Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

Metafizyka muzułmańska — kryzys, reformacja, transformacja, reintegralizacja?

Mariusz Turowski — 2024-09-23

The paper is an introduction to the collection of articles, published in the current issue of “Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia”, on both the subject matter conceived (as broadly as possible) as Islamic metaphysics and on the very studies of this research area (the current state of knowledge, conjunctures, tendencies, prospects etc.). It attempts to provide presentation of discussion of topics and problems, which can be included in this area, but offers also first drafts of tentative and “work-in-progress definitions” of how Islamic metaphysics can be understood with its orientation on the most recent contexts, inspirations and applications, internal structures and dynamics relating to its interpretations and evolutions, as well as its original, historical versions. One of the inspirations for the project of studying the Islamic metaphysics presented here is rooted in Jasser Auda’s ambitious works on Islamic law, not narrowed to a technical, specialized domain of research about foundations (fundamentals), sources, jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) or specific legislation related to the Shari’a. The paper sketches a general orientation map introducing basic concepts and methodological strategies used by Auda with the prospects of their further application to the study (and potential rethinking) of Islamic metaphysics.

Związki między metafizyką a Kalam: Awicenna a Siradż al-Din al-Urmałi

Engin Erdem — 2024-09-23

The question of how the relationship between metaphysics and theology should be understood is one of the main topics of debate on the agenda of philosophers and theologians from Aristotle (d. 322 BCE) to Avicenna (d. 428/1037), from Avicenna to the late Islamic theological tradition, and even to medieval Jewish and Christian thought. Avicenna criticized Aristotle for identifying metaphysics with theology and presented a new perspective on the relationship between those two disciplines. He argues that God is not the subject but the goal of metaphysics, in other words — metaphysics is an ontological science in terms of its subject matter and a theological science in terms of its goal. In Islamic thought after Avicenna, the relationship between metaphysics and kalam continued to be one of the most heated topics of debate. Trying to explain the relationship between those two disciplines, thinkers such as Imam al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111), Shams al-Din Samarqandi (d. 702/1303), and Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjani (d. 816/1413) made a distinction between “Islamic science and rational science” and argued that metaphysics is an intellectual science while kalam is a religious (Islamic) science. On the other hand, Siraj al-Din al-Urmawi (d. 682/1283), who dealt with the relationship between metaphysics and kalam in his treatise On the Difference between Metaphysics (God-Science) and Kalam, revised Avicenna’s approach and criticized theologians who tried to explain the problem in terms of the distinction between religious and rational sciences. The aim of this article is to analyze Avicenna’s and Urmawi’s views on the relationship between metaphysics and theology, taking into account the historical-problematic context of the issue.

Z al-Kufa do al-Samarqand, z al-Samarqand do Stambułu: Adab al-Bahs ła al-Munazara

Necmettin Pehlivan — 2024-09-23

The chapter seeks to provide a road map of the historical journey of the science of Adab al-bahsa ła al-munazara (the science/art of investigation and debate). It has not attempted to identify all the various paths and crossroads of this journey, as it would have stretched the limits of this study too much. The focus was mainly on the Hanafi tradition. Even within this tradition, however, we did not have the opportunity to present all the directions and orientation points on the “Adab map”. We try to show, nevertheless, that if the route/road we have sketched is followed, then enough knowledge about the fundamental components of the science of debate/argumentation could be obtained. We hope, at the same time, that our study can serve as a guide to more exhaustive research on this subject. Undoubtedly, the road from Kufa to Samarkand described in the first, the largest part of the chapter is quite complex and challenging. Everything on the road seems to be still in the process of formation where not all patterns and principles have been fully revealed yet. The road from Kufa to Istanbul presented briefly at the end of the chapter contains probably less unexpected and challenging twists and turns than the previous one, but it is still far from being a simple, straight, and direct line connecting the starting point and the destination. As soon as we enter the Anatolian territory, via Tabriz, we encounter new texts and discourses of the science of debate. Moreover, the commentaries, glosses and taliqs (supercommentaries) produced on this land, have become, so to speak, the main record book and the general manual of the science of debate in every aspect.

Zagadnienie zła a teodycea w myśli muzułmańskiej

Zikri Yavuz — 2024-09-23

The existence of evil in our world seems to pose a serious challenge to belief in the existence of a perfect God. If God were all-knowing, it seems that God would know about all of the horrible things that happen in our world. If God were all-powerful, God would be able to do something about all of the evil. Moreover, if God were morally perfect, then surely God would want to do something about it. These facts about evil seem to conflict with the Islamic theist claim that there exists a perfectly good God. Several solutions to this problem have been proposed in Islamic thought. Ibn al-Arabi’s thought on evil goes as far as to say that what is seen as evil is actually illusory and has no reality. According to Ibn al-Arabi, existence is all good. Evil has no existence and belongs only to non-existence. The thoughts of Abu al-Hasan al-Ash‘ari can also be said to have caused a kind of moral conventionalism. Ash‘arism, unlike Mu‘tazilite thought, claims that the task of revelation is not only to explain moral statements but to impose and determine them. We encounter Neoplatonist point of view in Islamic thought. Avicenna says that evil has no positive existence or reality of its own. Evil is the incomplete realization of a good or existence. As maintained by him, evil arises when something does not show the full characteristics of its nature or type. There is no pure evil in the absolute sense. Solutions to the problem of evil do not always resort to the idea that evil is an illusion or an accidental element. According to Mu‘tazila and Maturidism, evil actually exists in this world; for conceptions of evil as an illusion or an accidental element do not adequately meet the conditions of being a free agent. According to this understanding, in order for an agent to have free will, it must not have been caused by external factors, e.g. God or the laws of nature.

Relacja między rozumem a moralnością w myśli muzułmańskiej

Ahmet Dağ — 2024-09-23

In terms of Arabic philology, the concept of reason performs the function of bonding and is a key to terms such as wisdom, goodness, duty, and autonomy. By using the reason in its proper place, morality that regulates the self (nafs) emerges. The reason, which is seen as the source of spiritual values, has given human beings the quality of being the subject of trust (amana). In Islamic Wisdom, human beings are distinguished from animals by the characteristics of carrying the Trust and having morality. Morality is not a factual but a spiritual value produced by the self. Thus, having reason also requires being moral. Reason, which is related to both matter and meaning, must move in parallel like a clock with morality, which is related to ideas and deeds. The unity of reason and morality is like the two boat oars that must be pulled in order to navigate the boat at the sea. The disruption of this balance leads to the disruption of the order. Islamic wisdom emphasizes that when this dual plane is well established, order and dynamism arise, and when it is disrupted, chaos and stagnation occur. In this paper, the unity of reason and morality relationship in Islamic wisdom is discussed.

Prywatność w myśli muzułmańskiej. Konteksty filozoficzno-religijne

Kasım Küçükalp — 2024-09-23

There are two dimensions of the concept of privacy, the first of which is to limit people’s sexual orientation and, in this direction, to be in a cautious relationship with both their own body and other people’s bodies, and the second is shaped around the meaning of “confidentiality” and today we come across the conceptualizations of privacy of personal or private life. The originality of the concept of privacy in Islamic thought, in which both dimensions are particularly emphasized, is related to the semantic implications that religious thought in general and Islamic thought in particular have brought to the concept of privacy. Because, just like the concepts of modesty and chastity, the concept of privacy, with both theoretical and practical implications, is related to meeting the true meaning of being human. Because, in terms of Islamic thought, privacy is related to man’s management and administration of everything that is entrusted to him as a trust, including his body, with the awareness of being in the presence of the Owner of knowledge, property and order, in line with his lofty purposes.

Wiedza i lęk („al-Taqwa”) w islamie oraz ich związek z terrorem w literaturze zachodniej

Sadık Türker — 2024-09-23

A person who has reason instead of instinct needs to be informed in order to survive. The relationship of vital knowledge with the soul, the source of life, has been established with emotions. Throughout the history of philosophy up to the 19th century, emotion has been a subject viewed negatively. Despite this, all deep-rooted wisdoms in the world, especially philosophy defined as love of wisdom, have accepted emotions as a criterion or a psychological sign of reaching the truth. In the last century, with the legitimacy of the view that the self-awareness of consciousness is emotional rather than mental, the relationship between knowledge and emotion has been placed on the agenda of philosophy and science. The emotional basis of Islamic wisdom, as in the original forms of Judaism and Christianity, is fear and its more intense derivative, terror. In other words, the emotion of the person who acquires vital information is at the most severe level. In the translation of terms such as taqwa, and rughb, which express these feelings, into Western languages, the etymological closeness between the terms terror and terrorism, the foreignness to Islamic wisdom, and deliberate manipulations have given negative meanings to its authentic and positive basis.

Hobbes bez Schmitta. Suwerenność, prawa człowieka a porównawcza teologia polityczna

Mariusz Turowski — 2024-09-23

The paper is a contribution to discussions about prospects of reaffirmation of the ontological-political interpretation of Hobbes’s thought advised in the mid-twentieth century by Leo Strauss and C.B. Macpherson. The paper begins with an outline of the main avenues and lines of contention and division within contemporary Hobbes studies, constituted as examples of the “definitive rejection” of Strauss’s and Macpherson’s interpretations. In the second part, there are discussed some issues in detail that help us to define the meaning of the political ontology in Hobbes’s thought as determined by the pair of oppositions “juridical (negative) power” — “ontological-generative (positive) power”. In the third and fourth parts there are considered two main aspects and implications of the Hobbesian theory of sovereignty, as well as the current debates around it (launched mainly as a result of inspiration by Carl Schmitt’s reading of the theory): firstly, the doctrine of an exception/state of emergency in relation to the idea of citizenship and human rights, and, secondly, metaphysical-political and theological-political, justifications of the “monistic” authority of the absolute power juxtaposed against a pluralist and democratic (republican), and at the same time a-secular and cross-religious-comparative considerations of sovereignty of the “people” (as a “multitude”). As a result of the proposed analyzes and reflections, the religious and theological foundations (considered through comparative studies on the doctrines and traditions of three monotheistic religions) are highlighted for questioning the “essentialist” approach to the “fetishism” of sovereignty in the most influential doctrines from Schmitt to Morgenthau and Hinsley.

Percepcja teologiczno-religijnych struktur wyznaniowych a naturalna kreatywna dyspozycja człowieka: perspektywa islamu

Mahmut Ay — 2024-09-23

The Muslim tradition brought secondary and sectarian literature on upfront and made its followers paralyzed by the confines of theological structures deactivating any human potentials bestowed upon them. Any attempt for aesthetic and artistic creativity expressing human emotional capacity could be easily condemned and banned for being against the Sharia law. Thus, human life becomes a subject of thorough surveillance under the light of sectarian, secondary and tertiary, narratives. This dilemma creates a conflict between the dynamic human powers of creativity and historically accumulated mindsets. This paper aims at investigating instances of this tension and finding some alternative responses to the problems it poses.