

A. PRAWNE ASPEKTY CZŁONKOSTWA W UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

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POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE SECOND AND THE THIRD POLISH REPUBLIC ON THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEAN UNITY — BRIEF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The idea of European unity has not been foreign to the political, intellectual and doctrinal traditions of Polish social thought for the last six hundred years. Ideological lineage of this paradigm can be traced back to the period of fourteenth/fifteenth century and to so-called Polish school of law among nations,¹ the main representatives of which were Paweł Włodkowic, Stanisław from Skarbimierz and Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski. They developed an impressive range of advanced and progressive concepts without which the twentieth-century process of continental integration would not only be impossible to realize, but it would even be inconceivable to formulate a proposal to create institutionalized framework of transnational cooperation. Włodkowic, Stanisław and Modrzewski wrote about human dignity, natural law and individual rights; they expounded the need for mutual tolerance; they promulgated notions of the equality of states, of the necessity to maintain peaceful relations among nations and of the fundamental role played by international law; they considered the creation of mechanisms which would enable European states to coexist harmoniously and to settle their disputes in an objective, dispassionate manner without resorting to wars to be

¹ See for example M. Maciejewski, G. Haręża, *Zarys dziejów polskich idei federacji europejskiej (XV–XX w.) na tle zachodnioeuropejskich koncepcji zjednoczeniowych*, [in:] *Spółczesność w przełomie. Polska, Niemcy i Unia Europejska*, ed. M. Maciejewski, Wrocław 1999, p. 50–53; J. Łaptos, W. Prażuch, A. Pytlarz, *Historia Unii Europejskiej*, Kraków 2003, p. 17.

eminently reasonable. These doctrinal suppositions certainly were inspirational for the later-day proponents of European unity. While the importance of these thinkers should not be minimized, it ought to be made perfectly clear that they did not advocate building of any supra-state organization which would be responsible for the enforcement of their theoretical suggestions (they opted rather for the *ad hoc* cooperation). The ideas to form some sort of Paneuropean organization really started to appear in Poland only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A few of these concepts seem particularly significant. For example, we should mention two-time Polish monarch Stanisław Leszczyński, who advocated the establishment of European federation under the auspices of the king of France; a Piarist priest Kajetan Skrzetuski, who supported the creation of Paneuropean association responsible for securing international peace and stability; prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, who promoted the creation of transnational European League; a pacifist thinker Wojciech Bogumił Jastrzębowski, who focused on legal issues and presented a proposal to adopt the European Constitution forming a basis for “an eternal alliance between civilized nations”; and a historian Stefan Buszczyński, who fostered European unification founded on the principles of political and economic liberalism.² Judging even by contemporary standards, many of the above-mentioned ideas exhibited a high degree of maturity and complexity. Of course their proponents can be — and were — accused of naivety, but such is sometimes the fate of political prophets who transcend the boundaries of their time. To sum up, this, by necessity brief, overview justifies a thesis that before the beginning of the World War Polish political thought was familiar with the concept of European federation (although these ideas by no means enjoyed widespread popular support). We should also remember that a relatively large number of the nineteenth-century Polish political writers were in favor of the idea of building a transnational federation or confederation limited to Central-Eastern European states.³ In this article we will focus only on those integrationist projects which, according to their authors, were supposed to embrace the whole continent. Such decision is dictated by the existence of huge differences in political, geopolitical, axiological, ideological or economic argumentation and discourse displayed by the protagonists of both types of pro-federation stance.

At the beginning we will indulge in self-evident truisms and restate the obvious fact that the popularity of the idea of European integration very much depends on the political-and-social climate in a particular country, both in domestic and foreign dimension. Taking this point into account, we should not be surprised that the pro-unification viewpoint was not prevalent in the inter-war

² More detailed and precise description of these ideas can be found in Ł. Machaj, *Za i przeciw Europie. Integracja europejska w polskiej myśli politycznej w latach 1989–2001*, Wrocław 2006, p. 46–61.

³ This project remained very popular in Polish social-and-political thought over the course of the last century.

Poland. The whole continent was being torn apart by many multifaceted, violent and drastic national antagonisms; the spirit of international cooperation was on the wane; nationalism ran rampant; democratic-liberal systems were being gradually replaced by authoritarian or even totalitarian regimes; Poland's relations with many of its neighboring countries were, to put it euphemistically, far from perfect; serious economic difficulties, caused both by the Great Depression and general backwardness of Polish economy, contributed to disenchantment with any liberal ideas. There was also one other additional factor — the joy of the freshly regained independence. In such circumstances any idea to renounce even a part of national sovereignty could not have been expected to make much headway. Even if certain politicians, intellectuals or thinkers were willing to embrace general principles of federalism, they usually refrained from specifics and considered European integration to be a realistic project only in some more or less distant future and not a viable solution for contemporary problems. However, even such rudimentary and non-elaborate proposals remained on the fringes of public debate. Therefore, we will present only two examples of such concepts in order to give the reader a basic idea of the imprecision of these ideas which definitely paled in comparison with plans designed by, for instance, Jastrzębowski or Buszczyński. We chose notions coming from two almost opposing sides of political spectrum.⁴ On the one hand, we have a very well-known and very conservative jurist Władysław Leopold Jaworski, who in 1929 expressed his approbation for the idea of the United States of Europe founded on the tenets of Christian religion.⁵ On the other hand, we have a number of statements made in the twenties by the Polish Socialist Party which put forward an idea to construct — in a long-term future — the Association of European Nations (alternatively called the United States of Europe). According to this vision, such an organization should be a result of gradual step-by-step movement because European unity cannot be created in a rush. The process of integration ought to begin in the economic sphere and only after (and if...) it produces intended satisfactory consequences, it ought to expand to the other realms of social life. While socialists generally remained loyal to this ambitious long-term goal, they certainly did not attach a lot of importance to it in their day-to-day activities. Even in their foreign policy documents they put emphasis on much more moderate and a bit more realistic projects (like the establishment of Polish-Czechoslovakian federation which was also supposed to include Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia or creation of larger regional federation consisting, apart from already-mentioned

⁴ This by itself proves that the idea of European unity is capable of transcending traditional political divisions.

⁵ W.L. Jaworski, *Stany Zjednoczone Europy*, "Droga" 1929, no. 9. See M. Jaskólski, *Miedzy normatywizmem i uniwersalizmem. Myśl prawno-polityczna Władysława L. Jaworskiego*, Wrocław 1988, p. 30.

states, of Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia).⁶ We feel obliged to reiterate that however strongly some people — if they are so inclined — may applaud these efforts today, it would be a mistake to overestimate their practical impact, theoretical utility or political value.

In the whole panorama of Polish political thought of the inter-war period only one group seems to have formulated a more comprehensive concept of continental unity. We refer to the Polish section of Pan-European movement. Obviously Pan-Europeanism was not an original product of Polish doctrine of international relations. This vision of Europe's transformation in accordance with a communal and peaceful spirit was first put forward by an Austrian aristocrat and diplomat Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, who advocated the creation of the United States of Europe which were supposed to come to existence in a gradual manner (first step would have been an establishment of Pan-European customs union). Coudenhove-Kalergi's projects were favorably received by some Polish politicians and activists. The Polish section of the movement was led by Aleksander Lednicki, a lawyer and pacifist of liberal-democratic convictions. He was a chief force behind the creation of the Polish Committee of Pan-European Union in 1925. This was one of many similar national organizations on the continent which propagated Kalergi's concepts.⁷ It is important to know that Lednicki was not a blind follower in Kalergi's footsteps who unquestionably accepted all doctrinal and geopolitical assumptions made by the Austrian diplomat. He did not hesitate to verbalize a number of conditions the fulfillment of which was considered indispensable in order to ensure Poland's participation both in the Pan-European movement and in the future federation. He forcefully emphasized that authoritarian regimes and undemocratic states should be excluded from membership in the projected association. He particularly strongly opposed any suggestions to let the Soviet Union gain access to the organization. He feared that this state might easily use Pan-European ideology

⁶ "Zagadnienie Stanów Zjednoczonych Europy" a series of articles published from June to September 1926 in "Robotniczy Przegląd Gospodarczy"; J. Juchnowski, *Federalizm i integracja europejska w myśli politycznej socjalistów polskich (1922–1939)*, [in:] *Federalizm. Teorie i koncepcje*, ed. W. Bokajło, Wrocław 1998, p. 208 and further. See also L. Ziaja, *PPS a polska polityka zagraniczna 1926–1939*, Warszawa 1974, p. 220 and further; B. Głowacki, *Polityka Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej 1929–1936*, Warszawa 1979, p. 224 and further.

⁷ J. Tombiński, *Początki ruchu paneuropejskiego w Polsce*, "Prace Historyczne", Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, z. 118, 1993, p. 84; G. Haręza, *Z problematyki paneuropeizmu w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, [in:] *Doktryny polityczne i prawne u progu XXI wieku. Wybrane problemy badawcze*, eds. M. Maciejewski, M. Marszał, Wrocław 2002, p. 267. The Committee also included, among others, H. Liebermann, M. Niedziałkowski, A. Skarzyński, S. Thugutt and H. Gliwic as its members. We should also say a few words about Bronisław Huberman, another Polish supporter of Pan-Europeanism, who in his text titled *Europa w walce cel, klas i narodów* (its fragments can be found in P.O. Loew, *Polskie wizje Europy w XIX i XX wieku*, Wrocław 2004, p. 128–131) advocated the abolition of political borders between "Germany, Poland, France, Italy" by transforming them into mere regional administrative boundaries, the implementation of federalist model, creation of transnational armed forces, elimination of customs and formation of European statehood.

as an instrument to impose communist ideology and system on other continental countries. On this point Lednicki and Kalergi remained in absolute agreement. The former also called for the intensification of international efforts aimed at preventing armed conflicts. This proposal also was not contentious. The serious discord appeared elsewhere. It was caused by Lednicki's distrust towards German foreign policy's intentions which he considered to be inimical to Polish national interest. Therefore, he was not willing to let Germany play a fundamental role in the new European order. This stance collided with Kalergi's pro-Germany inclinations and his conviction that this state will perform crucial functions in the United States of Europe. Step by step the rift between Lednicki and Kalergi started to deepen. For example Lednicki in most emphatic terms rejected demands to return Gdańsk to Germany and to build a corridor linking the Reich with Eastern Prussia.⁸ He advocated strengthening of ties between Poland and its "natural allies," i.e. France, Great Britain and Belgium. Lednicki also did not hesitate to refute Kalergi's idea to construct a uniform economic bloc of countries located between Baltic and Mediterranean Seas.⁹ In the mid-thirties these political and geopolitical disagreements finally resulted in the atrophy of activity of Polish section of Pan-European movement. In our view the history of this dispute seems quite instructive because it shows that often the reconciling of sometimes antagonistic national interests on the common platform of European unity is an immensely difficult endeavor. Protagonists of such political projects can sometimes easily and not-so-surprisingly find themselves at cross-purposes when their visions of continental unity substantially diverge due to the differences in their respective national interests. This was especially true in turbulent inter-war times when the notions of interdependence, international mutualism and solidarity were either nonexistent or merely in embryonic form. In other words, the general phrase "united Europe" can mean different things to various people.

One other component of Lednicki's federalist doctrine deserves to be mentioned here. Responding to the charges of utopianism and lack of realism of Pan-European project, the politician made it clear that, while trying to achieve this noble purpose, we should never lose sight of reality, stop exercising careful judgment or ignore the current state of geopolitical or geo-economic affairs. In order for Pan-Europeanism to succeed, its proponents should always realistically evaluate existing perspectives for the building of continental unity. Radicalism might be correct when setting of final goals is concerned, but in practical operation it is a misguided and self-defeating attitude. Lednicki insisted that "in the question

⁸ Kalergi was a staunch advocate of these ideas.

⁹ K. Ruchniewicz, *PanEuropa hr. Richarda Coudenhove-Kalergiego a Polska*, [in:] *Polska wobec idei integracji europejskiej w latach 1919–1945*, ed. M. Wojciechowski, Toruń 2002, p. 56 and further; K. Fiedor, *Niemieckie plany integracji Europy na tle zachodnioeuropejskich doktryn zjednoczeniowych 1918–1945*, Wrocław 1991, p. 122 and further; A. Marszałek, *Z historii europejskiej idei integracji międzynarodowej*, Łódź 1996, p. 123 and further.

of Paneuropa we always have to separate the maximum and minimum programs. The maximum program would be the creation of the United States of Europe the forming of which requires overcoming many political, economic, social, etc. difficulties which are insurmountable today. When we take the minimum program into account, we find ourselves able to accomplish a number of postulates, meaning the elimination of strictly European affairs from the League of Nations deliberations, particularly those of economic realm, establishment of the International Bank, introduction of customs armistice, abolitions of passports and visas between particular states, unification of railway tariffs [...] Paneuropa, as a real idea concerning the association of European nations, gains more and more material shape.”¹⁰ In this context Lednicki’s views closely resemble those of Jean Monnet — one of the founding fathers of the European Union.¹¹

Summing up, we can conclude that due to the international and national circumstances Polish politicians, thinkers or intellectuals during the period of the Second Republic exhibited unsurprisingly little interest in the ideas of continental unity. As history was soon to prove, the idea of European unity was at that time divorced from socio-political realities.

The disappearance of communist system in the Central-Eastern European countries after 1989 signified a dramatic modification in Poland’s geopolitical situation. Polish foreign policy was reoriented; joining the institutions of the Western world became its most important goal. Even if the slogan of “Poland’s return to Europe” became a subject of some controversy, all major political parties and intellectual circles, generally speaking, considered accession to the European Union as a main directive of national interest. Opposition came from marginal — in a quantitative sense — groups. At the same time the attitude towards the European Union and Poland’s admission to it constituted one of the most basic lines of distinction between political actors. The presence of general consensus on the subject should not mislead us into concluding that the issue of continental integration was not a crucial factor in political disputes. The pro-integration discourse was very diverse and multidimensional, even if lacking in precision or depth. It revolved around historical, political, geopolitical, economic, cultural, philosophical, axiological and legal matters. It also touched both on the questions of universal importance (like the influence of integration on international relations or the fate of European economic model) and on problems specific to Poland (like the impact of accession on Poland’s economy and its geopolitical localization). While public debate was certainly robust, it seems to have faltered a bit in other aspects (like exhaustiveness or relevancy). Nevertheless, we can attempt to reconstruct certain concepts of united Europe which appeared in Polish political thought

¹⁰ Quoted in K. Ruchniewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 56. See also G. Hareża, *op. cit.*, p. 267–268.

¹¹ See J. Monnet: *The Path to European Unity*, eds. D. Brinkley, C. Hackett, New York 1991, *passim*.

prior to the accession. Unfortunately, this analysis has to be based upon partial, fragmented, emotional, banal, unclear, ambiguous, reactive, changing or imitative utterances (although obviously there were some exceptions...). In our opinion we can distinguish seven such basic concepts of European unity¹²: “federal Europe,” “Europe of nation-states,” “Europe of regions,” “free-market Europe,” “social Europe,” “liberal Europe” and “Christian Europe.”¹³

The concept of federal Europe did not enjoy a widespread support among the participants in a political discourse. The reason for it is obvious. Traditionally conceptualized national sovereignty is still considered by the prevalent number of Poles to be an autonomous value which should not be undermined by continental integration. Therefore, hardly any politician dared — at least openly and publicly — to propose a systematic federalization of the European Union. What is even more significant and at the same time troubling, many protagonists of the debate derisively laughed at the warnings that the possible evolution of the EU may lead to the creation of federal state and declared such opinions to be a result of completely unsubstantiated fears. Nevertheless, we can enumerate a few Polish politicians (like Andrzej Olechowski or Jerzy Łukaszewski) or publicists (like Zdzisław Najder) as the proponents of federalism. Described in its most rudimentary form, the paradigm of federal Europe implies continuous strengthening of transnational institutions (European Parliament and European Commission), widening of EU competences (in the realm of foreign policy, law enforcement, security, monetary, fiscal or energy policy), further development of common market leading to the introduction of truly free movement of capital, goods, services and workforce, limitation (maybe even abolition) of the right of national veto. Several arguments are usually advanced in support of this idea. First of all federalists claim that only a federal Union can be an efficient Union. If the process of continental integration is to succeed, the persistent ghosts of protectionism, of unbounded state sovereignty, of bilateralism and of thinking in terms of national egoism must be fully exorcised. Otherwise the European Union will get swamped in internal strives and vegetate in stagnation (or possibly even break down and implode). Only federal EU is capable of dealing with many difficult challenges (political, economic, environmental, security, etc.) which face humankind in contemporary world; only it can realize promises and hopes entertained by the EU founding fathers. The choice is actually extremely simple: either progressing irrelevancy of continental institutions, triumph of nationalist idiosyncrasies and growing disenchantment of

¹² The following reconstruction is based on public speeches and writings of many Polish politicians, journalists, writers, members of the clergy, intellectuals, etc. For extensive and detailed bibliography on this subject see Ł. Machaj, *op. cit.*, p. 245–461.

¹³ These concepts should obviously be treated as ideal types. A large majority of Polish politicians, journalists or intellectuals had no clear, well-defined vision of European integration; others were willing to compromise and search for middle-ground between opposite ideas; some simply did not care about these issues as long as the EU kept providing Poland with financial resources.

European citizens or fearless and courageous embracement of new inspiring ideal of federal Europe. The latter would be analogous to putting fresh air into a dusty room. To sum up these arguments, only federal European Union can provide useful and efficient framework for stable cooperation among its members which is an absolutely indispensable instrument for solving international problems. Federalists also maintain that only federalized EU can remedy one of the most pervasive plagues troubling continental institutions, i.e. eliminate the deficit of democracy and legitimacy. Transparent, uniform and simple rules of lawmaking process, strong position of parliament in the institutional structure, majority vote — all these solutions, characteristic of federal organization, would make the EU more understandable for its citizens. Finally, federalists also insist that federal Europe will better protect the interests of smaller and economically weaker states. Under a current regime, their influence is limited, their role is inferior and *rationes imperii* still dominates over *imperio rationis*. To a large degree the EU still remains an organization whose policy is set by those bigger and better-developed members. Only further progress of integration would enable other states — particularly those from Central-Eastern Europe to overcome these difficulties and make their voice heard.

The idea of Europe of nation-states is basically polemical towards federalist proposals. It is mostly a reactive concept the substantiations of which are usually verbalized in a negative manner by enumerating faults and dire consequences implied by the realization of the idea of federal Europe. It is quite telling that in a more radical form this notion is present in the discourse of the opponents of continental integration and of Poland's accession to the European Union. The protagonists of Europe of nation-states emphasize the role played by nation-states in international affairs, praise or even glorify national sovereignty, are unwilling to accept any enhancement of EU competences, denounce practically every suggestion to deepen the process of integration, affirm the right of national veto, disbelieve any possibility of achieving stable consensus on matters of foreign, defense, economic or security policy among member states, advocate national diversity and competition, reject any attempt at axiological uniformization of Europe. They claim that the idea of federal Europe (alternatively called by them European "super-state") is an irrational and doctrinaire proposal which ignores social reality and neglects the fundamental functions of nation-state (shaping individual identity and collective national memory, organizing political and social community, protection of common good, etc.). As long as there is no European nation and no European public opinion, such tasks cannot be efficiently performed by continental institutions. Federalism threatens to cause cultural and civilizational pauperization of the continent by imposing artificial values, by crushing dissent, by establishing false consensus and by sanctioning the rule of the strong. Since federalist ideas are unpopular, they can be implemented only by the sleight of hand, under false pretenses, by legal coercion or simply by the use of force, and not through honest,

open, public debate. The strongest promoters of federalism (because it directly leads to the enlargement of their power) are anonymous Brussels bureaucrats, deprived of any feelings of national loyalty, heartless and mindless pen-pushers. Another argument raised by the advocates of Europe of nation-states is that federalism by its nature necessarily implies centralization of power, renunciation of the subsidiarity principle and economic collectivism (for example by elimination of a possibility to compete for capital and investments through lowering taxes, reducing disproportionately high standards of social security or making Labor Codes less strict for entrepreneurs). The idea of federal Europe is therefore illiberal in nature. Finally, there is one other argument, or rather a warning: coercive federalization from above provokes violent nationalistic response which may easily lead to the growth of international tensions and even to EU breakup.

In its most extreme form the doctrine of Europe of regions involves a proposal to substitute nation-state with region and establish the latter as a basic structural unit of continental union. This point of view was (is) accepted in Polish political thought only by marginal regionalist groups and a mere handful of liberals. There were (and are), to be sure, Polish proponents of significant devolution and deep decentralization, but hardly anybody saw the very institution of nation-state as an anachronism in itself. Such a stance cannot, however, be identified with the acceptance of the concept of Europe of regions. The latter view is based on the assumption that in contemporary world individual identity is multi-layered. People feel loyalty towards their places of living (i.e. Wrocław), their regions (i.e. Lower Silesia), their states (i.e. Poland) and towards Europe as a whole. The institutional architecture of the European Union ought to reflect above-mentioned complexity. The supporters of this concept also point out that because regional identification transcends political borders and is cooperative in nature, basing Europe on regions may help to eliminate a lot of persistent collective antagonisms. They enumerated many other benefits and profits of implementing their proposal, like bringing the authorities closer to the people, elimination of centralism, better control over bureaucracy, reduction of economic inefficiency, enrichment of social initiative, promotion of multiculturalism and of multi-ethnic perspective, revitalization of interest in the common good, facilitation of individual expression, useful exchange of cultural, economic, educational and political experiences.

Two visions of continental integration in the realm of economy were mirror images of one another. Liberal paradigm of free-market Europe was based on a notion that the EU ought to provide a remedy for growing stagnation of continental economy which is caused by the preponderance of social-democratic tenets and dogmas and that it should transform itself into a guardian of basic rules of capitalist, liberal economy. It should, for example, foster free competition, fight monopolies, promote privatization of state-owned companies, eliminate public subsidies to certain branches of private industry, ensure truly free flow of capital,

goods and services, prevent members from leading protectionist policies, stimulate foreign investment, reduce social security standards, remove over-regulatory rules, liberalize Labor Codes, stimulate prudent monetary policies, prohibit excessive taxation. The opposite concept of social Europe was based on a notion that the EU should be an antidote to the process of economic globalization which leads to the emancipation of economy from political control. European institutions should therefore protect such institutions and values as solidarity, redistributive justice and interventionist macroeconomic policies; they should create a social safety net and build a social security system on continental scale; they should embrace corporatist solutions, ensure primacy of labor over capital, take environmental concerns into economic account, refuse deification of profit, combat social exclusion, impose progressive and relatively high taxes, promote common good and egalitarianism, take issues like education, health-care, etc. outside economic realm, rein in transnational corporations, introduce European minimum wage and unemployment benefit. According to this point of view, the EU should be a welfare state on a continental scale and not a center of uncontrolled capitalism and free enterprise.

At the core of the liberal Europe concept is an attempt to identify values which constitute axiological foundations of continental integration. According to its followers, individualism is the defining feature of European civilization. Continental culture is anthropocentric and based on respect for human dignity and individual rights or freedoms. In the political sphere it translates into democratic model (participative government, universal suffrage, majority rule coupled with protection of minority rights, political liberties, etc.). In the economic sphere it means at least conditional support for free-market system (respect for at least some limited form of private property, esteem for individual enterprise). In the cultural sphere it translates into a requirement of tolerance and honoring social pluralism (separation of church and state, distinguishing between sins and crimes, etc.). In the legal sphere it means establishing the rule of law. Although there were significant differences in the precise understanding of the above-mentioned terms, it seems justified to conclude that the supporters of “liberal Europe” tended to identify continental values with those connected with at least basic form of liberal democracy (with its appreciation for political, economic, personal, religious, legal and cultural liberty). Continental culture and axiology were also sometimes described by enumeration of certain formal dispositions of European mind, like skepticism, ability to question own judgment and civilizational standards, empathy towards other cultures, rejection of exclusivism, permanent criticism and auto-criticism, reflexivity, rationalism, belief in progress, reason and a power of imagination, rationalism, Prometheism, will to conquer matter, epistemological curiosity, cult of exploration, analytical abilities, preference for consensus, dialog, compromise and intellectual confrontation over dominance, monolog, violence and forceful imposition

of alleged truth, activism, anti-dogmatism, reformism, outright refusal to accept that we live “in the best of possible worlds” and constant willingness to search for alternative solutions, political proposals, social-economic models, etc. From a genetic-historical perspective, the advocates of “liberal Europe” found the roots of continental civilization in the individualist motives permeating ancient Greek philosophy, Roman law, Christian religion (albeit in a decidedly non-traditional variant), Renaissance world-view and Enlightenment philosophy. One other way to define European values was to name ideological enemies of continental civilization (fascism, totalitarianism, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, xenophobia, racism, communism and any form of political fanaticism). We can easily deduce from this brief overview that many supporters of “liberal Europe doctrine” often saw European culture as a culture of human rights. Ignoring practical questions raised by this issue, it is possible to conclude that they perceived the EU as a protector of those rights (either factually or potentially). Some of them even believed that the European Union should impose (non-violently) liberal values and human rights on recalcitrant and wayward member states.

The idea of Christian Europe was, by comparison, rather simple. Its supporters thought that Christian values (in a more or less orthodox version) should constitute the axiological foundation of continental community. This concept was not too popular among pro-integration camp. Due to the growing secularization of Western Europe, it was considered unrealistic to assume that these values might in any meaningful way direct EU policies and legislation. For this reason many Polish catholic advocates of integration and accession preferred the “Europe of nation-states” concept in light of which the European Union should focus on political-economic cooperation and refrain from settling moral disputes (for example those concerning abortion, euthanasia, sexual minorities, etc.). Making room for a possibility of future change, they simply feared that the axiological choices made by today’s EU would not be compatible with Christianity. Finally it needs to be mentioned here that the “Christian Europe” doctrine was quite popular among anti-integrationists and opponents of accession, for whom this vision of united continent’s axiology served as an honest (or just discursively useful) counterpoint to current theory and practice of European integration.

Summing up, we would like to conclude that contemporary Polish political thought in the realm of continental integration does not properly meet the challenges posed by contemporary world. European integration is one of the most important subjects in our current reality, an issue which permeates all spheres of social existence. We should require nothing less from politicians than a clear, detailed, precise, adequate and relatively consistent formulation of their position on European affairs. Instead, we receive silly slogans, mutually exclusive statements, inexplicable changes of stance, demagoguery, populism and appalling short-sightedness. To make matters worse, these are often accompanied by outrageous lack

of basic knowledge. This evaluation refers to all sides of political debate. No matter what our personal ideological, axiological, political, social or economic persuasions are, we should all expect more from our representatives. While the seven concepts of European integration may constitute rudimentary foundation for future doctrinal development, Polish political thought simply must elaborate on them and significantly improve itself. Otherwise Poland's role in the European Union will be marginal at best or totally insignificant at worst. We should not, to paraphrase a very notorious statement, seize an opportunity to "sit quietly."