scope of cognitive linguistics and particularly the axiological semantics.

## 2. The semantic-pragmatic axiological interface between a base and derivative in case of the Verb-to-Noun conversion – theoretical assumptions

The Verb-to-Noun ( $V \rightarrow N$ ) conversion constitutes, as Twardzisz (1997) clarifies, a type of semantic extension from the conceptual domain of processes to the domain of things. According to cognitive grammar assumptions, a *thing* constitutes an area in some domain, while a *process* covers some complex relation with time axis embedded (Langacker 1991).

The Verb-to-Noun ( $V \rightarrow N$ ) conversion of a lexical entity results in complex semantic, pragmatic as well as axiological changes which occur in that entity. Changes within a lexical item undergoing the process of Verb-to-Noun conversion can be described with respect to a given interface between a putative base (here a verb) and its derivative (here a suffixless deverbal noun). The interface covers in the present paper the semantic, pragmatic and axiological differentiation between a verb and its derivative, i.e. a suffixless noun. The axiological character of this differentiation depends on factors such as: 1) type of values associated with senses of given lexemes and 2) the position of these values on a bipolar (negative(–)–positive(+)) axiological scale which constitutes a domain and tool for evaluating all kinds of entities and relations between them. The pragmatic facet of this differentiation, in turn, concerns various uses, i.e. contexts and the most salient senses in which speakers tend to use given verbs and their nominal suffixless derivatives. This pragmatic facet of the interface constitutes in the present paper the main frame, though not the only one, for the analysis of axiological relations between

verbal and nominal senses of lexical items affected by verb-to-noun conversion; hence the usage-based, context-oriented approach applied in the significant part of the present paper. That means, the analysis concerns mainly these senses, in which speakers are most likely to use given verbs and nouns.

For example, the semantic-pragmatic axiological relations between the most frequently used verbal and nominal senses of the lexeme *drink* can be accounted for in terms of a clash between values associated with those senses. As a verb, *drink* can mean either 'to take liquid into your body through your mouth' or 'to drink alcohol,' as it is stated in the dictionary Oxford Wordpower (1997). In its second sense, *drink* is more likely to occur in negative contexts than its nominal counterpart a *drink*. The negative contexts within which the verb *to drink* appears make it bear the sense of drinking excessive quantity of alcohol and thus the verb acquires negative connotations possibly concerning vital, social or moral values, e.g.: *He drinks like a fish, I drank too much vodka last night, He's been drinking again*. Its nominal counterpart, in turn, tends to appear in contexts highlighting positive hedonistic aspect of drinking usually some alcoholic beverages, e.g.: *How about having a drink in a pub?, She has a drink once in a while with her friends, Would you like to have a drink with me after work?*. The author does not claim that the verb *drink* occurs mainly in negative contexts, but only states that it is more ready to occur in negative contexts, when it refers to alcohol, in comparison to its nominal counterpart a *drink* – the remark which results from the analysed material.

The axiological relations between a base (a verb) and a derivative (a noun) may be accounted for either in terms of an axiological concordance or discordance. The aforementioned examples with the lexeme *drink* illustrate, that the axiological discordance may cover the relations between lexical items with different axiological tendencies. These tendencies, however, can concern two cases. That is, they can refer to the situation, where, despite the same tendency of both a verb and a noun to appear in given contexts, for example negative ones, the number of other contexts, for instance positive ones in which they can occur, is still much higher in case of one entity, be it a verb or a noun, than in the other one. These tendencies can also present the absolute majority of contexts, positive or negative, in which given verbs and nouns occur and which differentiate these two items. Such a discordance can be clearly seen between the salient verbal and nominal senses of the lexeme *bite*, i.e. senses occurred in the majority of contexts. Respondents asked to form a sentence with the verb *bite* used this verb mainly with the negative meaning of to hurt one with teeth or sting one, while in its nominal sense a *bite* was used as something to eat or an amount of food to eat – the senses which express rather positive hedonistic aspect of consuming food. This example will be elaborated further on in the present paper in section on axiological discordance between verbs and nouns derived from these verbs through Verb-to-Noun conversion.

The notion of the axiological discordance covers in the present paper values which are highlighted in given lexical items. That implies, that, though two items may call up the same set of values, different values are highlighted in one lexical entity and different in the other one, which is illustrated by the lexeme *smoke*, which can fulfill either the verbal or nominal function. Both items, i.e. *to smoke* and *a smoke* (as an act of smoking, e.g. *to have a smoke*) may evoke both vital and hedonistic values. The verb, however, seems to occur more often in contexts highlighting vital values but from the negative perspective, while the noun, in the majority of contexts, positive hedonistic values. Highlighting implies also hiding because putting emphasis on one value leads to weakening another one or even, in some contexts, to its disappearing.

As it was mentioned above, the axiological discordance corresponds also to the type of values evoked by given lexical items. That means, that a change of an axiological load of a lexical item undergoing Verb-to-Noun conversion may be on a par with a change of the type of value ascribed to the converted item. The change of both axiological charge and type of values ascribed to a given verb do not always obtain simultaneously. In some cases, despite the basic concordance of the kinds of values, the two lexemes, i.e. a verb (a base) and a noun (a derivative) bear different axiological loads. In other cases, in spite of the same axiological load, there occur different kinds of highlighted values. The observations outlined above result in distinguishing two aspects of the axiological discordance, namely the axiological-load and aspect-of-valuation discordance, which is further illustrate in the subsequent points.

The discussion on axiological interface between verbs and nouns resulted from these verbs through the process of conversion gives rise to discriminate the following patterns of the relations – the patterns were identified on the basis of the linguistic material gathered for the axiological analysis and they reflect tendencies primarily of pragmatic character: 1) the concordance of both axiological load and type of value, e.g.: *kiss* vs. *a kiss*, *hug* vs. *a hug*; 2) the discordance of both axiological load and type of value, which is illustrated by pairs such as: *to smoke* vs. *a smoke* (of cigarette), *to blow* vs. *a blow*, *to dive* vs. *a dive*, *to bite* vs. *a bite* (of something); 3) cases presenting the axiological load discordance and aspect-of-valuation concordance simultaneously, e.g.: *to haunt* vs. *a haunt*.

### 2.1. The concordance of both axiological load and type of valuation

The basic overlap of an axiological load and type of values of entities related to each other through the process of conversion constitutes the issue to be thoroughly discussed. The axiological concordance draws on the most prominent values evoked by senses of given verbs and nouns, which is illustrated in the following table showing examples that come from the material provided by native speakers of English:

Table 1. Axiological concordance

Verbs	Deverbal Nouns
KISS	
At Xmas time it is tradition to kiss under the mistletoe. I kissed my mother goodbye at the airport. The lovers kissed each other tenderly. All my Spanish friends kiss you on the cheek when they meet you.	At Xmas time it is tradition to give someone a kiss under the mistletoe. I left her with a kiss. He greeted her with a kiss. Give me a kiss!
HUG	
She hugged him tightly. What I want is to kiss and hug you. I hug my teddy bear while I sleep. In the freezing temperature they hugged each other to keep warm.	She gave him a hug. Come on, give me a hug! Everyone can use a hug once in a while. She needed a hug to cheer her up.
FALL	
I slipped on the ice and fell. She's fallen down and she can't get up. I fell up the stairs because I was drunk. I always fall over.	John sustained serious injuries after a fall from his horse. She had a bad fall. He's heading for a fall.
LICK	
The boy licked his ice-cream. A small child was given a lollipop to lick. The dog licked my hand when I petted him. Jane licked all the icing off the cake. A baby's licking a chocolate bar.	Have a lick of my ice-cream. I would love a lick of your ice-cream. The dog gave him a friendly lick. Give me a lick of your ice cream, please. Go ahead, take a lick of my pop-sickle.
RINSE	
After washing his clothes with soap he rinsed them under a tap. Vegetables need to be rinsed in water before you eat them. I rinse my hair after I wash it. Please, rinse out the tub after you use it.	I'll just give the clothes a rinse. I gave the vegetables a quick rinse before steaming them. You'd be cute if you put a rinse on your hair. My grandma put a rinse through her hair to hide the grey ones.

Almost all examples of nouns from the table above represent episodic nominalizations. Such nominalizations, as Twardzisz (1997) clarifies, result from shifting a profile from the sequences of development of the overall, prototypically perfective, process to: 1) an instantaneous occurrence of that process as a whole, e.g. *a rinse* as in *to give vegetables a rinse* or 2) to one segment out of a sequence of interrelated episodes constituting the overall process, as in *Have a lick of my ice-cream*. In both cases enumerated above, the complex temporal relation is conceived of as an instantaneous event with time axis suspended and consequently profiled as a thing, i.e. a region in some spatial domain (Langacker 1991). Since the main difference between such nominalizations and their verbal basis consists

in time axis which is suspended in the former and included in the latter, as well as in scanning mode, which is sequential in verbs and holistic in such nominals, the conceptual content of the lexeme being converted does not change. That means that both a verb and its derivative, i.e. a deverbal suffixless noun, refer to the same conceptual domain and profile the same process within this domain. Therefore episodic nominalizations tend to inherit axiological properties of their verbal basis, though these properties can be modified by the syntactic frames and broader context in which those nominalizations can occur.

The axiological and conceptual dependence of episodic nominalizations upon their verbal bases can be seen in case of the lexeme *rinse*, e.g. *rinse* in *He rinsed the clothes under the tap*, and *a rinse* in *He gave the clothes a rinse*. *To rinse* as well as *a rinse* refer to the same conceptual domain, i.e. a process of cleaning by means of running water. Here it is the act of rinsing which involves the clause trajector (TR), i.e. the doer expressed by the preposition *he*, the clause landmark (LM), i.e. the receiver/undergoer of the action expressed by the noun phrase *the clothes* and inner landmark explicated here as a deverbal noun *a rinse* in case of the phrase *give a rinse*. The execution of the action (construed as a thing) in case of *to give the clothes a rinse* is indicated by the verb *give*. The entire scene evoked by the lexeme *rinse*, in its verbal as well as nominal function, bears the same axiological charge and values which can be explicated as X (to rinse/a rinse) is regarded as a positive (+) action with respect to pragmatic, possibly aesthetic (to remove dirt from something), values. Thus the major difference between verbal and nominal sense of the lexeme *rinse* does not lie in conceptual content and axiological properties but in time axis and scanning mode, which was clarified in the previous paragraph.

Two examples with the nominal *a rinse* from the above table do not present episodic nominalizations, i.e.: *My grandma put a rinse through her hair to hide the grey ones* as well as *You'd be cute if you put a rinse on your hair*. Those two examples illustrate nominals with specialized meanings. Such nominals do not only draw on the conceptual domain of the verb, from which they are derived, but also they express some additional meaning by reference to other conceptual domains, in the present cases to the domain of colours. Hence putting a rinse on one's hair means putting some colour on hair. Specialized meanings of such nominals are explained in section 4.

Despite given exceptions, most examples presented in the table above illustrate the conceptual as well as axiological dependence of episodic nominalizations upon their verbal bases. The basic axiological concordance can be detected in other examples listed above and explicated here according to the following general axiological formulae proposed by Laskowska (1992: 26) and translated into English by the author as follows: X is G/B with respect to V, that reads as X is good/bad with respect to the criterion V, i.e. given values; the author illustrated each formula by providing some examples, that represent the context implying given valuations:



- A. X (to hug/a hug) is mainly positive (+) with respect to hedonistic and emotional/spiritual values, as in *Come on, give me a hug!* or *What I want is to kiss and hug you*, as well as, in given circumstances, vital values – *In the freezing temperature they hugged each other to keep warm.*
- B. X (to kiss/a kiss) is mainly positive (+) with regard to hedonistic and emotional/spiritual values, as in *The lovers kissed each other tenderly* or in *Give me a kiss!*
- C. X (to lick/a lick) is mainly positive (+) with regard to hedonistic values, as in *A baby's licking a chocolate bar* or *I would love a lick of your ice-cream.*
- D. X (to fall/a fall) is mainly negative with respect to vital as well as hedonistic values, as in the examples: *I slipped on the ice and fell*, *John sustained serious injuries after a fall from his horse.*

It is significant to note that the valuations presented above are implied by main uses of given verbs and nouns in everyday English; hence they have pragmatic character.

The axiological concordance, as it was presented above, seems to occur frequently particularly in case of episodic nominalizations which inherit the cognitive scene and consequently axiological load from the verb they are derived from. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity it must be repeated that the semantic axiological properties of episodic nominalizations may be affected by the syntactic and/or textual context – the issue, which needs further analysis.

2.2. Axiological discordance generated by the Verb-to-Noun conversion

Some verbs and nouns derived from them by means of Verb-to-Noun conversion (V→N), though semantically related to each other and one being subordinate to the other, tend to be used in different contexts, which impose upon them different axiological properties. The problem discussed here is exemplified in the table, in which sentences, selected from the material of the axiological analysis, illustrate contexts in which respondents were most likely to place given lexemes:

Table 2. Axiological discordance

Verbs	Deverbal Nouns
SMOKE	
I will never smoke again. To smoke is to be stupid. I smoke as a form of civil disobedience. She smokes four packs a day. It's very unhealthy to smoke. It is forbidden to smoke in all public places in Ireland.	Let's go have a smoke. I am going to have a smoke. Have a smoke! During the break several employees went outside for a smoke. He's gone outside for a smoke. I always like to have a smoke with my pint.

Verbs	Deverbal Nouns
BITE	
That dog tried to bite me! I was bitten by a wasp. The dog bites when it's angry. John was bitten by a dog and needed medical attention. His sarcasm bit; she was very offended.	This cake is delicious – would you like a bite? May I have a bite of your chocolate bar? We took a bite out of the apple. Jane and Mary met at lunch time and went for a bite to eat.
HAUNT	
The memory of that day haunts me even now. The ghost haunted the vaults of Edinburgh. Sometimes when people recollect about places they used to frequent they refer to the places they used to haunt.	They're at their favourite haunt. The marshes are a haunt for sea birds. The Star and Garter is one of his old haunts. A favourite haunt of mine is the old dinner. The pub has been a haunt of mine for some time.
DIVE	
She dived into the pool. In the local swimming pool there are spring boards that the people can use to dive. They went on holiday to the Barrier Reef and dived for pearls. I like to dive.	Profits have taken a dive since October. David Beckham took a dive in the penalty area and was sent off. The place is nothing but a dive. The plane took a dive. That was a beautiful synchronized dive. The dive went really well and we even saw some dolphins.
RUN	
To run is a serious way to keep fit. He ran the 5000 metres in a record time. I have asthma, so I cannot run for a long time. I always have to run for the bus. I ran away from the angry bull. Why is it that only creeps ran for public office? Bush ran for presidency again.	He's out for a run. When people are serious about keeping fit they usually go for a run. The athletes warmed up with a run round the track. The Broadway musical had a long run before finally ending. She broke into a run.

As it was mentioned in the section on theoretical assumptions, the axiological discordance concerns in the present paper axiological properties of verbs and nouns which are acquired by them in the majority of contexts, which justifies its pragmatic character.

The pragmatics of a lexeme *smoke*, i.e. the reply to the question how and in which contexts it tends to be used by speakers, embraces the prototypical case of axiological pragmatic discordance between verbal and nominal uses of a lexeme. The lexeme *smoke* in its verbal function is more likely to appear in contexts which make it refer to vital values than its nominal derivative *a smoke* understood as an act of smoking. Out of a random selection of 50 most frequent uses of the verb *smoke* from the *British National Corpus*, 33 uses refer to negative contexts.



In case of the nominal *a smoke*, in turn, out of 50 uses only 25 were taken into account, since others were specifying the meaning of *a smoke* not as an act of smoking, the sense derived from the verb, but a product of a fire. Out of those 25 uses 19 refer to positive contexts highlighting positive hedonistic aspect of smoking. Since life constitutes the point of reference to distinguish vital values, everything that destroys or endangers life bears negative axiological charge, while everything that protects or strengthens life evokes positive associations. The verb *smoke* shows marked tendency to be associated with contexts, which depict situations negative for vital and social values, which is most directly expressed in sentences such as the following: *It's very unhealthy to smoke, It is estimated that for every cigarette you smoke you shorten your life span by 5 min.* (EB1 1681) or *Children who smoke are more susceptible to coughs...* (EBY 233). Besides medical context, the negative connotations of the verb *smoke* result from the domain of social rules and conventions to be broken, which can be noticed in sentences such as: *It is forbidden to smoke in all public places in Ireland, I smoke as a form of civil disobedience, Sorry, sorry does your mum know you smoke?* (KP4 359), *You smoke! She said in horror* (JYB 890). Negative uses of the verb *smoke* can be also justified by BALANCE schema, that was proposed by Johnson (1987, quoted in Krzeszowski 1997: 126), according to which, as Krzeszowski (1997) states, Balance is Plus and Imbalance is Minus. Such a schematic imbalance can mean an excessive number of something and it is implied in sentences such as: *You smoke too much, Snorers either drink too much, smoke too much or eat too much.*

The nominal *a smoke* (understood as an act of smoking), in turn, tends to evoke positive or rather positive connotations, because in the majority of contexts it acquires positively charged hedonistic values which are highlighted, i.e. elevated to the level of the cognitive salience, e.g. *Let's have a smoke, I always like to have a smoke with my pint, Give my friend a smoke.* The examples show that positive hedonistic values ascribed to the noun *a smoke* in the sense of an instantaneous act of smoking make it occur in tentative suggestions and offers, e.g. *Let's go have a smoke, Have a smoke!, Do you fancy a smoke.* The nominal *a smoke* constitutes in the cited examples a positively charged landmark (LM) that is a source of pleasure for the trajector (TR), i.e. a person who takes part in smoking. The positive load of *having a smoke* corresponds to the following schema provided by Krzeszowski's (1997) Fundamental Axiological Matrix: TR (+) into LM (+) = (+), which depicts positive relations between two salient participants of a cognitive scene – in the present case a person and act of smoking, which is perceived with respect to hedonistic values. For the sake of clarity it ought to be repeated that the positive charge of landmark, i.e. *a smoke* as an act of smoking, stems from highlighting its positive aspects with regard to hedonistic values and hiding negative aspects with respect to vital values, which can be also noticed in various examples discussed below.

The axiological discordance between the verb *bite* and nominal *a bite* is also justified by their different uses. *Bite* as a verb shows stronger tendency to appear

in negative contexts than its nominal counterpart *a bite*. Out of 50 most frequent uses provided by *The British National Corpus* 30 uses were negative, 6 positive and 14 uses rather neutral. The majority of contexts in which the verb *bite* occurs makes it bear meanings paraphrased as ‘to hurt somebody/something by teeth/sting’ or ‘to hurt one in general’ e.g. *That dog tried to bite me!*, *I was bitten by a wasp*, *The dog bites when it’s angry*. Consequently, the verb *bite* used in the sense mentioned above evokes negative connotations with regard to vital values, for in the majority of contexts it refers to the domain of actions aimed to hurt somebody and not from the domain of FOOD, where *to bite* means to consume food. Consequently, Krzeszowski’s (1997) schema: TR(–), a dangerous entity, into LM (here usually a human being) justifies the negative charge of the verb *bite* in a great deal of contexts. The action of biting in the contexts under discussion leads to destruction of a canonical state of some entity, i.e. to bite somebody means to make him/her suffer, feel bad and hurt.

Contrary to the verb *to bite*, the nominal *a bite* tends to refer more frequently to the domain of FOOD than to the very action of biting/stinging somebody/something, e.g.: *Do you feel like having a bite to eat*, *May I have a bite of your chocolate bar?*, *We took a bite out of the apple*. Out of 50 most frequent uses of the nominal *a bite* coming from the *British National Corpus*, 26 were positive, 12 negative and 12 rather neutral. The nominal *a bite* usually designates a small amount of food to taste or something to eat in general. That is why a bite (of something) usually bears positive load and call up hedonistic values coming from the sense of taste. The nominal *a bite* constitutes a landmark (LM) that the TR (a person) comes in touch with and thus the whole relation arise from the schema: TR (+), usually a human being, into LM (+), something to taste/eat = positively charged relations.

The axiological discordance can be also pinpointed in various contexts between lexical items such as *to dive* vs. *a dive* and *to run* vs. *a run*, *to haunt* vs. *a haunt*, which results from the various cognitive domains those items can refer to and consequently from the variety of entities they profile within given cognitive domains. Since the pairs of items presented in the present paragraph bear in a great deal of contexts metaphorical meaning, they will be thoroughly accounted for in the subsequent chapter the main objective of which concerns axiological results of metaphorical extensions within Verb-to-Noun conversion (V→N).

### 3. The axiological outcomes of metaphorical extensions which draw on V→N conversion

Apart from a cognitive domain, to which a given lexical item refers and relations between trajector (TR) and landmark (LM), i.e. the participants of the cognitive

scene evoked by a lexical item, the axiological properties of deverbal nominals also depend on the character of semantic extensions as a result of which the nominals are derived from their verbal base, i.e. the semantic extensions can be either literal or metaphorical. The metaphorical extensions draw on ascribing some features of one entity to the other entity. That is to say, metaphorical extensions, as Langacker (1991) asserts, consist in recognizing certain correspondences between given concepts, one of which refers to more basic usually physical domain, i.e. *source domain* and the other one relates to some abstract domain, i.e. *target domain*, which is illustrated here by correspondence between concepts evoked by phrases such as *a blow to his head* and *a blow to his ego* respectively. The former noun phrase (NP) relates to a human body, *his head*, as its conceptual domain and the latter refers to some abstract domain of human self, i.e. *his ego*. The metaphorical semantic extension can be also noticed within pairs such as *to dive* vs. *a dive*, *to haunt* vs. *a haunt*, *to run* vs. *a run*.

Relations between verbal and nominal senses of the lexeme *haunt* constitute (in given contexts) another example of the axiological discordance resulted from metaphorical extension. The respondents used the lexeme *haunt* as a verb more frequently in negative contexts that describe some spooky and mysterious situation than in positive contexts. The nominal *a haunt*, in turn, was used in the vast majority of positive contexts which make it bear the meaning of a place liked and frequently visited by someone/something, which is illustrated by sentences such as *They're at their favourite haunt* or *The marshes are a haunt for sea birds*. The senses of the nominal *a haunt*, i.e. the sense mentioned above as well as the sense concerning an entity that comes to one's mind frequently, e.g. *The Star and Garter is one of his old haunts*, represent a kind of metaphorical semantic extension. Since metaphorical extensions draw on comprehension of one entity through understanding the other, regarding a pub as *a favourite haunt* for someone depends on recognizing certain metaphorical similarity between place that is haunted and a place frequently visited by someone. The similarity under discussion concerns the frequency of visiting some place or thinking of something, i.e. a haunted house is frequently visited by ghosts, while a place regarded as a haunt for someone is frequently visited by him or her, because it is assessed by them as positive one. That is to say, a place regarded as a haunt tends to acquire positive connotations concerning mainly hedonistic and social values. That can be explicated by the following axiological formula: X (*a haunt*, as a place) is mainly positive (+) with respect to hedonistic/social values, e.g. *The pub has been a haunt of mine for some time*, which implies that this pub is a nice place to spend some time in.

The last illustration presented in the table above concerns the lexeme *dive*. The nominal *a dive* tends to appear in the material used for the analysis more frequently in contexts that make it bear a metaphorical meaning than its verbal counterpart *to dive*, which involves axiological consequences. The comprehen-

sion of the metaphorical extensions of the lexeme *dive* depends on the basic, literal domain it draws upon, i.e. the domain of downward movements, as well as on superimposing the profile of the process denoted by verb *to dive* upon more abstract entity referring either to economics' domain *Profits have taken a dive since October*, or to the domain of areas *The place is nothing but a dive* and the domain of sport *David Beckham took a dive in the penalty area and was sent off*. The nominal *a dive* both in its literal and metaphorical meaning draws upon the downward movement of a trajector (TR) into some landmark (LM). The only difference concerns the entities elaborating trajector (TR) and landmark (LM); that is to say, in case of the lexeme *dive* in its prototypical literal sense the trajector (TR) is elaborated by a person and the landmark (LM) by some water area, both being prototypically positive. The trajector (TR) and landmark (LM) of the lexeme *dive* in its metaphorical senses are elaborated, in turn, by some entities characteristic for given domains, which is clarified below.

The lexeme *dive* referring to domain of economics often takes a positive trajector (TR) elaborated by some abstract entities, e.g. *profits*, *rates*, that can take a dive, i.e. go downwards to some negative landmark (LM) conceptually elaborated by some economic state to be avoided. Such a situation complies with the UP/ DOWN schema (Johnson 1987, cited in Krzeszowski 1997: 113) because a positive trajector (TR), e.g. *profits*, conceptually leaves some positive economic state, e.g. being valuable, and moves down to some negative state, e.g. being less valuable, worth paying attention to. The UP/DOWN schema is here compatible with the FAMA (Krzeszowski 1997: 134) according to which the situation where TR (+) (an entity being UP) moves into LM (–) (an entity being DOWN) results in being evaluated negatively. The same UP/DOWN schema and FAMA: TR (–) in LM (+) justify the negative economic values of the nominal *dip in a dip in sales*, *fall in a fall in wages*, *drop in a drop in salary*, etc.

The reverse situation can be noticed in examples such as *a fall in prices*, *drop in the crime rate*, where the nominals *a fall* and *drop* bear positive values, which results from their modifiers, i.e. the prepositional phrases *in prices* and *in the crime rate* which call up the schema: TR (–) into LM (–) equals (+), where TR (–) is elaborated by *fall* and *drop* respectively, and LM(–) refers to prices in the former and crime rates in the latter. The examples presented in the present paragraph also comply with Johnson's (1987, cited in Krzeszowski 1997: 126) BALANCE schema, for the negative entities, i.e. *(high) prices* and *the crime rate* respectively, disappear from some positive state or domain which results in re-establishing some economic balance in the former and social order in the latter.

The examples described in the previous two paragraphs make it clear that the axiological consequences of metaphorical semantic extensions which convert verbs into nouns result from elaborating TR and LM by entities different from those evoked by a given lexeme in its literal, prototypical sense as well as from the cogni-

tive domain those entities relate to. The similar situation can be observed in case of the lexeme *run* which in its nominal sense can denote not only an act of running, in which a person is a prototypical trajector (TR), but also a period of something, e.g. *The Broadway musical had a long run before finally ending*, where the trajector (TR) is elaborated by a performance, i.e. *the Broadway musical*, that is regarded as something positive, valuable and desirable, which, in turn, justifies its long run. As it was mentioned above, the metaphorical extensions give rise to some specialized meanings of the nominals in question, which requires further explanation and thus constitutes the main issue to raise in the subsequent point.

#### 4. The specialized meaning of the deverbal suffixless nouns

Deverbal suffixless nouns possess a network of interrelated senses, which show various degree of prototypicality and conventionality. Some of the senses seem highly specialized and conventionalized and their semantic axiological properties depend on cognitive domains they refer to and the entities they profile within these domains, which is illustrated here by given senses of the nominal *the catch*.

The potential axiological charge of the nominal *the catch* can be established with reference to the following domains illustrated here by examples from the *Collins Cobuild Advanced Learners English Dictionary* (2003): 1) *the catch* as a game for children consisting either in throwing and catching a ball or chasing each other bears positive (+) axiological charge with respect to hedonistic value (the game as an enjoyable activity), vital value (the game requires movement which is healthy), emotional/spiritual values (children seem happy playing that game which is positive for their psychological development); 2) *the catch* as the amount of fish caught, as in *The catch included one fish over 18 pounds*, tends to bear positive (+) axiological charge with regard to pragmatic/economic value, which is justified by the GOAL subschema (the aim of fishing has been achieved); 3) *the catch* as some concealed difficulty, as in *The catch is, that you work for your supper and the food and accommodation can be very basic*, bears negative (–) axiological charge with reference to a wide range of values specified by a context. For the sake of generalization, however, *the catch* (as some problem) pertains to the negative pole of the axiological scale with respect to pragmatic/economic values (hidden difficulties are not convenient to deal with), which implies the BLOCKAGE schema (Johnson 1987, cited in Krzeszowski 1997) according to which BLOCKAGE (here understood as some problem) is MINUS and NO BLOCKAGE is PLUS (Krzeszowski 1997: 129).

The present remarks only illustrate the issue of specialized meanings and thus require further analysis, which is beyond the scope of the paper.

## 5. Concluding remarks

The present paper shows that Verb-to-Noun conversion results not only in the change of a verbal profile of a lexical entity into a nominal one, but it also modifies the semantic, pragmatic as well as axiological properties of items which undergo conversion. The axiological properties of given senses of verbal bases and nominal suffixless derivatives depend on the following factors: 1. the conceptual domains to which given senses refer, 2. entities profiled within cognitive domains, 3. the character of semantic extension, i.e. literal or metaphorical one, and consequently the properties of the *source* and *target* domain, as well as 4. the salience of given values associated with verbal and nominal senses of lexical items, i.e. the cognitive prominence of value judgements imposed upon senses of given verbs and nouns by syntactic contexts in the majority of their uses. Those issues were only outlined in the present paper, the main purpose of which was to signal complexity of problems enumerated above, and, thus, they require further in-depth analysis.

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