Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

Sztuka wykładu

Jan Krasicki — 2025-01-28

Neuronauka poznawcza z punktu widzenia Mocnego Programu Socjologii Wiedzy Naukowej

Marek Więcław — 2025-01-28

This article aims to apply the main theses of the finitist account of knowledge of the Strong Programme of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SPSSK) to cognitive neuroscience, understood as a methodologically advanced, transdisciplinary research enterprise belonging to the tradition of natural sciences. The text reconstructs the argumentative line of the Strong Programme’s finitism, pointing to its theoretical sources: the late Wittgensteinian semantic concepts together with his rule-following considerations and the network concept of language proposed by Mary Hesse. The application of the conceptual grid of the Strong Programme to contemporary neurocognitive sciences suggests that the natural science scientific and research enterprise on the neurophysiological substrate of cognition is a collective, institutionalised thought process that can be described as a social practice of concept (kind terms) application. This social process of using concepts proceeds in accordance with the concept of meaning- and rule-finitism. Grounded in this concept, the normativity of reference is explained based on the community thesis. If the finitist approach to meaning and knowledge proposed by the Edinburgh School is correct, two conclusions follow. The first directly follows from the formulation of the theses of classification and knowledge finitism: both the future use of neurocognitive terms and the future implications of neuroscientific beliefs are open-ended. The second is that any potential neurocognitive attempts to establish the neuronal mechanism behind meaning determinism are inevitably conducted in the mode of meaning finitism. Consequently, SPSSK seems to precede, in a logical order, all possible results of neurocognitive research, which turns out, like allnatural sciences, a conceptually open-ended and indeterminate system. In traditional epistemic terms, SPSSK claims that no cognitive neuroscientific claim is ever indefeasibly true or false. The crucial conclusion is that any potential neurocognitive attempts to account for the idea of meaning determinism and pinpoint the neuromechanism of semantic closure must themselves be semantically open-ended.

Prawda: własność czy relacja?

Maciej Chlewicki — 2025-01-28

The starting point of the article is a passage in Tarski’s work entitled The Semantic Concept of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics (1944), in which he points out the difference between the concept of truth and other semantic concepts. According to Tarski, unlike other semantic concepts, “truth” does not indicate a relation but a property (property of sentences). Although Tarski did not elaborate on this claim in his seminal paper, I argue that this passage may be taken as a starting point for further considerations of the essence of truth. In particular, one of the most important issues is the classical concept of truth and the problem of correctly constructing the definition of truth understood as not a relation but a property.

Wplątanie. Derridiańska demaskacja funkcji figury „Boga” w metafizyce obecności

Bartosz Bednarczyk — 2025-01-28

This article is a systematic analysis of Derrida’s concept of deconstruction in terms of its critical implications regarding the function of the concept of „God” in Western theology. First, the concept of „metaphysics of presence” and its significance for the topic is explained. Then, the article considers the structure of metaphysical discourse exposed by Derrida, along with its indispensable concept of the „Absolute”. This figure turns out to have the logos function, consisting in stabilizing meanings, centralizing the discursive system, and containing the influence of chaotic différance. Finally, Derridean criticism of the figure of „God” is related to an existential problem that he discovers. This concept, thanks to its centralizing function, turns out to be a response to the terrifying experience of being entangled in the unceasing game of differentiation, a response to the instability of discourse and, finally, to human finitude.

Teologia wśród nauk formalnych. Uwagi polemiczne do artykułu Krzysztofa Jaworskiego

Łukasz Remisiewicz — 2025-01-28

In the article, the author responds to Krzysztof Jaworski’s (2023) polemic, maintaining the thesis that, in relation to the methodological criteria of science, theology should be considered a formal science. The author argues that theology does not meet the criteria of empirical science due to the impossibility of treating God as a public subject of study. The author also addresses Jaworski’s objections and points to the need for a more precise definition of his earlier position, emphasizing the importance of formal methods and rules of text transformation in theology.

Siła upokorzenia. Avishaia Margalita refleksja o upokorzeniu i przyzwoitym społeczeństwie

Katarzyna Liszka — 2025-01-28

The article discusses Avishai Margalit’s philosophical reflection on humiliation developed in his book The Decent Society. It aims to show that while Margalit’s book focuses on the idea of a decent society as non-humiliating, and on “testing” selected institutions for humiliation, it also unfolds a complex reflection on humiliation as such. The purpose of the article is to reconstruct Margalit’s concept of humiliation and problematise selected aspects of it. I focus in particular on the relationships between humiliation and cruelty, humiliation and self-respect, respect and humiliation, institutional and private humiliation, as well as the theme of the humiliating perception of the other as less human and treating them as if they were not human. The argument is developed through reference to the texts of thinkers commenting on The Decent Society, among them Martin Krygier, Frederic Schick, and Dianne Taylor; those developing similar projects, like Judith Shklar, Richard Rorty, and Ute Frevent; and those bearing witness to humiliation, especially Audre Lorde and Frantz Fanon.

Niewykorzystana szansa. O niedoszłym do skutku dialogu aksjologicznym Ingardena i Elzenberga

Andrzej Lorczyk — 2025-01-28

In this paper, I take as a starting point an exchange between Henryk Elzenberg and Roman Ingarden concerning the mode of existence of values. Based on their correspondence, I attempt to trace the missed and lost opportunities for dialogue between the two great Polish axiologists. I demonstrate that while sharing an intense interest in the issue of the existence of values, they addressed them independently and in divergent ways. Following that, I also look at the posthu- mous fate of their unfinished dialogue and argue that their work opens a space for further exploration of the ontology of values.