Lectiones & Acroases Philosophicae
https://wuwr.pl/laph
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego Sp. z o.o.pl-PLLectiones & Acroases Philosophicae2082-9221Roman Ingarden a metafizyka
https://wuwr.pl/laph/article/view/9198
<![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Roman Ingarden and Metaphysics</strong><br /> <br />Roman Ingarden sees a human person as a power which builds itself up, exists and becomes free by its effort to realize goodness, beauty and truth. In an essay delivered 25 years ago, its author expressed doubt concerning the applicability of Ingarden's ontology to the realization of such an enterprise. In the first place, this is a very dynamic idea of a human person, while Ingarden's ontology, based on the Husserlian analysis of perception, is utterly static. Moreover, Ingarden lays great stress on the existence and importance of values, but is not able to find a place for them in his ontology. His speaking of some 'higher powers' which we sometimes experience, is a rather enigmatic or even euphemistic way of expressing the problem of God by a thinker who in such a strong way accepts the main tenets of the Judeo-Greek understanding of humanity, the very basis of the European culture. To realize goodness one needs to know the truth about it, to accept the intelligibility of the world in which we live. But for the Modernity God's existence is not guaranteed by the intelligibility of being any more but, vice versa, only God could guarantee the intelligibility of being. In this way, Ingarden's idea of a human person presupposes a metaphysics of truth and goodness and a metaphysics of God. Only such a metaphysics can be a sort of a map of the world in which we live, a map indispensable to the enterprise of moving in it in order to realize truth and goodness − the necessary condition, according to Ingarden, of the existence and development of a human person. To make this clear, the author compares the attitude to the problem of God of Friedrich Nietzsche and of Richard Rorty and argues that not the vague hopes of the postmodern thought, but only an effort of building up a <em>culture of love and charity </em>as understood by John Paul II may make the life on this earth better.</p>]]>Andrzej Półtawski
Prawa autorskie (c)
2013-05-212013-05-2152720Husserlowska redukcja transcendentalna wobec redukcji ejdetycznej
https://wuwr.pl/laph/article/view/9199
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Husserl’s transcendental reduction and eidetic reduction </strong><br /><br />The starting point of this article is Tischner’s thesis which says that investigating the relation between the transcendental and eidetic method of description is necessary to solve the problem of the right concept of first philosophy. There are many writings about phenomenological reduction but it is hard to find answer to the question: from where Husserl knows what and how is to reduce? In this article I examine that and other problems as, form example: why Husserl reduces “general thesis of natural attitude” and subsequently level temporal immanence and ideal objects? What is the decisive point? What is a real background of transcendental reduction?</p>Maria Bielawka
Prawa autorskie (c)
2013-05-212013-05-21522132Zagadnienie postaktualności. Z ontologii egzystencjalnej tego, co przeminęło
https://wuwr.pl/laph/article/view/9200
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The problem of post-actuality — ontological inquiry of the past being</strong><br /><br />In his existential ontology Roman Ingarden presents a very interesting and sophisticated characteristics of a real being. This type of being, in his opinion, apart from its present phase, has past and future existence to some extent too. The so called post-actuality or backward ontic derivativeness of real being is something like a somehow weaker existence, deprived of a power of acting. This intriguing idea has quite an interesting exemplification in Polish literature — namely in the prose of Bruno Schulz. Unfortunately, under closer investigation one must admit that the idea of post-actuality as a weaker existence cannot be rendered intelligible.</p>Marek Rosiak
Prawa autorskie (c)
2013-05-212013-05-21523346Descartes i Husserl o zewnętrzności i rozciągłości
https://wuwr.pl/laph/article/view/9201
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Descartes and Husserl about externality and lengthiness</strong><br /><br />The article is dedicated to the analysis of sources and nature of Cartesian concept of externality and its relation with geometrical idea of lengthiness. Cartesian solution is compared with Husserl’s suggestion that geometrical description of the space must be connected with phenomenological description. The examination of Husserl’s conceptions presented in the article shows that he cannot avoid typical modern and Cartesian geometrical vision of externality.</p>Damian Leszczyński
Prawa autorskie (c)
2013-05-212013-05-21524756O mierzeniu części
https://wuwr.pl/laph/article/view/9202
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>The Measuring of Parts</strong><br /><br />Philosophers such as Husserl, Twardowski, Ingarden and others distinguished different types of parts of an object such as possible parts, independent/dependent parts, parts of different order and the extent of the impact of some parts, but also some of these philosophers recognize unity and identity of an object as it’s parts. In this article we propose to identify the different types of parts as a different measures defined on the whole which consists of these parts. We propose to use for this purpose mathematical measure theory and the issue of measurement in quantum mechanics — as examples of good practice in the matter of measuring. Ontological problem of measurement has not been so far sufficiently developed. Our work is aimed at raising some insights which may eventually contribute to the formulation of the precise ontological theory of the measurement of parts of some whole.</p>Bartłomiej Skowron
Prawa autorskie (c)
2013-05-212013-05-21525776Topologia jako zagadnienie dla historii filozofii nauki
https://wuwr.pl/laph/article/view/9203
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Topology as an Issue for History of Philosophy of Science</strong><br /><br />Since antiquity well into the beginnings of the 20th century geometry was a central topic for philosophy. In contrast, most philosophers of science, if they took notice of topology at all, considered it as an abstruse subdiscipline of mathematics lacking philosophical inter est. Here it is argued that this neglect of topology may be conceived of as the sign of a conceptual sea-change in philosophy of science that expelled geometry, and, more generally, mathematics, from its central position in philosophy of science and, instead, placed logic at center stage in the 20th century philosophy of science. Only in recent decades logic has begun to loose its monopoly and geometry and topology received a new chance to fi nd a place in philosophy of science, as an object for philosophical reflection and as a conceptual tool for doing philosophy.</p>Thomas Mormann
Prawa autorskie (c)
2013-05-212013-05-215283100Filozofia nauki: topologia vs. logika
https://wuwr.pl/laph/article/view/9204
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Philosophy of Science: Topology <em>vs</em> Logic</strong><br /><br />Authors point out to to the essential and fruitful role of topology in research in areas of ontology and philosophy of science. They also show important Polish contribution to the development of that discipline.</p>Paweł JarnickiBartłomiej Skowron
Prawa autorskie (c)
2013-05-212013-05-21527782Status praw natury w ujęciu Davida M. Armstronga
https://wuwr.pl/laph/article/view/9205
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Status of Laws of Nature in David Armstrong’s view</strong><br /><br />The following paper is devoted to the metaphysical status of laws of nature in David Armstrong’s ontology. The text has been divided into three main sections. The first one presents some of the most basic principles and notions of Armstrong’s ontology, along with his theory of states of affairs and universals as their constituents — state-of-affairs types. The second part describes his theory of natural laws, which in the end he understands as causal relations between state-of-affairs types. The third section is devoted to two problems: the problem of determinable universals, which arises along with his theory of functional laws of nature and the problem of causal powers which is an implausible consequence of his theory of natural laws in general.</p>Marek Radosław Dziekan
Prawa autorskie (c)
2013-05-212013-05-2152101112Quine’a teoria znaczenia. Język jako przedmiot badań i narzędzie referencyjnego odniesienia do świata
https://wuwr.pl/laph/article/view/9206
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Quine’s theory of meaning. Language as a object of research and instrument of the reference to the world</strong><br /><br />In the article I present and examine the most important problems connected with Quine’s philosophy of language. I start with a widely known thought experiment illustrating the difficulty with radical translation which leads to the thesis of ontological relativity. In the further parts of the article I present behaviorist view of language acquisition and Quine’s theory of meaning.</p>Marek Maciejczak
Prawa autorskie (c)
2013-05-212013-05-2152113128Co możemy powiedzieć o wartościach
https://wuwr.pl/laph/article/view/9207
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>What can be said about values</strong><br /><br />The paper is an attempt at the descriptive analysis of the realm of values, undertaken from the phenomenological perspective. It is not a systematic survey in this field but rather a review of some basic intuitions. The author tries to show that terminology of Ingarden’s ontology can be succesfully applied to this matter. In particular, ontological status of values reminds to some extent existential characteristic of intentional objects: they exist only for conscious subjects, although they are not created by them — in this last respect they bear some similarity to real objects.</p>Marek Rosiak
Prawa autorskie (c)
2013-05-212013-05-2152129148Czego ciągle o wartościach nie możemy powiedzieć?
https://wuwr.pl/laph/article/view/9208
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>What still cannot be said about values</strong><br /><br />In this article I present a number of specific questions concerning values, their structure, cognition and their relation with other categories. I discuss problems as follows: 1 the role of emotions in cognition of values; 2 types of obligations in various types of values; 3 obligation and value; 4 unconditional imperative to realise of values; 5 types of values; 6 value and purpose. In phenomenological perspective I propose synthesis axiological emotionalism with axiological rationalism in some „critical axiology”.</p>Leszek Kopciuch
Prawa autorskie (c)
2013-05-212013-05-2152149168Przedmioty i tajemnica. O pewnym wątku Zbigniewa Herberta poezji rzeczy
https://wuwr.pl/laph/article/view/9209
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Objects and Mystery. On some motif in Zbigniew Herbert’s poetry of things</strong></p><p style="text-align: justify;"> </p><p style="text-align: justify;">The article is devoted to very important detail of Herbert’s poetry of things — the relationship between mystery and dignity. Herbert continues some aspects of Rilke’s Dinggedichte, i.e. he emphasizes incommunicability and tautological character of objects. This feature is a basis of object’s mystery and it is in turn the fundament of dignity. The source of violence is violation of mystery.</p>Marek Piwowarczyk
Prawa autorskie (c)
2013-05-212013-05-2152169186Kategoria a priori w fenomenologii Mikela Dufrenne’a
https://wuwr.pl/laph/article/view/9210
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Notion of<em> a priori</em> in Mikel Dufrenne’s phenomenology</strong><br /><br />M. Dufrenne, in opposition to Merleau-Ponty, is not a philosopher well-known in Poland. But his concept of experience, sentiment and bodily cognition is crucial to the contemporary phenomenology of the sensuous. Dufrenne’s notion of <em>a priori </em>and the analysis of its status, functions and possibilities seems especially important. A Dufrenne’s idea of <em>a priori</em> better understood in a historical context of mainly Kant’s, Husserl’s, Heidegger’s or Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on the essential dualism and reciprocity between the rational and the sensuous, broadens the modern philosophical reflection on perception and its rational claims. M. Dufrenne thoroughly creating a specific to himself metaphoric and engaging philosopical terminology describes the subjective and objective material,bodily, existential, universal or affective ones conditions of possibility of human perception and cognition, enrooted in the sensuous. He draws special attention to the mediating function of imagination, being a medium between body and mind, presence and absence, perception and idea, reception and creation of the the object of experience, <em>etc.</em> Having elaborated a „virtual knowledge” idea, he establishes Nature or „the originary” as a fundamental base for any kind of experience and communication. This sensuously deepened image of human possibilies of cognition implies a renewed idea of aesthetics as a science of the sensuous, as well as a panaesthetic conception of esthetisation of re-making the world and oneselves, inaugurated by human activity of experience and the urge for knowledge starting with a philosophical wonder. Everything begins with perception — like M. Merleau-Ponty said, and finishes with aesthetics — like M. Dufrenne suggests.</p>Agnieszka Bandura
Prawa autorskie (c)
2013-05-212013-05-2152187206Husserl a Ingarden. Z Andrzejem Półtawskim rozmawia Marek Maciejczak
https://wuwr.pl/laph/article/view/9211
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Husserl and Ingarden</strong><br /><br />In the conversation professor Połtawski presents his opinions on the most important aspects of philosophical systems of Husserl and Ingarden.</p>Andrzej PółtawskiMarek Maciejczak
Prawa autorskie (c)
2013-05-212013-05-2152208256