

Engagement and the future in non-anthropocentric humanities

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What kind of engaged humanities?

Although Polish academics have not been interested in non-anthropocentric humanities for a long time, it seems we can already point out some emerging tendencies. Given the engagement of the so-called posthumanities, the issue I would like to tackle here touches upon both the essence of the movement and its academic standards. Linked to political emancipation, historical policy or intervention in reality, engaged humanities have no longer been concerned only with the “social construction of social reality”¹, since society was replaced with a human-non-human collective. I believe that it is with Latour’s idea that we should associate the conceptualisation and crystallisation of the non-anthropocentric movement. The networking of the world (*universum*) and the human environment has created favourable conditions for a new way of defining the relations between the human and the non-human, a way desired and expected by many scholars.

The engaged nature of posthumanistic reflection justifies conscious opposition to official anthropocentrism². As Ewa Domańska notes, the very question about the non-human subject undermines the working of Agamben’s anthropogenic machine³. Thus, this truly Derridan deconstruction has a political value – after all, it is among people that the non-anthropocentric project is to fulfil its task. Just like giving voice to the vo-

¹ E. Domańska, *Historia egzystencjalna. Krytyczne studium narratywizmu i humanistyki zaangażowanej*, Warsaw 2012, pp. 119-120.

² Or a model of anthropocentrism, if we take into account the objections of some scholars concerning the abandoning of anthropocentrism. See J. Lejman, *Ewolucja ludzkiej samowiedzy gatunkowej. Dzieje prób zdefiniowania relacji człowiek-zwierzę*, Lublin 2008, p. 380.

³ Domańska refers here to articles by Monika Bakke (E. Domańska, *Humanistyka nieantropocentryczna a studia nad rzeczami*, *Kultura Współczesna* 2008, no. 3, p. 11).

iceless and writing history from below opened the social elites to the reality of the working class, so, too, the interest in non-humans is to open society to Latour's collective.

However, unlike other trends linked to engagement⁴ the question of truth – which in addition to the researcher's neutrality and objectivism clearly distinguishes engaged humanities from non-emancipating and non-political humanities – is not so much suspended but is still to be worked out. For posthumanism lacks a clearly specified intervention objective in the name of which scholars would question the social-cultural order. This order cannot be the general idea of harmonious co-existence of humans and non-humans, which points to a direction of the search rather than expected results. Consequently, it is worth paying attention to the status of the victim, which in the non-anthropocentric humanities is not as unequivocal as in, for example, gender studies or post-colonial studies. Inter-species differences in contemporary ethics are not clear, unlike intra-species differences. Thus, the victims of the anthropogenic machine include both non-humans and its creators themselves. What matters more than defiance leading to a shared goal, typical of engaged humanities – which thus create their underdogs – are any points in common among scholars. Thus tracking down anthropocentrism has marks of friendly, Pouletan self-identifying criticism (*critique d'identification*). The strategy of the non-anthropocentric humanities is not to support or create a policy of opposition of the victims (which is a dogmatic principle of the classic, if we may use this expression, engaged humanities), but to creatively, affirmatively search for a community of ethics. It is not based on normative determination but axiomatic community. As I understand it, this is what Domańska meant when she wrote that “observation of modern scholarship suggests that what brings together researchers are not methods or theories, but problems on which their intellectual effort is focused. These problems – more or less directly – are increasingly linked to the protection of life”⁵.

The non-anthropocentric humanities are focused on the future, not on the past or the present. However, this is not about a future that is an element of a linear model of time, but about potentiality, a worldview project that demands scholars' activity, that demands agency from them. Therefore, the future is what we should achieve here and now: “The present is always the future present: it will have made positive difference in the world. Only the yearning for sustainable futures can construct a liveable present”⁶, writes Rosi Braidotti, commenting on Donna

⁴ When writing about engaged humanities, I would like to focus on the part of these disciplines that is linked to studies into minorities. By pointing to the tradition of engaged humanities, in which I place the posthumanistic thought – the tradition of emancipating humanities with its main task of giving voice to the voiceless, from the first works by Edward P. Thompson on – I would also like to point to the different engagement of the non-anthropocentric thought. A different, broader analysis of engaged humanities can be found in e.g. *Zaangażowanie czy izolacja? Współczesne strategie społecznej egzystencji humanistów*, ed. J. Kowalewski, W. Piasek, Olsztyn 2007.

⁵ E. Domańska, *Humanistyka nie-antropocentryczna...*, p. 10.

⁶ R. Braidotti, *Posthuman, all too human: Towards a new process ontology*, Theory, Culture & Society 23, 2006, no. 7-8, p. 206.

Haraway's idea. Such activity places the future in the way rather than in the goal. In what requires constant and developing nurture. That is why even in posthumanistic analyses of the past the nurturing potential is focused on the future. This potential, Spinoza's *potentia*, is power which, however, has little in common with negatively understood violence. The non-anthropocentric humanities, far from the engaged humanities' focus on the victims and the trauma, remind us of the possibility of influencing the reality around us. At the same time they reiterate Bruno Latour's question of whether and how we can live together.⁷

Non-engaged reception

The French thinker's question has a critical edge. It reveals the discouraging nature of victim-centrism, as it were, of the engaged humanities. It would seem that the epistemic privilege of the oppressed, which is behind it, has legitimised engagement through negation.

Given the changes taking place in the world [...] the humanities cannot afford to promote the idea of a weak subject, fragmented community and raptures over the figure of the victim. What needs to be strengthened is a belief in the agency powers of the subject and the community in the face of the systems enslaving them [...].

It is worth reflecting at this point on the effects of traumatophilia, characteristic of the victim-defending humanities. Andreas Huyssen links the emergence of the trauma discourse to the subject's loss of faith in its agency (that is, a conviction that one has some influence on the surrounding reality and course of affairs). This, in turn, as he claims, is associated with a decline of the utopian dimension of politics. [...] I see the promotion of the trauma discourse as a risk not only to the subject, but also to the idea of democracy in general⁸.

This observation by Domańska, made with reference to postmodernism-inspired science (also Polish science), prompts us to ask: does the conviction that agency has been lost and the subject is weak not deprive the engaged humanities of a possibility of becoming engaged?

In their introduction to a reflection on the engaged humanities, Jacek Kowalewski and Wojciech Piasek note

What might possibly be worrying is the fact that our local academic circles are usually dominated by a tendency to observe and participate in the creation of generalising perspectives, typical of the world humanities, and that we make less effort to analyse our own practices and local problems stemming from them⁹.

When writing about the reception of the *French Theory* in the Polish academia, Domańska suggests that this movement promotes "subjectivity created by power

⁷ B. Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory*, Polish translation by A. Derra, K. Abriszewski, Kraków 2010, p. 376 f.

⁸ E. Domańska, *Historia egzystencjalna...*, p. 137.

⁹ J. Kowalewski, W. Piasek, *Introduction*, [in:] *Zaangażowanie czy izolacja?*..., p. 8.

relations and deprived of its agency”¹⁰. Thus she wants to demonstrate how strongly this Anglo-American trend has influenced the theory and practice of the Polish thought. However, whereas the interest in the theory itself has fluctuated over at least dozen or so years – as is typical of scholarly fashions – its discouraging influence has endured, according to Domańska. She concludes:

I think that instead of applying the way of thinking and interpretative grid offered by this theory to our domestic research material, often purely instrumentally, we should distance ourselves from it. The Polish methodology and theory in the humanities, treating Western achievements as inspirations and not as a “toolbox” ready to analyse and interpret our domestic research material, have a lot to do in this respect¹¹.

Thus although the influence of epistemology transplanted with the theory and methodology of *French Theory* is still very much in evidence, both the vision of a weak, agency-less subject and its consequences are no longer clear. It is in the lack of metareflection on the influence of this trend that we can look for the sources of passivity, as it were, of the Polish engaged humanities. This state of affairs was consolidated by the concurrence of the reception of the *French Theory* and the political transformations in Poland – after all, as Domańska writes, for many people postmodernism turned out to be an “antidote to ‘communism’”¹². What fitted in perfectly with the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century in the Polish academic circles cannot, however, be continued as a neutral, innocent epistemology in the non-anthropocentric humanities. It would seem that Domańska, who studies but also participates in them, is well-aware of that.

Therefore, if instrumentalisation of a foreign theory is sanctioned (which is a consequence of a weakening of the subjectivity of both the researcher and the researched), there is, in fact, no room for practising the non-anthropocentric humanities, which cannot come down to a passive reception of their Anglo-Saxon version without contradicting themselves.

The nurturing value of the non-anthropocentric humanities

When what matters more is the goal and not the way, when what matters more than the questions are normative answers, we are witnessing a subtle rupture between the posthumanities and the engaged humanities. Both postcolonialism, the *queer* perspective, and posthumanities pursued on foreign research soil lose the most important element of the engaged humanities – being rooted in culture. However, the non-anthropocentric humanities not only are involved in the space-ti-

¹⁰ E. Domańska, *Historia egzystencjalna...*, p. 148.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 110.

¹² Ibidem, p. 150.

me of a concrete *universum*, but, unlike the two trends indicated here, do not offer either any ready answers. Like their object, they are dynamic, process-like, to refer to the title of Braidotti's article. Although representatives of both the posthumanities and queer studies or postcolonial studies are engaged in change, only among the former will we find no normative directives, which prescriptively indicate from above where intellectual quest is to lead. That is why erudite reconstructing of the non-anthropocentric humanities in the Anglo-Saxon version acquires a particularly simulacrum-like nature, characteristic of imitated and not cultivated phenomena.

Thus, the non-anthropocentric humanities project the reality "here and now", always, however, being sensitive to them in both micro- and macroscale. That is why they are sometimes referred to as ecological humanities, sensitive to life relations (home, family relations, as indicated by the etymology of *οἶκος*). As Dorota Wolska points out "'engagement', alongside 'community', 'bonds', is [...] today a form of articulating axiological problems"¹³. Above all, this is evident in the posthumanistic thought, which prefers engagement, to distinguish it from the engagement of the emancipating humanities, which I refer to as nurturing.

Looking for the nurturing dimension of the non-anthropocentric humanities, I would like to refer to the Ciceronian category, not without some doubts as to whether the traditional ways of interpreting them provide for a still living, non-petrified use.

And, to go on with the comparison, as a field, although it may be naturally fruitful, cannot produce a crop without dressing [*sine cultura*], so neither can the mind without education. Such is the weakness of either without the other. Whereas philosophy is the culture of the mind [*Cultura autem animi philosophia est*]: this it is which plucks up vices by the roots; prepares the mind for the receiving of seeds; commits them to it, or, as I may say, sows them, in the hope that, when come to maturity, they may produce a plentiful harvest¹⁴.

Supposed to pluck vices by the roots and prepare the mind to receive the seed, philosophy, Ciceronian science of "self" nurturing is a processual undertaking. The spirit cannot produce fruit without constant philosophical cultivation. In addition, given the fact that in stoicism, with which Cicero identified himself, philosophy is of practical nature, nurturing is enriched by the demand for its local involvement. Similarly, the non-anthropocentric humanities demand action in collaboration with the immediate environment – after all, they are supposed to show concern for it.

With regard to culture studies and a perspective formulated by Stanisław Pietraszko, we could say that posthumanist reflection defined in such a way becomes a manifestation of a value-driven way of being¹⁵. Undoubtedly, this should be lin-

¹³ D. Wolska, *Kilka uwag o zaangażowaniu, czyli o uczuciach i ich badaniu*, Teksty Drugie 2007, no. 1-2, p. 14.

¹⁴ Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, transl. C.D. Yong, Republished Classics 2013, p. 40.

¹⁵ S. Pietraszko, *Kultura. Studia teoretyczne i metodologiczne*, Wrocław 2012.

ked to its non-epistemic nature¹⁶. In addition to epistemic, scholarly or diagnostic objectives, the non-anthropocentric movement is undoubtedly characterised by moral engagement. Although it would be difficult to describe the non-anthropocentric humanities as a prognostic trend in sciences, the future, as I have already mentioned, is an essential element of its project. Unlike heritage, nurturing cannot only denote the inherited legacy. Thus, by definition, as it were, it has to be non-passive, creative, adapted to changing conditions and creating conditions itself. Thanks to the nurturing dimension of the humanities, their focus on shaping the reality where the human world and the environment meet – and not just on getting to know it – not only the present, but also the future becomes its real point of reference. Let me once again refer to Domańska:

The subjective approach, which I promote in *Historia egzystencjalna*, is part of a broader concept concerning rethinking of the idea of a strong subject (and strong community) and building – as Bruno Latour writes – the knowledge of living together [...]. Standing in the background of these reflections is the utopia of metacommunity, free from the burden of negativity hanging over postmodernism, negativity with its apocalyptic visions of the end, death, silence, trauma and denial. This is not a naive utopia, however, creating a vision of a harmonious world of universal happiness, but an idea creating various scenarios for the future and showing the potentiality that is there in every decision. This utopia opts for co-designing of the future world/planet¹⁷.

It is worth adding that it is the nurturing, action-demanding nature of the non-anthropocentric humanities that constitutes their main epistemic limitation. For both valuation (value judgement) and estimation (assessment) depend on the conditions in which they occur. Despite the fact that discernment is an essential element of scholarly practice, it is further non-epistemic activity that remains the essential foundation of posthumanities. Thus, it is a cultural activity, set in an environment from which it cannot be separated.

Local reading – the Polish non-anthropocentric humanities

Visitors to the *Bêtes et Hommes* exhibition organised at la Grande halle de la Villette (September 2007-January 2008) and inspired by Bruno Latour's demands — including the fundamental one to replace society with collectives — were welcomed by a cow and Witold Gombrowicz's words. Unique words, because they

¹⁶ In the sense ascribed to it by Pietraszko, making the epistemic humanities distinct from the non-epistemic humanities. The latter is focused primarily on normative-regulatory or valuating objectives. See S. Pietraszko, *Elementy teorii kultury*, [in:] idem, *Kultura...*, p. 395.

¹⁷ Ewa Domańska o projekcie historii egzystencjalnej, Marcin Wilkowski's interview with Ewa Domańska, *Historia i Media* 25 June 2012, <http://historiaimedia.org/2012/06/25/ewa-do-man-ska-o-projekcie-historii-egzystencjalnej/> (access: 20 January 2013).

referred to the experience of cowness¹⁸ (Georges Rey's *La vache qui rumine* effectively strengthened this impression) at a site built especially for the purpose of slaughtering cattle. This exhibition was also analysed in Poland¹⁹, while Gombrowicz's non-anthropocentric sensibility was noticed by Paweł Mościcki and Anna Orzechowska-Barcz in the writer's diaries²⁰.

As Dorota Wolska pertinently notes, "we are witnessing profound revisions (definitely not yet finished), which can be seen in the deep emotional engagement of many participants in 'animal' debates"²¹. This remark can be applied to Grzegorz Kowalski, whose 1977 photographic cycle *People/Animals* became the subject of Monika Bakke's posthumanistic reflections²². Juxtaposed with theoretical reflections by, among others, Steve Baker, Rosi Braidotti, Donna Haraway as well as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, the photographs make us realise the multiplicity and variety of attitudes to animality.

The daily proximity of farm animals often seems to obscure the life of animals in general. This happens because animals living in the wild, as they are described, are not apparently entitled to human concern – after all, they are supposed to have everything they need in life. As long as we do not talk about endangered species on the outskirts of our Europe-centric world, the status of predators is particularly neutralised in this respect. That is why Patrycja Tomczak's article *Pochwała szczeliny. Humanistyka na tropach wilka* seems to be all the more valuable. The author appears to dissociate herself from posthumanism, though the question is

¹⁸ "I was walking along a eucalyptus-lined avenue when a cow sauntered out from behind a tree. I stopped and we looked each other in the eye. Her cowness shocked my humanness to such a degree – the moment our eyes met was so tense – I stopped dead in my tracks and lost my bearings as a man that is, as a member of the human species. The strange feeling that I was apparently discovering for the first time was the shame of a man come face-to-face with an animal." To continue the quote: "I allowed her to look and see me – this made us equal – and resulted in my also becoming an animal – but a strange even forbidden one, I would say. I continued to walk, but I felt uncomfortable... in nature, surrounding me on all sides, as if it were... watching me". W. Gombrowicz, *Diary*, transl. L. Vallee, Yale University Press 2012, p. 307.

¹⁹ The theme of the Paris exhibition was taken up by Edwin Bendyk (*Paryż jesieni*, Antymatrix, 4 December 2007, <http://bendyk.blog.polityka.pl/2007/12/04/paryz-jesienia/> (access: 20 January 2013); and idem, *Jej krowość, moja ludzkość*, Polityka.pl, 11 February 2008, <http://www.polityka.pl/nauka/245170,1jej-krowosc-moja-ludzkość.read> (access: 20 January 2013).

²⁰ A. Orzechowska-Barcz, *Człowiek i zwierzę — problem granicy w Dziennikach Gombrowicza*, Artmix 23 (13), <http://www.obieg.pl/artmix/16507> (access: 20 January 2013). P. Mościcki, *Gombrowicz i nieludzkie*, Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki 2004, no. 10, pp. 63-85; idem, *Gombrowicz, Zwierzę*, [in:] *Gdzie wschodzi Gombrowicz i kędy zapada*, ed. A. Zbrzezny, J. Mach, Warsaw 2004.

²¹ D. Wolska, *Zwierzę — (w) granica(ch) kultury. Kilka uwag i pytań*, [in:] *Natura (w) granica(ch) kultury*, ed. K. Łukasiewicz, I. Topp, Wrocław 2012, p. 36.

²² M. Bakke, *Stawanie się (ze) zwierzętami. O projekcie Ludzie/Zwierzęta Grzegorza Kowalskiego*, [in:] *French Theory w Polsce*, ed. E. Domańska, M. Loba, Poznań 2010.

not one of identification²³. In her article she demonstrates a paradoxical similarity between attempts to culturalise nature and naturalise culture. Defending both the specificity of the humanities and the wolf, Tomczak sees not fraternisation but communion with the wolf as a way to escape Derrida's animal-words (*animots*) ruthlessly present in our culture²⁴. As a scholar studying the religious discourse and a member of the "Wolf" Nature Society taking part in the monitoring of wolves in western Poland, she practises the humanities bringing together both activities in their engagement. Significantly, in the Society's most recent publication the only photograph by Tomczak does not show a wolf like in many other photographs, but its traces: urine, which, after all, requires extraordinary tracking skills to recognise its animal, and, above all, the ability to be with the animal itself²⁵. Therefore, is communion with the humanities and the wolf an elite venture (which may be suggested by the rejection of culturalisation and naturalisation of experience and life, but also rejection of the third, non-anthropocentric way)? Tomczak's article is an intriguing – I would even say: subversive, given the fashion for posthumanism – contribution to the emerging non-anthropocentric humanities in Poland.

Monika Bakke stresses that Neil Badmington or Cary Wolfe do not dissociate themselves from humanism; instead, they expect from posthumanists

a critical reflection on the real contexts in which today we find values like equality, tolerance or justice – regarded, after all, as humanistic values. In addition, Wolfe demands that their historical and ideological contexts be indicated and that they be rethought again – this time in relation to non-humans²⁶.

The nurturing dimension of the Polish non-anthropocentric humanities concerns not only animals, however. For while animals are the closest to humans biologically, the issue of things and materiality draws our attention to their involvement in the human *universum*. That this does not legitimise anthropocentrism was something to which Ewa Domańska tried to testify, juxtaposing an announcement of a collection of things for the poor with Tadeusz Kantor's idea of a "lower-rank object"²⁷. In this case, too, we can question the opposition: its positive part built on Latour's theory of a resistant, i.e. objective actant, and the total criticism of the author of the announcement. Both examples presented by Domańska, far from the already entrenched associations with the non-anthropocentric humanities, illustra-

²³ M. Bakke rightly notes in her own attempt to enumerate the Polish representatives of the posthumanities that many scholars do not identify themselves with this trend; "sometimes even the object of their research is not explicitly linked to posthumanism" (M. Bakke, *Posthumanizm: człowiek w świecie większym niż ludzki*, [in:] *Człowiek wobec natury — humanizm wobec nauk przyrodniczych*, ed. J. Sokolski, Warsaw 2010, p. 354).

²⁴ P. Tomczak, *Pochwała szczeliny. Humanistyka na tropach wilka*, [in:] *Natura (w) granica(ch)...*, p. 44. See also J. Derrida, *L'animal que donc je suis*, Paris 2006, p. 73.

²⁵ S. Nowak, R.W. Mysłajek, *Wilki na zachód od Wisły*, Twardorzeczka 2011, p. 37.

²⁶ M. Bakke, *Posthumanizm: człowiek...*, p. 344.

²⁷ E. Domańska, *Humanistyka nie-antropocentryczna...*

te, however, the potentiality found in everyday objects close to our hearts. Thus, although the author of *Historia egzystencjalna* is deeply involved in posthumanistic metareflection, she does not shy away from exemplifications, so important to the evolution of the Polish non-anthropocentric humanities. It must be noted that a conscious move from *potentas* to *potentia*²⁸, i.e. from the so-called engaged humanities to what Domańska calls the affirmative humanities project, seems best to convey the transformations of this trend in the Polish academia.

Krzysztof Abriszewski stresses not so much the resistance but the agency of materiality. Suffice it to mention that his transdisciplinary epistemic perspective not only adapts the actor-network theory to the Polish reality, but also significantly enriches it. An example here can be short reflections on the moral subjects in Toruń's open space, pointing to a significant impact of abiotic actants on human everyday reality²⁹. The means of transport define the forms of social co-existence, which is illustrated by the example of drivers illegally parking their cars. As Abriszewski stresses, people do not choose specific objects – in this case cars – to achieve their goals, but, rather, the properties of objects have an agency-like power, in a way enabling people to behave in contravention of accepted norms³⁰.

There are many examples of nurturing-focused posthumanistic thought, especially given the fact that issues associated with animals and materiality do not exhaust it by any means. Let me just mention the issue of cyborgs or relations between humans and technology – an interesting work in this respect, with a very much “local” backbone, is G. Gajewska's monograph³¹. On the other hand, the concept of mountaineering as a ridge of culture, a concept systematically developed by Marek Pacukiewicz, could be a starting point for a Polish discussion about Haraway's term “nature-culture”, which shows the impossibility of “returning to nature”³². A separate analysis should be devoted to the now slightly forgotten

²⁸ According to Baruch Spinoza's distinction – a move from power-domination to power understood as a possibility, agency, influence. For more of the affirmative humanities, see Domańska's *Humanistyka afirmatywna: władza i pleć po Butler i Foucault*, [in:] *Pleć i władza. Historyczne konteksty, współczesne krytyki, nowe perspektywy*, ed. F. Kubiaczyk, M. Owsiana (soon to be published).

²⁹ K. Abriszewski, *Drogi wartości. Toruńska przestrzeń i jej podmioty moralne*, [in:] *Do Torunia kupić kunia*, ed. H. Czachowski, A. Miancki, Toruń 2008.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 71 ff.; see also illustrations 9 and 10 in the non-numbered supplement at the end of the collection. There are also cases in which objects make their users' life difficult. It would be difficult to image that a driver deliberately parked his car in a way that blocked a tram. It is worth noting here that the track itself is empty – it is the tram that sticks out. The passengers can continue their journey on foot, only the tram will not go any further (*ibidem*, ill. 12).

³¹ G. Gajewska, *Arcy-nie-ludzkie. Przez science fiction do antropologii cyborgów*, Poznań 2010. As Roch Sulima has noted (*Antropologia cyborgów*, *Przegląd Kulturoznawczy* 9, 2011, p. 195), “the most frequent references listed in the index at the end of the book are to Stanisław Lem; a classic of the subject – Donna Haraway – is behind him”.

³² M. Pacukiewicz, *Natura alpinizmu. Wspinaczka jako bricolage*, [in:] *Natura (w) granica(ch)...*; *idem*, *Grań kultury. Transgresje alpinizmu*, Kraków 2012.

original works by Jolanta Brach-Czaina³³, who with her philosophical reflection was at least ten years ahead of scholars identifying themselves with the non-anthropocentric attitude.

During an interview in connection with the recent publication of *Historia egzystencjalna*, Ewa Domańska said:

One of the most interesting phenomena in avant-garde approaches in the contemporary humanities is the criticism of anthropocentrism and the idea of the uniqueness of humans as a species, as well as the neutralisation of the narcissistic, individual subject and the turn towards the community (which is no longer only human). However, what has existential history got to do with all this? It is interested in, among others, bringing up a morally responsible individual, in supporting a strong subject and community, building positive visions of the future in which cooperation will be more important than competition and intellectuals-scholars will be important originators of integration (of community and knowledge) as well as links and creators of various networks-associations³⁴.

Thus the future in the non-anthropocentric humanities but also the future of these humanities themselves are inextricably linked to nurturing engagement.

³³ J. Brach-Czaina, *Szczeliny istnienia*, Warsaw 1992; *eadem*, *Błony umysłu*, Warsaw 2003. Brach-Czaina's contribution to the Polish thought is examined by M. Bakke, *Posthumanizm: człowiek*, pp. 354-357. See also M. Kasprzak, *Autoteliczni nie-ludzie*, [in:] *Człowiek w relacji do zwierząt, roślin i maszyn w kulturze*, vol. 2, ed. J. Tymieniecka-Suchanek (soon to be published).

³⁴ Ewa Domańska *o projekcie historii egzystencjalnej...*