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## SILESIA DURING THE NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGNS IN 1806/1807 AND 1813

### ŚLĄSK W DOBIE KAMPANII NAPOLEOŃSKICH 1806/1807 I 1813 ROKU

**ABSTRACT:** The article presents events in Silesia during the Napoleonic Wars. They were discussed both the 1806/1807 campaign, known as the War of the Fortress, in which the Prussians defended Silesia against Napoleonic troops, as well as the Polish uprising in New Silesia, which decided the further fate of this land incorporated into Prussia in 1795. The course of the 1813 campaign in Silesia were also presented. The analyse of the source material and academic literature showed that the description of these campaigns mythologised by Prussian historiography, so effectively blurred the actual course of events that the stories about Silesian patriotism became one of the foundations of the legend of German Silesia.

**KEYWORDS:** Napoleon Bonaparte, Silesia, New Silesia, Prussia, Napoleonic Wars, 1806–1807 Campaign, 1813 Campaign

Although Silesia in the 1806/1807 campaign was a minor theatre of warfare for Napoleon, he could not allow himself to ignore its military significance. Therefore, after the declaration of war by Frederick William III, King of Prussia and the defeat of his troops at Jena and Auerstaedt in Thuringia, in the first days of November 1806, the troops of the *Grande Armée*, led by Hieronim Bonaparte, Napoleon's youngest brother, entered Silesia. The French could not leave this area without military control because Silesia, bordering Austria, with its 8 fortresses, could become an area of preparation for a counterattack against the main forces of the *Grande Armée* marching eastwards. Against them were marching the troops of

Tsar Alexander I, who intended to support Prussia. Napoleon did not want to allow the Russian army to outrun his troops and enter Warsaw before him. In Silesia, it would get connected with the forces of its ally through Częstochowa, which remained in Prussian hands, and then the course of the 1806/1807 campaign could take a completely unexpected turn<sup>1</sup>.

The threat of such a development of the situation was a matter of concern for Marshal Louis Nicolas Davout, who, while staying in Poznań in early November 1806, sent his corps to Warsaw. He did not forget about the military importance of Silesia and he also did not overlook the stronghold on Jasna Góra Monastery, located near the border with the Habsburg estates. He planned to occupy the fortress and to start a Polish uprising on the eastern and southern borders of the Prussian state, which would cut Silesia off from warfare. At the same time he knew that about 30,000 Prussian troops had been deployed in the Silesian fortresses, which would lose contact with the main area of war operations in Mazovia and East Prussia, where the Russian army – the new enemy of France had just entered<sup>2</sup>. Davout informed Duke Hieronim about his intention to conquer the fortress in Częstochowa on 15<sup>th</sup> November. Duke himself had already been sieging the first of the Silesian fortresses – Głogów (Glogau) since 7 November<sup>3</sup>.

Through a joint action by Polish insurgents and a French cavalry unit, Jasna Góra Monastery was seized on 19<sup>th</sup> November 1806<sup>4</sup>, as a result of which Silesia was isolated from the main war zone in East Prussia. Napoleon intended to use Silesia and its resources to fight against the army of Tsar Alexander I and against

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<sup>1</sup> L.N. Davout to Napoleon dated 18 November 1806 and to H. Bonaparte, [in:] *Correspondance du Maréchal Davout (1801–1815)*, ed. Ch. Mazade, Paris 1885, vol. 1, pp. 343–345.

<sup>2</sup> L. N. Davout to H. Bonaparte dated 15 November 1806 from Poznań, and to A. Berthier dated 21 November 1806 from Sompolno, [in:] *Correspondance*, vol. 1, pp. 340, 350; J.H. Dąbrowski to A. Berthier dated 19 November 1806 from Poznań, [in:] *Dał nam przykład Bonaparte. Wspomnienia i relacje żołnierzy polskich 1796–1815*, eds. Robert Bielecki, Andrzej Tyszka, Kraków 1984, vol. 1, pp. 141–142.

<sup>3</sup> Patrycjusz Malicki, *Wielka Armia Napoleona na Śląsku 1806–1808*, Wrocław–Racibórz 2008, pp. 67–68; Grzegorz Podruczny, *Król i jego twierdze: Fryderyk Wielki i pruskie fortyfikacje stale w latach 1740–1786*, Oświęcim 2013, p. 87; Jarosław Helwig, *Twierdza Głogów – czasy wojen napoleońskich – 1806–1814*, Oświęcim 2011, pp. 16–19.

<sup>4</sup> Archive of the Jasna Góra Monastery, 759, *Acta Congregationis, S-ti Pauli 1797–1807*, pp. 315–316; Dariusz Nawrot, *Zdobycie twierdzy częstochowskiej i wybuch powstania na Nowym Śląsku w 1806 i 1807 roku*, [in:] *Częstochowskie Teki Historyczne*, eds. Norbert Morawiec, Robert W. Szwed, Maciej Trąbski, Częstochowa 2012, pp. 77–101; Janusz Staszewski, *Kaliski wysiłek zbrojny 1806–1813*, Kalisz 1931, p. 9; Aleksander Achmatowicz, *Epizod napoleoński w dziejach Jasnej Góry*, “*Studia Claromontana*”, 8 (1987), p. 180.

the remnants of the army of Frederick William III supporting it. The political position of Silesia was not certain, because after three wars with Austria, it was annexed more than half a century earlier to Prussia, it doubled its military potential, but its painful loss was still remembered by Austria, so far neutral in the conflict<sup>5</sup>. The French Emperor, after handing over the command in Silesia to his youngest brother, entrusted him with a corps of his army, consisting of 2 Bavarian infantry divisions of Generals Erasmus Deroy and Carl Wrede, a division of the Württemberg infantry of General Friedrich Seckendorff and 3 cavalry brigades of Generals Paul Mezzanell, Charles Lefebvre-Desnouettes and Louis Montrbrun. These were military contingents of the member states of the Confederation of the Rhine allied with France. He entrusted the command of the corps, which ultimately consisted of 29,000 people, and which was given number IX in January 1807, to the 22-year-old Prince Hieronim, in order to create the conditions for him to acquire commanding skills. This was to be facilitated by the presence of excellent generals at his side, including General Gabriel Hedouville, the Chief of Staff. However, the forces at Prince Hieronim's disposal did not have a high combat quality, and the most numerous Bavarians distinguished themselves in rape and robbery. What is more important, the troops sent to Silesia were not prepared to seize powerful fortresses, as could be seen in the initial lack of siege artillery and poor reconnaissance of the enemy<sup>6</sup>.

To defend Silesia, the Prussians have deployed over 19 thousands of people in the fortresses: Głogów, Wrocław (Breslau), Brzeg (Brieg), Koźle (Cosel), Nysa (Neisse), Świdnica (Schweidnitz), Srebrna Góra (Silberberg) and Kłodzko (Glatz) (there were infantry and cavalry depôts and two infantry regiments). They were soon joined by refugees from broken regiments as well as volunteers and recruits, bringing the number of soldiers to over 28,000. However, the morale of officers and soldiers, after the October 1806 defeats of the Prussian army in Brandenburg, was severely weakened, so aversion to service and desertion was spreading. In addition, as Tomasz Przerwa correctly pointed out, the fortresses defending Silesia were of various types and purposes. In the Sudeten line there were: Świdnica, Srebrna Góra, Kłodzko and Nysa, and in the Oder line: Głogów, Wrocław, Brzeg and Koźle

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<sup>5</sup> In the Napoleonic era, the project to bring the province back to the Habsburg monarchy will be revived many times: *Historia Górnego Śląska*, eds. Joachim Bahlcke, Dan Gawrecki, Ryszard Kaczmarek, Gliwice 2011, pp. 174–175.

<sup>6</sup> Joseph Schmölzl, *Der Feldzug der Bayern von 1806–7 in Schlesien und Polen*, München 1856, p. 45; Eduard Höpfner, *Wojna lat 1806–1807*, Oświęcim 2016, pp. 18–19.

located in the south-east. This arrangement allowed to control the main communication artery of the region, which was the Oder River, and the Sudetes, which for a long time were intended to defend the province from the expected enemy attack. Whereas in 1806, Napoleon's troops have come from the west and north-west – from the direction where the fortress in Głogów was the only protection<sup>7</sup>.

Silesia was therefore not properly prepared for defence, and the situation after the defeat in the Thuringian fields overwhelmed the Silesian Minister Georg von Hoym, who was unable to control the resulting chaos. The brigadier of the Silesian fortresses, General Karl Christian Reinhold von Lindener, suggested that the commanders of the fortress should be passive and fight to a limited extent, which was right, as their garrisons accounted for only half the anticipated state for defence. He therefore ordered to leave the fortifications and to confine themselves to defending the core of the fortress. Attempts were made to save Silesia by the brothers Heinrich and Hans Lüttwitz, who set off for East Prussia in mid-November 1806 to look to Frederick William III for help for the endangered province. The King, after hearing the visitors from Silesia, appointed a new General Governor of the Province in the person of Prince Friedrich Ferdinand von Anhalt-Köthen-Pless on 21<sup>st</sup> November, giving him an unlimited power of attorney. He also ordered his adjutant Friedrich Wilhelm von Götzen to leave for Silesia immediately. At that time in Silesia, the recruitment started to complete the state of the battalions, supplies and weapons were collected. At this stage, the fortress in Koźle became the main point of forming Prussian forces and improving the defence of all Silesian fortresses. Attempts were also made to organise a manoeuvring corps for field operations, but the troops formed were not properly armed and trained, and had no experience in field operations<sup>8</sup>.

Głogów has been the first of the Silesian fortresses to capitulate on 3<sup>rd</sup> December 1806. Initially, the French substituted siege artillery for field artillery, which was less useful in such operations, and then, after a long wait, mortars and siege howitzers were brought to Głogów from seized Kostrzyn (Küstrin). They were used

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<sup>7</sup> Tomasz Przerwa, *Twierdze pruskie na Śląsku w czasie wojen napoleońskich ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem wojny 1806–1807*, [in:] *Śląsk w dobie kampanii napoleońskich*, ed. Dariusz Nawrot, Katowice 2014, pp. 38–39; Grzegorz Podruczny, *Twierdza od wewnątrz. Budownictwo wojskowe na Śląsku w latach 1740–1806*, Zabrze 2011, pp. 142–173.

<sup>8</sup> Malicki, *Wielka Armia*, pp. 54–63; *idem*, „Mała wojna” w Górach Sowich i Bardzkich (1807 r.), [in:] *Twierdza srebrnogórska II: wojna 1806–1807 – miasteczko*, eds. Grzegorz Podruczny, Tomasz Przerwa, Wrocław 2008, pp. 55–75.

during the siege of the next fortresses, because the cannons captured in Głogów enabled to fire them effectively. Moreover, the capture of Głogów secured the communication lines of the *Grande Armée* fighting on Polish soil, which was – in the opinion of Napoleon – the first and principal aim of Hieronim's units<sup>9</sup>. The capitulation of Wrocław on 5<sup>th</sup> January 1807 was also a success, and the fact that the Prussian side failed twice in its attempts to unblock the capital of Silesia by the army of the commander-in-chief of the area, Duke Anhalt-Köthen-Pless, defeated at Strzelin (Strehlen), Ołtaszyn (Oltashin) and Wojszyce (Woischwitz) on 26<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> December 1806. However, when this Prussian relief came near Wrocław, the garrison of the capital of Silesia did not manage to take any major action<sup>10</sup>. The fortress in Brzeg capitulated on 16<sup>th</sup> January 1807 and the attempts of the Prussian army to take over the initiative during the siege of Świdnica failed, and the attempt to attack the forces of General Dominique Vandamme ended on 15<sup>th</sup> February with the defeat at Świerki (Königswalde), causing the capitulation of Świdnica on 16<sup>th</sup> February. Prince Friedrich Ferdinand Anhalt-Köthen-Pless, after unsuccessful attempts to reach a truce with Prince Hieronim, left for Bohemia at the beginning of February, believing that only with the support of Austria will he be able to defend the province entrusted to him<sup>11</sup>.

The sieges of the Silesian fortresses usually lasted about a month, maximum two. In none of them did the Napoleonic forces have a clear advantage over the besieged, so the storming was not chosen, except in the case of Wrocław. Nor was the classic siege, which would have been severely hampered in winter, used. The

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<sup>9</sup> [Jacob J. Gaupp], *Belagerungsgeschichte der Festung Glogau*, Glogau 1807; Julius Blaschke, *Die Belagerung Glogaus im Jahre 1806*, Glogau 1906; Malicki, *Wielka Armia*, pp. 81, 186–187; Paweł Łachowski, *Głogów w okresie wojen napoleońskich 1806–1814*, Głogów 2006, pp. 12–17.

<sup>10</sup> *Die Belagerung von Breslau im December 1806 und Januar 1807*, Leipzig 1807; Grzegorz Podruczny, *Twierdza Wrocław w okresie fryderycjańskim: fortyfikacje, garnizon i działania wojenne w latach 1741–1806*, Wrocław 2009, pp. 130–136; Karl Mente, *Wspomnienia z obrony twierdzy Wrocław podczas oblężenia 1806/07 roku*, [in:] *“Wojna twierdz” na Śląsku 1806–1807 świetle pamiętników*, eds. Patrycjusz Malicki, Jarosław Szymański, Chudów–Gliwice 2008, p. 67.

<sup>11</sup> [Adolf Wasner], *Gedenkblatt zur Erinnerung an die Belagerung der Stadt Schweidnitz durch die Franzosen vom 10. Januar bis 16. Februar 1807*, Schweidnitz [1907]; R. Aue, *Herzog Ferdinand von Anhalt-Cöthen und sein Austritt aus der preußischen Armee im Jahre 1806*, “Mitteilungen des Vereins für anhaltische Geschichte”, 5 (1890), p. 25; *Napoleon to Hieronim Bonaparte dated 18 and 19 January 1807 from Warsaw*, [in:] *Correspondance de Napoléon I-er: publiée par ordre de l'Empereur Napoléon III*, Paris 1857–1870, vol. 14, pp. 210–211, 215–216; A. Du Casse, *Opération du Neuvième Corps de la Grande Armée en Silésie*, Paris 1851, vol. 1, pp. 184–185; Höpfner, *Wojna*, vol. 4, pp. 89–92, 146–148.

spectacular successes of Napoleon's troops were determined not so much by the lack of fortress supplies, but by the lack of discipline in the enemy's army, i.e. the spreading desertion caused, among other things, by the large number of Polish subjects serving in the battalions of Frederick William III in Silesia and the lack of faith in the victory of Prussian commanders. Thus, after the first two months of military operations, the French took over the strategic initiative in Silesia, which was greatly facilitated by the 'attachment' of the Prussians to the fortresses. As a result, Głogów and Brzeg capitulated after a few hours of bombardment with heavy artillery, and Świdnica after three days of firing. A regular siege was carried out only at Wrocław, making use of its solid fortifications and the Oder River, but its main fortifications were not damaged. Nor have the ammunition and food stocks been exhausted in the aforementioned fortresses. However, the destruction of private buildings as a result of bombardment and fires resulted in protests from the inhabitants, influencing the commanders when deciding on capitulation. The conquest of Wrocław, Brzeg and Świdnica completed the first stage of the fights, and the most economically valuable areas of Lower Silesia, which also protected the flank of Napoleon's troops operating on the Vistula River, were taken over by the French. The war resources they acquired, including artillery and ammunition, facilitated the siege of the next fortresses<sup>12</sup>. By order of 15<sup>th</sup> January, the Emperor commanded Hieronim to take over, by 1<sup>st</sup> March, all towns not yet occupied in Silesia.

The success of the troops and Napoleon's orders encouraged Hieronim to begin the siege of Koźle. Thus, on 18<sup>th</sup> January, General Deroy received commands to begin the blockade of the Koźle fortress, which was then in a state of reconstruction, with the forces under his control. However, its defensive qualities were strengthened by the use of the river network and floodplains. Napoleon watched closely the actions of Hieronim. He sent him instructions and urged his brother to act in order to take control of the whole province as soon as possible and use its resources in the spring campaign of 1807. Throughout the war activities, flour, grain, vodka, cloth and oxen were transported from Wrocław to the main forces of the *Grande Armée*. Yet Napoleon was convinced that the completion of the province's conquest was not essential to the final outcome of the war. More important was the strengthening the corps fighting against the Russians in the north, so he withdrew some of the troops from Silesia, and the forces remaining, with

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<sup>12</sup> Przerwa, *Twierdze pruskie*, p. 39; Malicki, *Wielka Armia*, pp. 112–126.

around 15,000 soldiers in March, were too weak to resolve the campaign in Silesia quickly. The Prussians had comparable forces under arms, but they were broken up into garrisons and isolated from each other in defended fortresses<sup>13</sup>.

From 27<sup>th</sup> March 1807, the defence of Silesia against the weakened forces of Hieronymus Bonaparte's IX Corps was led from Kłodzko by Count Götzen, the new Governor of the Province. Under his command, the determination of the Prussians increased, which allowed him to prolong the defence of Nysa and Koźle, but the latter fortress was again blocked by Bavarian forces from 7<sup>th</sup> April. However, Commander-in-Chief of Koźle, Colonel David von Neumann, did not surrender the fortress, becoming a Prussian hero, as he defended it despite its advanced age and progressive disease. The Prussians' brave action, taken to seize Wrocław and break the siege of Koźle, despite their militant success on 14<sup>th</sup> May at Kąty (Kanth), ended in failure. The French victory on 15<sup>th</sup> May at Struga (Adelsbach) was mainly due the Polish uhlans who arrived from Italy<sup>14</sup>. Apart from the attempts to regain Wrocław and Major Losthin's expedition, the mobile Prussian troops did not play a major role in the campaign in Silesia.

The next phase of the fighting started on 3<sup>rd</sup> June with the capitulation of Nysa, and on 13<sup>th</sup> June the new Commander-in-Chief of Koźle decided to surrender the fortress on 16<sup>th</sup> July if he would not receive the relief by that time. At the start of negotiations, he had only over a thousand soldiers capable of fighting. Most of the garrison was in hospitals because of typhus, which caused the death of around 20 soldiers a day. Eventually, news of the peace signed in Tilsit (now Sovetsk) ended the blockade before the date of its surrender<sup>15</sup>. In the last stage of the war in Silesia, the warfare was concentrated in the region of Kłodzko and Srebrna Góra.

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<sup>13</sup> Malicki, *Wielka Armia*, pp. 112–129; Stanisław Michalkiewicz, *Wojna 1806–1807 r. na Śląsku*, [in:] *Historia Śląska*, ed. *idem*, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1970, vol. 2, part. 2: 1807–1850, pp. 18–35.

<sup>14</sup> Jan Minkiewicz, *Ułani nadwiślańscy na Śląsku*, "Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny", 2 (1958), p. 182; Janusz Staszewski, *Wojsko polskie na Śląsku w dobie napoleońskiej*, Katowice 1936, pp. 20–21; Karol Jonca, *Relacje francuskich i bawarskich dowódców o potyczce pod Strugą-Szczawienkiem (15 maja 1807 r.)*, "Studia Śląskie", 34 (1979), p. 126.

<sup>15</sup> Bernhard Ruffert, *Belagerung und Einnahme der Stadt und Festung Neisse im Jahre 1807 und ihre Drangsale bis zum Abzuge der Franzosen im Jahre 1808*, Neisse 1909; Samuel Uthicke, *Historia oblężenia twierdzy Koźle, jej blokady i dziennik wszystkich smutnych i szczególnych wydarzeń*, [in:] "Wojna twierdz" na Śląsku, pp. 179–182, 201; Malicki, *Wielka Armia*, pp. 247–248, 251–253; Karol Jonca, *Wielka Armia Napoleona w kampanii 1807 roku pod Koźlem*, Opole 2003, pp. 25–46, 57–58; *idem*, *Strategiczna rola twierdzy kozielskiej w dobie wojen napoleońskich*, [in:] *Wojna i pokój w dziejach twierdzy i miasta Koźle*, eds. Edward Nycz, Stanisław Senft, Opole 2007, pp. 41–45; Schmölzl, *Der Feldzug*, pp. 403–405.



At the first of these fortresses, the operations of Hieronim Bonaparte's forces brought the Prussians the loss of their hastily fortified camp, after which Count Götzen decided to surrender. However, the Prussian historiography, which glorified Götzen's sacrifice and heroism, did not later reproach him for the fact that the fortress was surrendered without even storming the main fortification objects by the enemy<sup>16</sup>. However, the fortress in Srebrna Góra, after the first clashes on its foreground, was saved from surrender due to the end of the fighting decided on in the news of the negotiations in Tilsit. When the glory of the defenders of Srebrna Góra was later glorified – as the only unconquered Silesian fortress – it was forgotten that the fighting there lasted only a few days<sup>17</sup>.

As Patrycjusz Malicki pointed out, the actions of Prussian troops cannot be assessed positively from a military point of view. Eduard Höpfner's opinion that the efforts of the defenders of Silesia and its inhabitants, despite so many disasters, can be described as commendable, should also be rejected. The actions of the Prussian manoeuvring corps failed, and as a consequence of this state of affairs the Silesian garrisons were left to alone, as they gradually lost contact with each other and could not count on the relief<sup>18</sup>. The radical ideas that came up as early as December 1806 in the form of the Lüttwitz brothers' plan to keep only crews in Srebrna Góra and Koźle, to gather together all the other Prussian forces in Silesia and head them for the relief of Wrocław, were very risky. If they failed, the whole region and its resources would immediately fall into the hands of the enemy. On the other hand, the Prussian defence capabilities in the fortresses were significantly limited by the dispersal of the 'defenders', including their numerous desertions. Prussian soldiers, mostly peasants, were subjected to brutal discipline in the army and did not feel excessive attachment to the Prussian state. A similar distance was felt by the Polish Hohenzollern subjects, many of whom were incorporated into the Silesian regiments<sup>19</sup>.

The key to the course of the fights in 1806 and 1807 was the isolation of the Silesian theatre of warfare in New Silesia, which was mainly due to the development

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<sup>16</sup> For example: Hugo von Wiese und Kaiserwaldau, *Friedrich Wilhelm Graf v. Goetzen. Schlesiens Held in d. Franzosenzeit 1806 bis 1807*, Berlin 1902; Paul Rüffer, *Graf v. Götzen ein schlesischer Held in trüber Zeit des preußischen Vaterlandes*, Breslau 1905.

<sup>17</sup> Grzegorz Podruczny, Tomasz Przerwa, *Twierdza srebrno-górska*, Srebrna Góra 2006, pp. 246–257.

<sup>18</sup> Malicki, *Wielka Armia*, p. 362; Höpfner, *Wojna*, vol. 4, p. 297; Bernard Linek, *Pamięć wojny 1807 roku – obchody stulecia oblężenia twierdzy kozielskiej*, [in:] *Wojna i pokój*, pp. 103–113.

<sup>19</sup> Jarosław Dudziński, *Dezercja w armii pruskiej na Śląsku w czasie wojny 1806–1807*, [in:] *Twierdza srebrnogórska II*, pp. 89–99.



of the Polish uprising there. At the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, this area still belonged to Lesser Poland (Małopolska), which was part of the Voivodeship of Cracow, and was not included in the Prussian state until after the Third Partition of Poland in 1795<sup>20</sup>. However, when in 1806 the first Napoleon's Eagles appeared in the lands of the Prussian partition, and the appeal of General Jan Henryk Dąbrowski and Józef Wybicki called their countrymen to arms, New Silesia stood up to fight as one of the first Polish lands. The nobles, and also the inhabitants of towns and villages, had no doubt as to which side they should be on in the great clash of the Powers. After the capture of the Jasna Góra fortress, the nobility of Pilica and Siewierz counties signed on 21<sup>st</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> November 1806 the "Acts of Insurrection" and started to form the troops of the *levée en masse*<sup>21</sup>. The Prussian attempts to pacify the uprising, made by Andreas von Witowski from the Upper Silesian cavalry inspection, at the head of the Prussian hussars, were unsuccessful. His stronghold was Koźle<sup>22</sup>, from where he undertook raids, but in response, the Poles began their expeditions to Upper Silesian towns. Then, for refusing to swear an oath of allegiance to Hieronim Bonaparte, Karol Trougotto Henckel von Donnersmarck, the "Landrat" of Bytom and Tarnowskie Góry ("Landkreis Beuthen–Tarnowitz"), was arrested and imprisoned in the fortress on Jasna Góra. However, the initiated expeditions ended in a defeat in a clash with Witowski's hussars in Tarnowskie Góry on 7<sup>th</sup> January 1807<sup>23</sup>.

The influx of volunteers from Galicia, who did not recognise the partition of the former Voivodeship of Cracow under Prussian rule, made it possible to strengthen the insurrection that finally liberated the lands of New Silesia from the rule of Frederick William III<sup>24</sup>. Interestingly, Polish expeditions to Upper Silesia showed them that this country "as far as to the Oder River is not Prussian one but Polish".

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<sup>20</sup> Dariusz Nawrot, *Powstanie na Nowym Śląsku w 1806 i 1807 roku. U źródeł Zagłębia Dąbrowskiego*, Czeladź 2016, pp. 9–27.

<sup>21</sup> The Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw (Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie) [hereafter: AGAD], Dąbrowski's Portfolios (Teki Dąbrowskiego), vol. 10, part 2, p. 130, Report of the Lelów [Lelov] County Commission to the Administrative Commission of Kalisz [Kalisz] dated 23<sup>rd</sup> November 1806; *ibidem*, pp. 112–114, Declaration of the citizens of Lelów County of 21<sup>st</sup> November 1806 in Żarki.

<sup>22</sup> J. H. Dąbrowski to J. Murat dated 18 and 19 December 1806, [in:] *Dał nam przykład*, vol. 1, pp. 175–176; A. Nowack, *Andreas von Witowski*, "Oberschlesische Heimat", 3 (1907), pp. 139–150.

<sup>23</sup> *Report of Trembicki, a Levée-en-masse Lieutenant dated 4 January 1807*, [in:] *Dał nam przykład*, vol. 1, p. 176; The National Archives in Kraków (Archiwum Narodowe w Krakowie), Archive of Konopka Family from Modlnica (Archiwum Konopków z Modlnicy), T. Konopka, *Pamiętniki 1793–1810*, MS. 26, p. 216–219.

<sup>24</sup> Service Historique de la Défense in Vincennes, 2 C44, Köller's Report (unsigned) dated 20 March 1807 with comments on the margins.

Its inhabitants showed confidence in the Polish soldiers, welcomed them with joyful shouts and asked for help against the Prussian requisitions. It was during these events, in the spring of 1807, that the first project to provoke a pro-Polish uprising in Upper Silesia was created. A *levée en masse* under the command of Wojciech Męciński, a landowner General Major of the Voivodeship of Cracow, existed in the area of New Silesia until March 1807, securing the area of Silesia from the east. The Polish authorities of the Duchy of Warsaw had no doubt that the two counties of New Silesia should be placed under their jurisdiction in the new circumstances. That is why the Governing Commission in Warsaw has extended its authority in this area through the Administrative Chamber of the Kalisz Department. Events in New Silesia resulted in the accession on the part of Napoleon by Jan Nepomucen Sułkowski from Bielsko, the only Silesian aristocrat. However, he did not have the financial means to form a cavalry regiment. Although he reached Napoleon and obtained his acceptance for his intentions, the expedition to Upper Silesia and the confrontation at Mysłowice on 7<sup>th</sup> April 1807 led to an event of fatal consequences for Prince Sułkowski<sup>25</sup>. In Silesia, Polish lancers (uhrlans) who had arrived under the command of Piotr Świdorski from Italy also fought. But before they reached Wrocław, they had to battle with Major Losthin's unit and fight at Kłodzko and Srebrna Góra<sup>26</sup>. They gave rise to the Polish-Italian Legion in Silesia, and the influx of volunteers made it possible to form the Legion of the Vistula<sup>27</sup>. However, they did not feel any particular fondness for the inhabitants of Lower Silesia, who were concerned about whether Silesia would return under the rule of the King of Prussia<sup>28</sup>.

The 1806/1807 campaign brought Silesia not only the occupation of the French army but also the necessity to pay a great contribution imposed on the defeated Prussia. The peace with Napoleon also determined the territorial shape of Silesia. After several days of negotiations in Tilsit, the treaty between France and Prussia, concluded on 9<sup>th</sup> July 1807, remained Lower and Upper Silesia within the borders of the Kingdom of Prussia. Moreover, bearing in mind the economic value of New

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<sup>25</sup> AGAD, Governing Commission (Komisja Rządząca), II 50, p. 36, Governing Commission dated 11<sup>th</sup> April 1807; AGAD, Dąbrowski's Portfolios (Teki Dąbrowskiego), vol. 11, Part. 1, p. 202, S. Fiszer to J.H. Dąbrowski from Kalisz dated 18<sup>th</sup> January 1807.

<sup>26</sup> Dariusz Nawrot, *Udział Polaków w walkach na Śląsku w 1807 r.*, [in:] *Twierdza srebrnogórska II*, pp. 76–89.

<sup>27</sup> Stanisław Kirkor, *Legia Nadwiślańska*, Londyn 1981, p. 25.

<sup>28</sup> The Scientific Library of the PAAS and the PAS in Kraków (Biblioteka Naukowa PAU i PAN w Krakowie), MS 112, p. 9, P. Fądziński to his father, dated 29<sup>th</sup> April 1807 r.

Silesia, Prussian diplomats constructed the articles of the treaty in such a way that the area of western Małopolska, rich in natural resources, also continued to be part of their country. Ultimately, however, the Polish uprising in New Silesia and the sacrifices made in 1806 and 1807 caused the French to support the claims of the Polish authorities and in the final regulation of the borders, in the Convention of Elbląg (Elbing) of 10<sup>th</sup> November 1807, the disputed lands were incorporated into the Duchy of Warsaw<sup>29</sup>. Silesia, on the other hand, was to be occupied by French troops until 1808, under the command of Marshal Edouard Mortier. Napoleon also did not forget about the importance of the Silesian fortresses, but out of the four strongholds captured in the first phase of the fights he ordered to keep only the Głogów. This fortress was to secure the connection of Saxony with the Duchy of Warsaw and, together with the fortifications of Kostrzyń and Szczecin, guard the Oder line. The remaining fortresses were ordered to be demolished in order to weaken the defensive potential of Prussia in the future<sup>30</sup>.

The situation in Silesia was changed by Napoleon's defeat in the war with Russia in 1812 and Alexander I's army march westwards in 1813. The war returned to Silesia, and the province played an important role in the next war between Prussia and France. It was in Wrocław that King Frederick William III, in an appeal to his people *An Mein Volk* called, on 17<sup>th</sup> March 1813, Brandenburgers, Prussians, Silesians, Pomeranians and Lithuanians to fight alongside their Russian ally against Napoleon. The new war was to determine their future existence, independence and prosperity. Interestingly, the king did not use the term Germans and did not refer to Polish subjects. This first document in the history of Prussia addressed by the king to the people, in the opinion of Prussian and later German historiography, evoked allegedly an immediate response of a united nation, ready to fight and sacrifice. It has allegedly made a massive influx of voluntary donations and thousands of volunteers to fight the French occupier. Even those who were not of German origin took up arms and stood in line against Napoleon. They rushed to

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<sup>29</sup> Jules de Clercq, *Recueil des traités de la France*. Paris 1864, vol. 2, p. 209; Angeberg [Leonard Chodźko], *Recueil des traités, conventions et actes diplomatiques concernant la Pologne (1762–1862)*, Paris 1862, p. 466; Dariusz Nawrot, *New Silesia in 1806–1807 – between Prussia and the Duchy of Warsaw*, [in:] *Slezsko v 19. století*, ed. Zdeněk Jirásek, Opava 2011, pp. 35–51; Juliusz Willaume, *Rozgraniczenie Księstwa Warszawskiego z Prusami*, "Przegląd Zachodni", 3–4 (1951), p. 477.

<sup>30</sup> Malicki, *Wielka Armia*, p. 350 ff.; Hermann Markgraf, *Entfestigung Breslaus und die geschenweise Überlassung des Festungsterrein an die Stadt 1807–1813*, "Zeitschrift des Vereins für Geschichte Schlesiens", 21 (1887), pp. 47–115.

Kaliningrad (Königsberg), Grudziądz (Graudenz) and Wrocław, where successive battalions and squadrons were being formed, which together with the victorious armies of Tsar Alexander I pushed Napoleon's *Grande Armée*, which was being under reconstruction after the defeat in Russia, out of Germany, to the other side of the Rhine River<sup>31</sup>.

As a matter of fact, Frederick William III agreed to issue this appeal (its author was Theodor von Hippel) and to its form under pressure from the circumstances, as the Prussian monarch was left with nothing but to stand by Tsar Alexander I. The decision was made in late December 1812, at the moment of the defeat of the *Grande Armée* in Russia, when General Johann von Yorck, commander of the Prussian auxiliary corps at the side of the French, after the persuasions of the former Prussian ministers Heinrich vom und zum Stein and Gen. August von Gneisenau, who stayed at that time in exile in Russia, against the will of the King of Prussia, decided to sign on 30<sup>th</sup> December 1812 the Convention in Tauroggen (now Tauragė), under which Prussian troops withdrew from the fight and this meant that they were in fact on the side of the Russians. Frederick William III did not confirm this Convention, declared General Yorck a traitor and assured Napoleon of his loyalty as an ally. However, the event in Tauroggen meant an actual rebellion of his subjects, who had already entered East Prussia with the Russian army in January 1813. These were opponents of the alliance between Prussia and France, expelled from the country at the request of the French, or Prussian emigrants who, on the eve of the war of 1812, sought refuge under the wings of Alexander I. It should be added that General Yorck, although dismissed by the king, still held command of the troops in the East Prussian province. The civil administration in Kaliningrad was headed by former Minister Baron Stein and its main task was to arm the Prussian king's subjects to fight the French<sup>32</sup>.

In Silesia, in the spring of 1813, the first unit of German allies of Russia began to form. In the area of Sobótka (Zobten), the organisation of a volunteer corps, called the Lützow Free Corps from the name of its commander Adolf von Lützow, began. The idea of forming a volunteer corps was presented to Frederick William III,

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<sup>31</sup> Thomas Stamm-Kuhlmann, *König in Preußens großer Zeit*, Berlin 1992, p. 372; Hans Dechend, *Die Befreiungskriege von 1813–1814*, [in:] *Das Erwachen der Völker. Aus dem Zeitalter der Befreiungskriege*, ed. Julius Pflugk-Harttung, Berlin 1901, pp. 231–235; Stanisław Salmonowicz, *Prusy. Dzieje państwa i społeczeństwa*, Warszawa 1998, p. 243.

<sup>32</sup> Heinrich A. Winkler, *Długa droga na zachód. Dzieje Niemiec 1806–1933*, Wrocław 2007, vol. 1, p. 71–76; Golo Mann, *Niemieckie dzieje XIX i XX wieku*, Olsztyn 2007, pp. 50–52.

who was staying in Wrocław, on 9<sup>th</sup> February and accepted on 18<sup>th</sup> February. The corps was to be formed as a unit in which those Germans who were not subjects of the King of Prussia would serve. Its aim was to fight for the creation of free and united Germany. But the Lützow Free Corps was not to mobilise the citizens of Prussia against the French, but against the presence of France in the member states of the Confederation of the Rhine. The colours of this unit, black uniforms, red piping and golden buttons, later became the colours of Germany<sup>33</sup>.

Frederick William III stayed in Wrocław, free of the French, from 25<sup>th</sup> January 1813. He left Berlin, occupied by Napoleon's army, hoping to avoid being arrested by the French and to regain his freedom of action. In Wrocław, Baron Stein reached him and forced the King to meet Alexander I. On 28<sup>th</sup> February, in Kalisz, the two rulers once again fell in each other's arms, sealing the new alliance with kisses. The decision of Frederick William III was motivated both by the attitude of his own subjects and by the danger behind the idea of building, together with France, a united and liberal Germany in which Prussia would disappear. The reformers in Stein's circle strongly urged Alexander I to support this idea, and the Tsar was inclined to flirt with the forces that might have caused the anti-French German uprising to support his army. For Stein, this was supposed to be a struggle of the uprising nation (citizens) against despotism, and owing to his collaborator an in announcement of a new free Reich with a liberal constitution was made in the "Kalisz Proclamation" by Niklas von Rehdiger. This was a response provoked, among other things, by the "Adressess to the German Nation" of Johann Fichte about the awakening of the nation, which was reflected in the "Catechism for German Soldiers" by Ernst Moritz Arndt, another associate of Stein. This conviction, which was terrifying Frederick William III, was the result of, among other things, the reforms of the Napoleonic times in the area of the Confederation of the Rhine and transformation of the Prussian state, which gave birth to a wave of nationalism and a desire to continue the changes promoted by the strata of enlightened nobility and was a sign of growing in strength of the modern bourgeoisie. The Austrian question was also of importance to the king. Austria's neutrality at the time and the opportunity to strengthen its cooperation with Russia created an opportunity for the Hohenzollerns in Germany to gain an advantage over the

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<sup>33</sup> Frank Bauer, *Horrido Lützow! Geschichte und Tradition des Lützower Freikorp*, München 2000; Robert Kisiel, *Korpus Lützowa – wojsko z tradycji wrocławskiej Almae Mater*, "Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka", 57 (2002), 3, p. 373.

Habsburgs<sup>34</sup>. The military importance of Silesia was determined, among other things, by the fact that it was from there that the main attack of the Allies on Saxony started in March 1813. The Russian army in Silesia was accompanied by 27,000 Prussian soldiers commanded by Gebhard von Blücher. The delay resulted from the king's fear of the fate of Berlin, where Napoleon's soldiers were stationed. Prussia intended to take active action only after Berlin would be occupied by Russians, and Kutuzov did not want to engaged his army without Prussian forces. The dispute was settled by compromise, so the Prussian troops were to accompany their ally, but initially without engaging in combat. At the beginning of 1813, Prussia had a 42,000<sup>th</sup> army (2 guard regiments and 18 line regiments), which was doubled thanks to the "Krümpersystem", i.e. training of recruits called for service by experienced soldiers and sending them back to reserve at fixed intervals. A total of 52 battalions of the reserve were thus established, but only a few took part in the battles still being fought in the spring of this year. The rest were not ready for action until the autumn. Initially, these troops did not present high military quality and their problem was the equipment.

They were largely made up of foreigners, were badly commanded, undisciplined and did not play a significant military role. However, the youth of the nobility, and of the bourgeoisie, students and even pupils, animated by the spirit of patriotism, joined these formations. The patriotism of these young people, however, was not Prussian, but German, and most importantly, it was not as many volunteers as the Prussian and then German historiography later presented. Also Lützow's Free Corps on 28<sup>th</sup> March, after a mass in the church in Rogów Sobócki (Rogau Rosenau), set off to Saxony, where the recruitment process continued. In this context, the story of the mass participation of students of the University of Wrocław in this unit is a legend<sup>35</sup>. Admittedly, there were academic youth within it, but from completely different areas of Germany. In any case, they represented only 12% of its composition. There were not many Prussians, and especially Silesians, in the unit. Even if they did join it, prompted by patriotic calls, they often, like the great poet Joseph von Eichendorff, the son of an officer, resigned from service because the nature of the voluntary unit required them to provide themselves with uniforms

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<sup>34</sup> Karl Heinz Schäfer, *Ernst Moritz Arndt als politischer Publizist. Studien zur Publizistik, Pressepolitik und kollektiven Bewusstsein im frühen 19. Jahrhundert*, Bonn 1974, p. 123; Mariusz Olczak, *Kampania 1813. Śląsk i Łużyce*, Wrocław 2004, p. 49.

<sup>35</sup> There were 232 matriculated students in the academic year 1811/1812, and only 25 in the summer semester 1813 and 147 in the academic year 1813/14.



and equipment at their own expense<sup>36</sup>. There was a high desertion rate of 24.5% in the infantry and 8.5% in the cavalry. From 9<sup>th</sup> February 1813 onwards, universal compulsory military service was introduced, establishing the so-called "Landwehr", following the Austrian model. However, the costs of equipping the recruits had to be covered by the recruits themselves, or by the villages from which they came from, which resulted in the disastrous state of armaments and uniforms of the units formed out of them. Therefore, also in the 1813 campaign, this formation did not play a major role<sup>37</sup>.

One of the elements of the legend of a widespread rise of Prussians against Napoleon was the story of the involvement of the Silesians in the fight against the French. The sources say exactly the opposite. The mobilisation effort of Silesia was not at all the highest in the whole Prussian state, although it was assumed that a 50 thousandth contingent would be formed (in the middle of the year only 20 out of 68 planned battalions were sent to fight). This was determined by the attitude of the population, which was reluctant to submit to the wartime regulations of the Prussian administration. In Prussia, the small and medium nobility, who were painfully affected by the consequences of agrarian reforms and grain price volatility, were reluctant to engage in the war. Similar reluctance was also demonstrated by the patricians of Silesian cities, who felt they were victims of urban reform in 1812. The bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie were initially anti-French, but their patriotic zeal was quickly cooled by numerous war contributions. Also, the village did not rush into the army, recognising – interestingly – that the abolition of serfdom was thanks to France, and all the other inconveniences they suffered were the result of the Prussian authorities. Stein's reforms improved the economic situation of only a part of the wealthy peasants, and forced conscription to the army in the villages was even met with attempts at resistance. In this respect, the worst situation was in Upper Silesia, where the formation of the "Landwehr" collapsed at all, and when Napoleon's *Grande Armée* entered Silesia in June 1813, many inhabitants

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<sup>36</sup> Johann F.G. Eiselen, *Geschichte des Lützowschen Freikorps*, Halle 1841, p. 9; Karl Berger, *Theodor Koerner*, Bielefeld 1912; Günther Schiwy, *Eichendorff. Der Dichter in seiner Zeit. Eine Biographie*, München 2000; Bauer, *Horrido Lützow!*, pp. 250–255; Kisiel, *Korpus Lützowa*, p. 367–368.

<sup>37</sup> Albert v. Holleben, *Historia kampanii wiosennej 1813 roku*, Oświęcim 2017, p. 153; Francis L. Petre, *Ostatnia kampania Napoleona na terenie Niemiec*, Oświęcim 2011, vol. 1, p. 36–37; Paul Pietsch, *Die Formations- und Uniformierungs-Geschichte des preußischen Heeres 1808–1910*, Berlin 1911–1913, vol. 1: *Fußtruppen (Infanterie, Jäger, Schützen, Pioniere) und deren Landwehr*; vol. 2: *Kavallerie, Artillerie, Train, generalität usw.*



welcomed it with joy. The Prussian defender of Silesia in 1807, Prince Friedrich Ferdinand Anhalt-Kothen-Pless, a great magnate, provided the Prussian army with 12 “Jägers” in 1813, but already in May, when Napoleon defeated the Prussian-Russian army, he held ceremonies in Pszczyna (Pless) in honour of the French Emperor and his recent victories, including the conquest of Wrocław. He had an influence on the participation of Upper Silesians from the Pszczyna County in the “Landw-eright” in 1813, as out of 721 people obliged to serve only 261 reported, of which only 244 were sent to regiments, as 17 deserted<sup>38</sup>.

The spring campaign of 1813, despite the initially victorious march into Germany, ended with the disasters inflicted by Napoleon to the Allies in the battles of Lützen and Bautzen in May 1813. The march beyond the Elbe River ended, as predicted by the commander-in-chief of the coalition’ army, Mikhail Kutuzov, who died in the first days of the campaign in Bolesławiec (Bunzlau). For Napoleon, in his pursuit of the defeated, entered Silesia, and when he have captured Wrocław, the Russians even thought of leaving the province. The Prussians, on the other hand, intended to fill the fortified positions in the vicinity of Ząbkowice Śląskie (Frankenstein), at the gate of Kłodzko County, awaiting further developments. The Emperor of the French knew about the importance of the role of Silesia for the further course of the war. He remembered the possibility of using the province as a bargaining chip, especially in the context of Austria’s hesitation as to which side of the conflict it should take. Hence the repeated rumours in those months of Silesia returning to Habsburg rule. He also remembered the importance of the communication routes running through the area. However, entering Silesia by the French and reaching all the way to Wrocław, but without a final conclusion of the campaign in the general battle and the intervention of Austrian diplomacy, forced the fightings sides to establish a truce in Pielaszkowice (Pläswitz)<sup>39</sup>.

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<sup>38</sup> Henryk W.F. Schaeffer, *Kronika Wolnego Państwa Stanowego, a od 1827 r. Księstwa Pszczyńskiego*, ed. Bronisława Spyra, Pszczyna 1998, part 1, p. 96; Michalkiewicz, *Historia*, p. 72; Jerzy Polak, *Poczet panów i książąt pszczyńskich. Od Fryderyka Erdmanna Anhalta do Jana Henryka XV Hochberga*, Pszczyna 2007, part 2, pp. 47–51.

<sup>39</sup> Andrzej Olejniczak, *Wielka Armia na Dolnym Śląsku*, Oświęcim 2014, pp. 33–43; Petre, *Ostatnia kampania*, p. 144 ff.; Olczak; *Kampania 1813*, p. 113 ff.; Maciej Małachowicz, *Fortyfikacje Masywu Brzeźnicy i koncepcja obozu warownego z 1813 r.*, [in:] *Twierdza srebrnogórska II*, pp. 132–137; Zbigniew Aleksy, *Napoleon w Środzie Śląskiej w 1813 r.*, [in:] *Napoleon w Środzie Śląskiej (1813). Wydarzenie w kontekście epoki, historii wojskowości i pamięci historycznej*, eds. Grzegorz Borowski, Stanisław Rosik, Rościław Żerelik, Wrocław 2017; Franz Wiedemann, *Gneisenaus Feldbefestigungsplan von 1813 in Schlesien*, “Zeitschrift des Vereins für Geschichte Schlesiens”, 64 (1913), pp. 175–203.

The armistice brought about the division of Silesia into two parts separated by a demilitarised zone. Napoleon left a large part of his troops on the terrain captured during the spring campaign. Although during the Congress in Prague, the conditions for peace were discussed, the armistice was used by all sides in the conflict to strengthen their forces. Eventually, it was not until the summer of 1813 that the Prussian army reached 72,000 infantry and 13,000 regular cavalry, about 170,000 infantry in the battalions of "Jägers", *Freicorps*, *Landwer* and *Landsturm* and 18,000 cavalry from these formations. This, together with the artillery, gave more than 270,000 people, which was primarily due to the efficient administration carrying out the conscription of more than 5% of the 5 million people in Prussia. There can be no doubt that the value of this army was determined by the fact that it fought on German territory, and was encouraged to undertake the deed by the Iron Cross, a new order established by Frederick William III. A sign of the times was the fact that one of the first decorated for extraordinary bravery, after just a few weeks of fighting, was an inhabitant of the Silesian capital Meyer Hilsbach, who was also appointed, out of sequence, Second Lieutenant of the Guard<sup>40</sup>.

After the resumption of hostilities, the French Emperor thought primarily of an offensive on Berlin and limiting the activities of his troops in Silesia to the defensive. Yet at the beginning of the autumn campaign, it was from Silesia that another strike of coalition forces began, which drew Napoleon's attention. On 20<sup>th</sup> August, its forces, commanded by Gen. Blücher, reached the east side of the Bóbr (Bober) River, opposite Lwówek Śląski (Löwenberg). Aleksander himself decided to entrust the command of the so-called "Silesian Army" to a Prussian general, called "Forward", despite the almost common criticism that the Prussian cavalry general was under-qualified. It should be remembered that this army was two thirds made up of Russians, and its name reflected not its composition but the province from which it was to launch its offensive against the French. The actions were met with the immediate contraction of Napoleon, who took back the Lwówek Śląski, but failed to destroy the forces of the Prussian general. Blücher, according to the plans of the campaign, withdrew, not deciding to fight a decisive battle based on the Bóbr line. He then took a waiting position near Jawor, behind the cover of the Kaczawa (Kaztbach) River, but the Emperor of the French had to leave the Silesian theatre of war almost immediately to repel the march of Field Marshal

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<sup>40</sup> Bernt Engelmann, *Prusy. Kraj nieograniczonych możliwości*, Poznań 1984, pp. 245–247.

Karl von Schwarzenberg's Austrian-Russian army to Dresden<sup>41</sup>. On 24<sup>th</sup> August, Napoleon left Zgorzelec (Görlitz) opening the way to another offensive of the Silesian Army, which ended in victory over the corps of Marshal Etienne Macdonald (the so-called Bober Army) in the Battle of the Katzbach. Napoleon thought that the best plan for Macdonald would be to hit the enemy when they would launch the offensive. The offensive was started by both armies on 26<sup>th</sup> August, unaware of the enemy's steps. In the fields between the two rivers Kaczawa and Nysa Szalona (Wüthende Neisse), a battle took place which determined the fate of the 1813 campaign in Silesia. In an uneven battle, almost 80,000 Prussians and Russians took part opposite 48,000 Frenchmen. In the battles on the Janowice (Jannowitz) Plateau in a storm and heavy rain, General Blücher's troops gained the advantage. Despite the initial successes of the French, and even General Yorck's conviction of defeat, Horace Sébastiani's cavalry was scattered and thrown away towards the valley of the Nysa Szalona River. Its retreat could not be protected by the infantry, because the gun powder in its guns got damp. The violent rise of the waters of the Nysa Szalona River made it impossible to cross it, leading to a breakdown in order and discipline in the French troops. Those who could, were rescuing themselves on their own. In assessing the manoeuvres of the Silesian Army's troops, the actions of Aleksandre-Louis Langeron's left-wing corps were criticised. He was even accused of being cowardly. The command was also reproached for abandoning the vigorous pursuit of the French troops retreating from the Janowice Plateau in chaos, forgetting that most of the Bober Army was on the left bank of the Nysa Szalona River, which initially stopped the march across this river and across the Kaczawa River. The final success was only achieved by a few days' chase by the Silesian Army in heavy rain behind Macdonald's corps. It completely changed the course of the campaign in Silesia, from which, on 1 September, the Bober Army was driven out<sup>42</sup>.

The propaganda of the Allies, and later historiography, have taken full advantage of the success of Marshal Blücher's army. It was even said that on the

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<sup>41</sup> G. Clement, *Campagne de 1813*, Paris (n.d.), p. 322; Tomasz Szota, *Pamiętki z bitew napoleońskich pod Lwówkiem Śląskim w 1813 r.*, Lwówek Śląski 2003, p. 19.

<sup>42</sup> Patrycjusz Malicki, *Bitwa nad Kaczawą i jej znaczenie dla kampanii 1813 r.*, [in:] *Śląsk w dobie kampanii*, pp. 64–87; Mirosław Bujko, *Kampania na Śląsku i bitwa nad Kaczawą*, Oświęcim 2014, pp. 270–293; Gabriel Fabry, *Études sur les opérations du Maréchal Macdonald. La Katzbach*, Paris 1910, pp. 21, 24; Friedrich Carl Müffling, *Zur Kriegsgeschichte der Jahre 1813 und 1814. Die Feldzüge der schlesischen Armee*, Berlin, Posen und Bromberg 1827, pp. 25–26.

battlefields of the Silesian Army a new way of waging war was born, which was at the root of Prussian victories in subsequent wars of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The victory of the Kaczawa River did not end the fighting in Silesia. Once again in September Napoleon made an attempt at an offensive in Silesia, but it lasted only a few days. Still Głogów was in the hands of the French, being defended by a multinational crew led by Jean Rouger de Laplane. The fortress has played a crucial role in securing the key transport route of Napoleonic troops since the beginning of the siege in spring 1813. The garrison, weakened in number, capitulated only on 10<sup>th</sup> April 1814 and it is symbolic that the crew left the fortress only after Napoleon's abdication. Efficient command allowed the fortress to defend itself for more than a year, that is several times longer than the Prussians in 1806<sup>43</sup>.

The Napoleonic campaigns in Silesia, apart from the losses suffered by the province, also left a legend about the sacrifice of the inhabitants and the role of the events in Silesia for the final victory over Napoleon<sup>44</sup>. Prussian historiography has so effectively blurred the actual course of events in 1806/1807 and in 1813 in the consciousness of the Germans that the stories about the patriotism of the Silesians became one of the foundations of the legend of German Silesia, including the key role of the Victory of Katzbach. Napoleonic campaigns also decided about the territorial shape of Silesia, from which the so-called New Silesia was detached. From 1807 it became an integral part of the Duchy of Warsaw, and after the Congress of Vienna it became part of the Kingdom of Poland. Currently, as the Dąbrowa Basin, it is one of the industrial centres of Polish lands.

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<sup>43</sup> Frank Bauer, *Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher. Der Volksheld der Befreiungskriege 1813–1815*, Potsdam 2010; *idem*, *Katzbach 26. August 1813. Kleine Reihe Geschichte der Befreiungskriege 1813–1815*, Potsdam 2005; Herman Mueller-Bohn, *Die Deutschen Befreiungskriege. Deutschlands Geschichte von 1806–1815*, ed. Paul Kittel, Berlin [n.d.], pp. 595–604; Fritz von Knobelsdorff, *Geschichte der Befreiungskriege*, Berlin 1913, p. 147; Karl August Varnhagen von Ense, *Leben des Fürsten Blücher von Wahlstatt*, Berlin 1826, pp. 213–220; Petre, *Ostatnia kampania*, p. 190 ff.; Rudolf Friederich, *Historia kampanii jesiennej 1813 roku. Od podpisania zawieszenia broni do bitwy pod Kulm*, Oświęcim 2013, vol. 1, pp. 188–189, 282–283; Helwig, *Twierdza Głogów*, p. 110 ff.; Łachowski, *Głogów*, pp. 42–46; *Relation des Blocus et Sièges de Glogau: Soutenus par les Français contre les Russes et les Prussiens en 1813 et 1814*, Paris 1827; G. Bagès, *Le Siège de Glogau 1813–1814*, Paris [1902].

<sup>44</sup> Andrzej Olejniczak, *Obciążenia wojenne w zachodniej części Dolnego Śląska podczas kampanii napoleońskich 1806 i 1807 roku*, Bolesławiec 2009, p. 67. German soldiers from the countries of the Confederation of the Rhine and the Cossacks during the last campaign of 1813 were particularly burdensome for the inhabitants of Silesia.

## STRESZCZENIE

W artykule przedstawiono wydarzenia na Śląsku w okresie wojen napoleońskich. Omówiono przebieg kampanii 1806 i 1807 r., zwanej wojną twierdz, w której Prusacy bronili Śląska, w oparciu o 8 fortec, przed wojskami napoleońskimi dowodzonymi przez Hieronima Bonaparte. Stwierdzono, że z militarnego punktu widzenia działania wojsk pruskich należy ocenić negatywnie. Zawiodły działania pruskiego korpusu manewrowego, a konsekwencją tego stanu rzeczy były kolejne kapitulacje osamotnionych garnizonów śląskich twierdz. Zaprezentowano również wydarzenia związane z polskim powstaniem na Nowym Śląsku, które zadecydowało o oderwaniu od Śląską Zachodniej Małopolski, pozyskanej w wyniku III rozbioru Rzeczypospolitej, a utraconej już po pokoju w Tyliczu w listopadzie 1807 r. Zaprezentowano również wydarzenia kampanii 1813 r., w tym rzeczywisty udział Ślązaków w wojnie przeciwko Napoleonowi i znaczenie bitwy nad Kaczawą. Kampanie napoleońskie na Śląsku pozostawiły po sobie, poza stratami jakie poniosła prowincja, także legendę o poświęceniu mieszkańców i roli wydarzeń na Śląsku dla ostatecznego zwycięstwa nad Napoleonem. Analizując materiał źródłowy i posługując się opracowaniami historycznymi, stwierdzono, że zmytologizowany przez historiografię pruską opis wojen napoleońskich na Śląsku, na tyle skutecznie zatępił w świadomości Niemców rzeczywisty przebieg kampanii z 1806 i 1807 r. oraz z 1813 r., że opowieści o patriotyzmie Ślązaków, stała się jednym z fundamentów legendy niemieckiego Śląska.

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