Abstract: Situated at the interface between grammar, semantics and discourse, the cornerstone of the cognitivist approach to language and grammar, the paper presents some interrelations between these fields. As an illustration, the author analyzes some aspects of the morphological category of Polish diminutive. Like in other Slavic languages, it is highly productive; Polish diminutivises adjectives, adverbs, pronouns and verbs, but it is the noun that undergoes the process most easily and most frequently. The analysis focuses on the most productive type of nominal structures, i.e., synthetic diminutives. The discussion is inspired by Ronald Langacker’s cognitive grammar, and it is within this framework that the analysis presented in the paper is carried out, with the aim of describing cognitive processes that underlie, and give rise to, the polysemy of diminutive structures. Analysed from the cognitivist point of view, diminutivisation can be seen as making use of the same basic cognitive mechanisms that are operative in other areas of language production and use: metonymy, metaphor and blending.

Keywords: basic level, category prototype, cognitive mechanism, conceptual integration, polysemy, entrenchment, metonymy, metaphor, nominal diminutive, diminutive suffix

Chcę mówić do ciebie tak, jak ludzie mówią do dzieci, które dobrze znają.
(Wierzbicka, “Prototypy” 74)

Introduction

Professor Jan Cygan’s work covers a wide spectrum of topics pertaining to language or individual languages. A prominent philologist, he specialised in English, but considered his native Polish to be of equal interest to a grammarian. The scope of his work spans over all levels of language, from phonetic and phonological...
characteristics of individual sounds to phonological processes, to stress patterns and sentence intonation, to properties of alliterative verse. His interest in historical linguistics prompted fascinating comparisons between English and/or Polish and such languages as Greek, Latin or Old Germanic. Even though he did not carry out his research within the framework of cognitive linguistics (most of his work actually precedes its full development), some of his contributions to the theory of language show striking cognitivist insights. To quote just one example, in a paper on prepositions, he discusses their grammar from the nearly canonical cognitivist perspective (Cygan,”Kilka uwag”). Contributing to the monograph dedicated to his memory is an honour, but—in view of those achievements—also a challenge that makes one feel woefully inadequate.

In the present paper, I decided to focus on the interface between grammar, semantics and discourse, the interrelation which is present—albeit implicitly—in Jan Cygan’s thought about language and which constitutes the cornerstone of the cognitivist approach to language and grammar. As an illustration, I will deal with the morphological category of the diminutive. It might then be appropriate to begin with John Taylor’s statement: “Since English lacks a diminutive, I shall take most of my examples from Italian” (Taylor, *Cognitive* 173). Mine will come exclusively from Polish. Moreover, although the supposed absence of the category in English is usually taken for granted and treated as a piece of common wisdom, like some other linguists, I am inclined to disagree. I will not challenge this opinion here (but cf., e.g., Schneider, *Diminutives*; Lockyer, “The Emotive”); however, at this point, it might be worthwhile to mention that diminutives are commonly believed to create grave problems to translators working on Polish-English and English-Polish (literary) translation. The former group find it difficult to provide proper equivalents, while the latter are believed not to use the equivalents frequently enough (c.f., e.g. Lockyer, “Such a Tiny”; Bialy, *Polish and English*; Wierzbicka, *Cross-Cultural* 25 ff.).

As is well known, in Polish, like in other Slavic languages, the category of the diminutive is highly productive. Polish diminutivises adjectives (e.g. *mały* “small” → *malutki, maleńki, maluśki* → very small), adverbs (e.g. *szybko* “quickly”—*szybcieutko* → “very quickly”), pronouns (*taki* “such” → *takusienki* “such.DIM”), and occasionally even verbs (*plać*—“cry” → *plakusiać* → “cry.DIM”). However, the most productive category of diminutives involves nouns and noun suffixation; analytic formations are limited to cases that are discussed briefly in Section 8 below. In the text which follows, I shall focus on the most productive types of structures, i.e. synthetic nominal diminutives.

1. The state of art

Even though some linguists claim that research on the diminutive demonstrates the “niche character of the field” (Solak, *Natalia Długosz* 219, transl. E. T.), Polish and/
or Slavic diminutives have been investigated by many scholars and looked at from different theoretical perspectives. Works written in the structuralist vein focus upon the rich morphology and offer long, although usually rather inconclusive, lists of diminutive suffixes. Indeed, for Polish, the numbers—e.g. those reached by following Natalia Długosz’s comparative analysis (Długosz, “Porównanie”)—are quite impressive: seven suffixes for nouns of masculine gender, a further seven for feminine gender, eight for neuter gender and six for pluralia tantum. Works that focus on semantics and/or pragmatics of diminutives often offer valuable insights. Thus, for instance, Heltberg (“O deminutiwach”) makes (implicit) reference to the inherent fuzziness of borders that separate individual senses of polysemous diminutives, while Jurafsky (“Universal Tendencies”) classifies diminutive meanings in terms of radial categories, which grasp the inherent polysemy of diminutive lexemes. The polysemous character of the meaning of diminutives is the matter of general consensus, as is the conviction that diminutives do not have to convey the notion of smallness (cf., e.g., Lockyer, “The Emotive”; Dressler and Merlini Barbaresi, “Morphopragmatics”). With reference to this last property, most authors emphasise the emotional load of diminutive lexemes and the role of the pragmatic context of their use (cf., e.g., Bialy, Polish and English; Długosz, “Porównanie”). What is lacking in those analyses is a coherent theoretical framework that would embrace the wide array of senses; in this respect, the most promising proposal is that made by John Taylor as part of his cognitive study on linguistic categorization (Taylor, Cognitive, Ch. 9.2.). Taylor’s discussion of the diminutive was inspired by Ronald Langacker’s cognitive grammar, and it is within this framework that the analysis presented further in this paper is carried out, with the aim of describing the cognitive processes that underlie, and give rise to, the polysemy of diminutive structures.

2. Discrete vs. fuzzy

Langacker’s cognitive grammar has challenged basic tenets of classical and generative structuralism. In general, the most fundamental requirement that conditions modelling language and grammar from the point of view of the cognitive theory of language opposes the main assumption on which alternative models are based; that is, the postulate of sharp categorial distinctions and discrete category membership. In view of the present subject, three basic tenets of pre-cognitivist structuralist models of language and grammar seem particularly vulnerable.

First, the cognitive model erases the clear-cut border which—ever since the appearance of de Saussure’s theory—has separated diachrony from synchrony as two radically different approaches to the study of language. Abolishing the distinction, or replacing it with the “diachrony within synchrony” approach (cf. Kellermann and Morrisey, Diachrony), makes it possible to appreciate the relevance of etymological origins of language for synchronic studies as well as to consider
metaphorization, the basic cognitive mechanism of human mind, as a process developing in time and going through consecutive stages. For Jurafsky, various meanings of a diminutive do constitute a radial category, with peripheral meanings (associative) clustered around a prototype that makes the core of the category. But the picture is rather static, showing the stable result of a process, while it is the latter that an analyst of cognitivist persuasion tends to focus upon: metaphorization is seen as a process, rather than a product, with particular members of categories changing under the influence of changeable linguistic and extralinguistic (cultural, situational) contexts.

Second, challenging the existence of a precise demarcation line between semantics and pragmatics—even though the challenge makes the linguist’s position rather uncomfortable—allows to account for “associative”, “connotative” or “emotive” elements of meaning in terms of the crucial difference between meanings that are objective (i.e. shared by a speech community and found in language dictionaries) and subjective (i.e. context sensitive, such as is to be found in encyclopaedias). Predictably, the borderline between these two is fuzzy too, although coherent analyses facilitate operationalization.

Third, there is no clear-cut distinction between the emotional load of words, diminutives in particular, and their conceptual (or intellectual) meaning. As in the other two cases, these elements merge, in differing proportions.

The three types of fuzziness underlie the workings of three basic cognitive processes that condition the creation and the use of diminutives in the same measure as they condition the creation and use of other manifestations of language. Metonymy (Section 4) involves relations between concepts within a single cognitive domain, the *pars pro toto* relation being the most frequent and most familiar type. Metaphor (Section 5) involves juxtaposing elements taken from two or more cognitive domains. Conceptual integration (Section 6), the last and the most general of the three, reveals the ability of human mind to make different spheres of cognition overlap, giving rise to novel conceptualizations.

3. Category prototype

In agreement with the cognitivist principle of embodied meaning, the fundamental property of language is its functioning as reflection of embodied experience. The basic experience of humans involves direct contacts of their bodies with the physical reality that surrounds them and with which they interact; this is reflected in ways that people think and speak about the world. Part of that experience is the perception of properties of physical objects, and one such property is the ability to perceive and assess physical size. It comes as an obvious consequence that the prototype of the linguistic category “diminutive” would enter the language to serve as a label for a diminutive physical object; thus *kotek* “cat.DIM” is a “small
On the Diminutivisation of Polish Nouns: Small Is Not Always Beautiful

cat” and slonik “elephant.DIM” is “a small elephant”. But the reality that people experience is mediated by what the human beings know about the world, by what this reality is for them, or what it seems to be from their particular point of view. Thus the diminutive slonik refers to an entity that is conceived as “small”, even though in absolute terms it is “big”, because the assessment is made relative to other animals and other objects that we know. Therefore, in fact, slonik stands for “an elephant that we judge to be small as elephants go”. This pragmatic component is obviously relevant to the semantics of diminutives.

4. Metonymy

Again, part of our basic experience is experiencing “wholes” as being bigger than “parts of wholes”. Thus, it is natural that the pars pro toto metonymy should underlie the concept of diminutiveness. Equally natural is the fact that a great number of entities which people do not bother to count, because they consider them to be too small, too similar to one another and/or too insignificant for individuation, will be conceptualized as homogeneous (or, in cognitivist parlance, as substances) and referred to by uncountable (mass) nouns; for instance, słoma “straw” or trawa “grass”. When necessary (in terms of effective communication, which is the main purpose of linguistic activity), individual elements that comprise the substance will be referred to with countable nouns: then they are conceptualized as individual, and individuated, objects, small in relation to the mass they are parts of, hence słomka “a straw.DIM” or trawka “a (blade of) grass.DIM”. Perhaps less obviously, the fruit called gruszka (“a pear.DIM”) is conceptualized as a part of the tree on which it grows, with both entities being perceived as countable. Significantly, notwithstanding the substance-to-object shift, such diminutives are still prototypes of their respective categories.

5. Metaphor

As is well known, the regularity that underlies the process of metaphorization is defined as the transfer “from the ‘real’ physical or spatial world or the ideational domain to create more qualitative, evaluative, and textual meanings” (Jurafsky, “Universal Tendencies” 541). The definition grasps semantic and pragmatic characteristics of the typical metaphor, although the border that separates metaphor from metonymy is yet another instance of “fuzziness”: it is difficult, or impossible, to say where exactly one cognitive domain ends and another one begins. Therefore, there are expressions which rest in the conceptual space situated “in between” metonymy and metaphor—in a seminal paper by Louis Goossens (“Metaphtonymy”), they are described as metaphtonymies. As a linguistic category, diminutives are no
exception. The word *råczka* (lit. “little hand”) is a case in point. Primarily a label for “a small hand” (a category prototype, cf. above), with the prominent notion of reduction in physical size, it is also used to mean “something used to handle something else”—as is its English equivalent “handle”. While English does not use a formal diminutive, other cognitive aspects are the same in both languages: the notions “a small hand” and “a handle”, although different referentially, share the crucial concept of grasping (the prototypical object of the activity being a physical, three-dimensional object). Other properties do not appear in the name: presumably, they had not been considered important enough.

In both languages, the relationship is metonymical: a case described above as the *pars pro toto* relation and the conceptualization of size that is inherently connected with it. Interestingly, in Polish, metaphorical meaning, rather than the metonymy, prevails in the idiomatic expression *złota rączka* (lit. “golden hand.DIM”, fig. “handyman”, “jack-of-all-trades”), where the metonymy (hand conceptualized as a [crucial] part of a person) is accompanied by metaphorical extension of meaning: the main property of gold is its value (metonymy), and the value of gold is (like) the value of manual skills (metaphor). The above example illustrates metonymical and/or metaphorical relationships between countable objects; analogous mechanisms operate on substances. An example of the latter is *mleczko* (*kosmetyczne*) (lit. “milk.DIM”, fig. “lotion”), which does not involve the concept of reduction in size (that is, it does not mean “a small [amount] of milk”), but rather in the number of properties: *mleczko* (“lotion”) is” somewhat like milk, but not quite so”.

Linguists and psychologists who describe the process of metaphorization from the cognitivist perspective agree that the crossover between the domains of space and time, with time being conceptualized in terms of the cognitively simpler domain of space, gives rise to one of the most fundamental conceptual metaphors. Since neutral temporal expressions show the domain of space—*chwila* (“a while”)—as an “object existing in the domain of time”, it could be reasonably expected that diminutives might conform with the same procedure. This is indeed the case: *chwilka* (“a while.DIM”, “a short while”), conceptualized as “a small object existing in the domain of time”, is one of the many examples.

Words that in traditional grammatical descriptions are referred to as “abstract nouns” undergo processes analogous to those described for concrete objects and substances. As an example, we might consider:

(1) Osobiste *ambicjyjki* wyraståją ponad sprawy Polski. (WO, 13 Nov. 2021)

Personal aspirations.DIM exceed Polish causes.

As in the examples given above, the motivations referred to in (1) are “somewhat like real aspirations, but not quite so”. In the internet corpora *ambicja* (“aspiration”) collocates, among others, with adjectives *wysoka* (“high”) or *szlachetna*.

---

1 To mark sources of some examples, the following abbreviations will be used: WO—Wysokie Obcasy weekly; GW—Gazeta Wyborcza daily; DF—Duży Format weekly.
On the Diminutivisation of Polish Nouns: Small Is Not Always Beautiful

(“noble”): in our reality, having aspirations is a good thing. Therefore reducing them either in size or in number of properties must be considered as referring to something of a value “smaller than positive”, cf. the internet collocation *niewielkie ambicje* (“low aspirations”). “Small aspirations” are not beautiful; far from it: they do not deserve respect.


The emotive meaning component of the diminutive is recognized by all researchers—irrespective of the theoretical approach chosen and linguistic materials analysed. “Small is beautiful”, many sing in unison, but at the same time, the majority do not fail to notice that this is not always the case.

Typically, diminutives are associated with “baby talk”, or, more generally, with the world of children (Wierzbicka, “Podwójne”; Jurafsky, “Universal Tendencies”). The advocates of this interpretation argue that, on one hand, children are small (literally) and beautiful (as objects of affection); on the other hand, we would like to make the world less intimidating for children via its (metaphorical) reduction. This could be perhaps described in terms of iconicity: diminutive words reflect a diminutive world. Or, within a diminutive world, the distance between interlocutors is naturally small, and the (literal and/or metaphorical) reduction of distance—a condition for intimacy—corresponds to the use of “small” words.

The question arises why diminutives, characteristic for child’s speech and expressing affection, should become wicked, derogatory or downright offensive when used outside situations that typically call for “baby talk”. It seems that it is here that the theory of conceptual blending should provide the linguists with useful instruments. Consider:

(2) A na drugie danko, buraczki pan łaskawy życzy czy ogóreczki?
   And for the main course.DIM, do you wish beet roots.DIM or cucumbers.
   DIM, my good sir?

   The waiter who addresses an adult customer with (2) “reduces” their world to the diminutive size. At the same time, the reduction of social distance (cf., e.g., Schneider, *Diminutives* 15; Gorzycka, “A Note” 151) is supposed to create a friendly atmosphere. The customer may fall for it, but he may also feel offended when they blend their current mental space (two adult actors) with that involving an adult–child interaction—a situation that they may not be willing to appreciate.

   When used with the intention to offend the interlocutor, the reduction strategy can be purposefully denigrating and scornful:

(3) Dziewczynko, odejdź stąd! Zasłoń nosiek!
   Girl.DIM go away! Cover your nose.DIM! (GW, 28 Oct. 2020)

or, as a proof that English DOES have (a couple of) diminutives:
Get lost, girlie! Cover that little nose of yours!

An MP in the Polish parliament addressed (3) to an opposition lady politician. Even outside the political context, the latter had full right to feel offended by the speaker’s reducing the world of a parliament debate and her own position in it to the situation when a wicked little girl pokes her nose in adult people’s affairs and does not care to wear face mask in the middle of the pandemic.

Writer Szymon Twardoch performs a similar act when commenting on the behaviour of a group of Polish politicians:

(4) [The politicians who are offended by the results of presidential campaign in the US] tupią nóżkami i zaciskają oczka… (DF, 25 Oct. 2021)
stamp their feet.DIM and squeeze shut their eyes.DIM.

The mental space in which nasty children throw a tantrum becomes superimposed on one including adult politicians reacting to a political event of a great significance.

Blends of this kind can become quite complex, as in:

(5) [The president is ] przyssany niczym niemowlę do matczynego cycka partii…
sucking as a baby on the motherly tit.DIM of the party.
W Belwederze nie zasiada głowa państwa, tylko co najwyżej główka. (GW, 3 Sep. 2021)
In the presidential palace does not reside a head of state but at best head. DIM.

In (5), the “child’s space” is very elaborate: a suckling baby, the natural owner of a small head, feeds at his mother’s breast. The agent within the other space is the president, metaphorically, the head of state. Reducing the size of the head, and as a result, diminishing the metaphorical size of the presidential office, gives to (5) its stinging satirical colouring. As a marginal remark, consider the analogous effect of adjectival diminutives:

(6) [Dziennikarze] przymykali oko na wiele podlutkich tekstów. (GW, 15 Nov. 2021)
[Some journalists] turned a blind eye to many vile.DIM texts.

The texts mentioned in (6) were podle (“vile”), but ostensibly, the villainy was small, which might justify disregarding it. By default (“small is beautiful”), the property could actually make the texts acceptable, if not nice to read. While it might be taken to tally with the observation that the use of a diminutive can be motivated by the speaker’s wish to soften a negative emotion (cf. Lockyer, “The Emotive”), disregarding things that are podle, or actually like them, calls for negative evaluation: “turning a blind eye” to vile things is bad. The two assessments clash, and (6) becomes a case of irony. In her important paper on English diminutives (believed to exist, after all), Dorota Gorzycka states that “the same diminutive formation can have positive or negative connotations, depending on the context in
which it occurs, but never at the same time” (Gorzycka, “A Note” 155). While the first part of the statement is obviously true, the ironic use challenges the second part. However, an attempt at substantiating this claim would require going beyond the limits of the present paper. At this point, one last example must suffice. Telling a journalist about his work and social status, a young man says:

(7) Prowadziłem [w Gdańsku] pub Fantomatyka VR: piwka, gierki, imprezki dla sektora IT. (DF, 8 Nov. 2021)

I ran [in Gdańsk] the pub Fantomatyka VR: beers.DIM, games.DIM, parties. DIM for the IT section.

In fact, talking to us in (7) are two voices. The customers talk about their activities in the pub with affection, while the young man who organizes the event for them considers the job as professionally degrading.

7. (Basic) level shifts

In the historical development, some diminutives become basic level terms and lose the diminutive meaning—in either the literal or extended sense. The outcomes of this process vary. When the neutral item becomes obsolete, the formally diminutive form may achieve a neutral non-diminutive meaning, as in: *klatka (“cage”); originally small, now of unspecified size) from *kleć “cage”. The formerly diminutive noun can be raised to the basic level, where it co-exists with the neutral item, the two having cognate but differing meanings, as in kamera (“camera”) vs. kamerka (lit. “small camera”, webcam), or szkoła (“school”) vs. szkółka (lit. “small school”, a nursery garden). The double entendre, or ambiguity resulting from the use of the ex-diminutive in its original diminutive sense, is resolved by context—linguistic, situational or cultural.

Neutral ex-diminutives can give rise to formations situated both below and above the basic level, as in woda “water” → wódka (“water.DIM”, originally “little water”, spirits) → wódeczka (lit. small little water, voddie), or wódka → wóda (“little water.AUG, liquor).  

8. Analytic diminutivisation

In Polish, a language with very rich morphology, analytic diminutives are—predictably—rather infrequent. They seem to be context-sensitive and motivated by—more or less ad hoc—pragmatic needs. Thus, beside the synthetic formal diminutive słonik (“elephant.DIM”, cf. Section 1 above), there exists the analytic phrase maly słoń (“small elephant”). Free from the emotive component, it results

---

2 I owe this example to Wolfgang Dressler, personal communication.
from mere assessment of size. Analytic diminutives are more literal than their synthetic counterparts; hence, subtle differences in meaning. Thus, *słonik* is small as elephants go, while *mały słoń* is just smaller than other members of the same category (cf. e.g Gorzycka, “A Note” 155). One might perhaps say that synthetic diminutives categorize by prototype, and analytical ones by schema. Both types of diminutivisation can be mixed, creating chains as: *słoń* (“elephant” → *mały słoń* (“small elephant”)) → *słonik* (“little elephant”) → *mały słonik* (“small little elephant”). A cursory survey of English translation equivalents demonstrates the use of “small” for analytic and “little” for synthetic diminutivisation.

9. Entrenchment and decomposition

In agreement with the cognitivist model of language, which holds that in a grammar, general rules exist besides a structured inventory of linguistic units, frequently used (or entrenched) formations—notably such diminutives that are raised to the basic level—are not decomposed in the process of language production or reception. In other words, they are used as undivided wholes. Some linguists refute this assumption, arguing that it finds no definite affirmation in psycholinguistic research (cf. e.g. Wolfgang Dressler’s view, personal communication), but it is precisely basic level ex-diminutives that are a case in point. On the other hand, the fact that they seem to be stored as part of mental lexicon of a competent speaker does not preclude the very speaker’s conscious realization of the role of, for instance, diminutivising suffixes in their mother tongue.

The focus of the present paper is not on morphology, but it could be useful to suggest that it might be just this knowledge that makes native speakers’ reluctant in using the suffix *-ka* with masculine nouns and create a feminine noun as part of the ongoing battle of linguistic discrimination of women. Since the suffix *-ka* has a double function, either making non-diminutive feminine nouns or feminine diminutives, Polish speakers tend to protest against such word formation as in *polityk* (“politician.MASC”) → *polityczka* (“politician.FEM”, but also, significantly “politician.FEM+DIM” ). Nobody wants to become “a little lady politician”, although nobody protests against, for instance, being a *nauczycielka* (“teacher.FEM”); due to long and frequent use, the word functions as a non-composed linguistic unit.

The process is not limited to Polish; in a recent conference on diminutives Nicolas Royer-Artuso (“Beyond”) stated that his female French colleagues did not like being called *chercheuses* (lady researchers), though they did not object against visiting their well-entrenched *coiffeuses* (lady hairdressers).
10. Restrictions

The feminine : diminutive opposition invokes the crucial problem of restrictions on (noun) diminutivisation. At this point, it must suffice to propose that these can be formulated on exclusively pragmatic grounds. Recent developments within the theory of linguistic worldview might provide answers to many questions and help to solve numerous problems. Some seem relatively simple: we can form—and use—the diminutive deszcz → deszczyk (“rain” → “slight rain.DIM”) while ocean → oceanek (“ocean” → “little ocean.DIM) could only come to exist in a world different from ours. We can suffer from katar → katarek (“cold” → “little cold.DIM”), but pandemijka (“pandemic.DIM”) can only be a sarcastic judgment of a sceptic’s irresponsible decisions, because this is what we believe things are like in our world.

11. Conclusions

The bibliography given at the end of this paper is only a meagre selection of what has been said about the diminutive and diminutivisation in Polish and English. However, not much has been written on the subject from the cognitivist point of view. The aim of the present paper was to show the potential of the approach. Although the shift of focus from the ready product to the ongoing process makes the linguist’s life more difficult, it opens valuable theoretical perspectives. Diminutivisation can be seen as making use of the same basic cognitive mechanisms that are operative in other areas of language production and use: metonymy, metaphor and blending. Thus, it contributes to a general theory of language, and at the same time makes it possible to provide a comprehensive description of diminutivisation, seen as a cognitive process, instigated and restricted by a broad context of use.

Research on diminutives can turn into a never-ending story. The above discussion does not aspire either to a great depth or to being comprehensive in any sense of the world. It leaves numerous questions unanswered, or even not asked. Why is the diminutive dziewczątko (“little girl.DIM”) neuter, while the neutral word, dziewczyna (“girl”) is rightfully feminine? Why is środeczek (“the very centre.DIM”) more central than środek (“centre”)? What mental spaces intertwine to produce the image of the psychologist Marek Kotański’s home, as remembered by one of his colleagues:


[His] mother and grandmother attended to him and to his father, serving them on tiptoe.DIM, preparing sandwiches.DIM, cakes.DIM and dumpings.DIM

These, like many others, have to be left to furnish future projects.
References


Długosz, N. 2009. “Porównanie wybranych typów słowotwórczych w zakresie rzeczownikowych formacji deminutywnych z różnymi formantami w języku polskim i w języku bułgarskim.” Lingvistica Copernicana 2.2. 273–286.


