

STUDIA PHILOSOPHICA WRATISLAVIENSIA

vol. XVII, fasc. 1 (2022)

WYDAWNICTWO UNIwersytetu Wrocławskiego

STUDIA PHILOSOPHICA WRATISLAVIENSIA

vol. XVII, fasc. 1 (2022)

Redaktor naukowy numeru/ Issue Editor

ADAM CHMIELEWSKI

Redaktor naczelny/ Editor-in-Chief

ADAM CHMIELEWSKI

Zastępca redaktora naczelnego/ Deputy Editor-in-Chief

ARTUR PACEWICZ

Zespół redakcyjny/ Editorial Team

ROMAN KONIK

DAMIAN LESZCZYŃSKI

Sekretarzynie redakcji/ Editorial Secretary

URSZULA LISOWSKA

Adres redakcji/ Editorial Office

INSTYTUT FILOZOFII UNIwersYTETU WROCLAWSKIEGO

ul. Koszarowa 3

51-149 Wrocław

e-mail: studiaphilosophica@poczta.fm

www.wuwr.pl/spwr

© Copyright by Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 2022

ISSN 1895-8001

Czasopismo „Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia” ukazuje się przy wsparciu finansowym Instytutu Filozofii Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego

The journal *Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia* is financially supported by the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Wrocław

*Opracowanie edytorskie, typograficzne oraz rozpowszechnianie/
Editorial and Typographical Preparation, and Distribution*

WYDAWNICTWO UNIwersYTETU WROCLAWSKIEGO SP. z o.o.

pl. Uniwersytecki 15

50-137 Wrocław

tel. 71 3752474, e-mail: sekretariat@wuwr.com.pl

www.wuwr.eu

SPIS TREŚCI

ARTYKUŁY

RANDALL E. AUXIER, PRZEMYSŁAW BURSZYKA, <i>Strangers in the Hands of an Angry "I": On the Immediacy of Other Persons</i>	5
PIOTR MACHURA, <i>Moral Topography of Memory, Time Control and Accumulation of Identity</i>	27
VICTORIA ROWE HOLBROOK, <i>Metaphysics of Beauty in Islam</i>	45
ENGIN ERDEM, <i>The Place of God in Metaphysics: A Short Analysis of Ibn Sīnā's Critique of Aristotle</i>	53
ILONA BŁOCIAN, <i>Mnemonic Images in the Early Works of Sigmund Freud</i>	63
MARTA DIXA, <i>Miejsce hipotezy „napędu kulturowego” w wyjaśnianiu ewolucji gatunku ludzkiego</i>	71

RECENZJE

MATEUSZ WOCH, <i>Metapolityczna synteza św. Tomasza z Akwinu</i> [François Daguet, <i>Mysł polityczna św. Tomasza z Akwinu</i>]	95
--	----

RANDALL E. AUXIER
ORCID: 0000-0003-1121-1471
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

PRZEMYSŁAW BURSZTYKA
ORCID: 0000-0003-4978-198X
University of Warsaw

Strangers in the Hands of an Angry “I”: On the Immediacy of Other Persons*

Abstract: In the first of two essays on the ontological ground of otherness, and its phenomenological availability, we argue that what we call the “occasion” within the encounter of others are sources as well as re-sources for disclosing the results of a construction and concealment of a secret identity, one we keep from ourselves even though we have created it. Yet, individuals are capable of returning their encounters to the well of *sensus communis*, and that *sensus communis* is as natural as it is cultural. Human beings are not compelled to interpret strangeness as threat, even if we are culturally compelled to interpret strangeness itself. Narrative lives in our *sensus communis*, and it is open, revisable, even danceable. Immediacy is person, the person that is community, and it is sublime, is both liked and disliked.

Keywords: otherness, phenomenology, self, subjectivity, Waldenfels, *sensus communis*, imagination, narrative

* This essay was written well before the barbaric Russian invasion on Ukraine in February 2022. The resulting warming of relations on the Polish-Ukrainian border, and between the two peoples, is certainly a cause for reflection on the matter of who is a stranger and why, the topics we confront in this essay.

A “Crisis”?

This paper is an attempt to provide a kind of response to what is commonly referred to as the “immigrant crisis” in Europe and in the United States. We do not intend to approach the problem from the political or economic perspective. There is actually no evidence that the so-called crisis (actually repeated waves of groups aiming to immigrate to the United States or the European Union, garnering broad media attention) poses any real threat to the security or the way of life of either Europeans or Americans. The political football being kicked around obscures the situation further.

The first and the only form this “crisis” really took, so far, is very strong experiences of uneasiness, inquietude, or even deep existential anxiety. These experiences almost immediately found their expressions in the hysterical arguments and theories informing us that right now we, whose countries are called upon to host the would-be immigrants, especially refugees and asylum seekers, are facing the greatest danger since World War II, that we are invaded by the herds of aliens who intend to deprive us of our identity and completely destroy our cultural heritage. Many of these rants have reached extremely radical levels of aggressiveness, some of them taking the form of ridiculously self-contradictory or hyperbolic statements (for example, “lazy thieves” and “bad hombres”). But all of these epithets and jeremiads could be brought down to the simple sentence desperately cried out by hundreds of thousands of Europeans and Americans: “We are under siege!” Most human beings can understand what it means to confront a deadly danger, and if they believe the threat is real, real responses begin to follow (for example, the separation of children from their families by the US government, or the awful events on the Belarus/Polish border in the fall of 2021).

The whole situation becomes more complicated when we realize that the strongest and the most radical reactions have taken place in the Central European countries and in the rural Midwestern and Southern states, which are almost or completely untouched by these herds of “invaders.” By contrast, many who live close to borders and shores, and who *are* affected more directly, oppose the tendency to exaggerate the crisis. It becomes even more complicated if one makes the slightest effort to observe the real state of affairs. For example, the Syrians on the Belarus border are actually doctors and lawyers and engineers and teachers, who only want to cross to Germany, not invade Poland; the immigrants coming across the southern US border only want jobs that US natives do not want anyway, and actually help the US economy, and so on. But the situation is not *about* facts or states of affairs. It is not about actuality at all. That is why we must designate the “crisis” in scare quotes — and in this particular case, that is an unusually apt idiom.

We confess, at the outset, a very deep, frustrating disappointment, which at some moment turned into a more critical attitude, expressed in one single question: how is it possible that so many of our fellow citizens and colleagues from different parts of Europe and the United States were so strongly and so quickly taken captive by what Elaine Showalter calls “hystories”?¹

¹ See E. Showalter, *Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Media*, New York 1998.

The Problem of Otherness

The problem of thinking through “the other,” or “otherness,” is as old as the history of Western thought, and indeed even older. It seems that it is, and always was, one of the greatest challenges with which not just philosophy but everyone must struggle. Even with all the changes of historical-cultural background, one can immediately recognize the very same patterns which constantly return and resonate — in this or that form — when collective fear enters onto the stage. It is not our intention to provide a complete list of these patterns, but we would like to point out few enduring issues.²

First, at least since Plato’s *Sophist*, we know that otherness can take two main forms: either it is related to the same and as such appears as relative to it, as its peculiar moment, or it is something which resists any relation and as such remains completely incomprehensible. In other words, either it is reduced to the totalizing dialectics of immanence or is cast out into an absolute transcendence.

Second, and as a consequence, throughout the whole history of Western culture the category of otherness was expressed (in religion, philosophy, myths, social imaginaries) in terms of almost Manichaean opposition with regard to both the ontological and axiological aspects. In other words, oneness, self-identity, sameness, were always recognized as the highest ideal, as the Platonic Good. Everything that would question this ideal, that would introduce the aspect of differentiation without any possibility of being appropriated, that is, the risk of alienation, is presented as Evil. The ethical implications of this perspective go without saying.

Third, the obsession with otherness (with all the ambivalence characteristic of obsessive thinking) is perfectly reflected in conceptual or linguistic problems as to the *ways of naming it*. It seems that in most languages there is no single word which would be able to render all possible nuances, shades, and forms of otherness. It is as if our languages work relentlessly in order to sort out this unbearable enigma, which appears and re-appears in so many different forms. It is as if “evil” has so many names. Any closer analysis of most of the European languages will show that we can distinguish at least three more or less distinct meanings.

The Meanings of Otherness

First, what is other/strange/alien is somebody/something coming from the other *place*, something external, as opposed to interiority (*externum, étranger, stranger, foreigner, Fremde*). A second meaning implies the relation of *possession* — what is other does not belong to us, is excluded and exteriorized — in an economic (*oiko-nomos*) sense — from the realm of what is our own (*alienum, alien, ajeno*). Last but not least, otherness means something peculiar, odd, unfamiliar, and uncanny as opposed to what is well known, familiar, and homey. In other words, this otherness is something resistant to the concepts and categories

² For a thorough analysis of the ways and modes of approaching, interpreting and thematizing (philosophical, historical and cultural) of the problem of the others, as well as their ethical implications, see R. Kearney, *Strangers, Gods and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness*, London–New York 2005.

by means of which we make sense of reality, hence, we mean any phenomena that resist our efforts of *understanding* (*insolitum, étranger, estrange, Entfremden*). Obviously, these three meanings, although distinct, point at different aspects of the same problem — but they very often overlap or support each other. It seems to us that it is the first aspect which is of crucial importance and which implies or even embraces the other two.³ In our inquiry, we will use the terms “other,” “others,” and “otherness” to cast a net over this entire field of meaning. We are aware that the discussion can go indefinitely as to how the terminology is best arranged.

The Creation and Limits of the Self

It seems that what is at stake in our relation to strangers, aliens, foreigners, that is, others, is not so much how we should understand them (as if it were possible at all), but rather what this relatedness reveals about ourselves, how it reveals ourselves before and to ourselves. The others introduce into our everyday life a shadow of uncertainty, unfamiliarity — sometimes moderate, in many cases highly disruptive. But why? Why does the fact of being confronted with strangers appear to be so problematic that our provisional and immediate responses take on the form of imaginative representations of almost apocalyptic dangers (physical, cultural, religious, economic, hygienic, etc.)?

It seems that these colourful and often highly aggressive imaginative representations bring us face to face with two significant phenomena concerning our own identities, which are much more complex, conflicted, and fragile than we expect them to be. First, one can say — following Bernhard Waldenfels — that the process of creating the self lies, to a large extent, in “drawing the boundaries”⁴ (between what is *heimlich* and *unheimlich*). The boundary drawing is logically and phenomenologically primal. There is no self and no identity which would precede this process or at any moment would stand apart from it. And what follows the self is always already mediated through its intimate relation to otherness. Indeed, we will go so far as to say that “immediacy” just *is* the presence of *others*, or of *the other* (these are not quite the same). This idea is certainly not unique to our view but is not given the attention it needs. The idea of immediate experience (unmediated by culture, symbols, even space and time) spreads out in every direction and affects everything else we think, say, or do.

Second, in accordance with the still dominant cultural ideal of the autonomous, independent modern subject, ascribing the very sense of *being* one-self to a particular and exclusive field of our self-experience is — as some of the more profound psychoanalytical insights have shown — nothing else but the imaginary effect of

³ We rely here on the careful and detailed etymological and conceptual distinctions made by Bernhard Waldenfels. See B. Waldenfels, *Phenomenology of the Alien: Basic Concepts*, transl. A. Kozin, T. Stähler, Evanston 2011, pp. 71–72.

⁴ See *ibidem*, p. 11 ff. In Waldenfels’s view this process is considered as equal to the process of constitution of any (always and necessarily contingent) subjectivity, selfness or culture. In his view (and we follow him with this regard) human being has essentially liminal character.

originally constitutive identifications with what is other (and strange), of what does not belong to the realm of my “own-ness” — for reasons we will explain later in more detail. If that is so, subjectivity is, from the very beginning, marked by a peculiar and often violent dialectics of familiarity and strangeness, of the most vivid desire for self-possession and a painful, disruptive feeling of being possessed or dis-possessed.

Both points show that *the subject* and *the stranger* are two sides of the same imaginary effect, which is constantly at work in our perception of ourselves and of the others. This structure has been observed in literature (think of Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Man of the Crowd,” Fyodor Dostoevsky’s *Double*, Robert Louis Stevenson’s *Jekyll and Hyde*, Thomas Tryon’s “the other”), in art, in film, even in popular culture (such as Billy Joel’s song “The Stranger”). This widely recognized aspect of subjectivity, this doubling, brings us the other *as* the self, and without that experience (to see one’s own embodiment and gaze in a primal mirroring), it is unclear whether any “self” can develop. The experience is so powerful that it cannot be ignored or pass unnoticed. And as such, it can have, and in fact often does have, significant implications of an ethical (and political) nature.

The Other Group as Immediate Otherness

A further word is needed about the difference between the presence of others and “the other,” as *immediacy*. It seems likely that seeing otherness in the other group precedes the individualized experience, culturally and anthropologically speaking. In our primal *sensus communis*, those who are part of our group are unable to be present to individuals *within* the group *as* “other.” In all likelihood, otherness is first experienced in the presence of *the other group*, and hence, the feeling of uncanniness is first generated between and among groups of humans, and it is likely that the experience extends into animal and even insect experience as well. The group structure reaches deeply into nature, where many kinds of mammals, birds, reptiles, and even groups of ants distinguish the “other group,” sometimes co-existing peacefully, sometimes locked in mortal struggle, and even sometimes developing complex social interdependencies, as with the *Polyergus-Formica* ant slave-making relation. The broad evidence of otherness at the level of groups may explain why human beings are likely, when threatened, to fall back upon a primal nature immanent in the species and in many forms of life. While the presence of the other group is not always a threat, yet, we may safely say it is always “an occasion.” This will become a technical term for us. That is, when *the others* are present, that is when *we* are present, and there is immediacy in the sense that even non-action is a sort of decision, a sort of “cut in time,” a “before the others” and “after the others.”

The Strangeness of the Time: Encounters and Occasions

Thus, the uncanniness is an experience of *the strangeness of the time*, an introduction of a before and an after that suspends the encounter in its immediacy as a kind

of “no-time,” or as an eternity immanent in an event. The presence of the others is an experience of being out of time, and hence, without a ground, without a place, *atopos*, *unheimlich*, homeless. All occasions are “encounters” but not all encounters are occasions. The occasion is the encounter that “takes hold,” that has portents.

There is no reason to deny that the encounter with others, this aspect of human *sensus communis*, is our natural aspect, shared widely with other forms of life. Even the weirdness of the “occasion” of immediacy may belong with the natural aspect, since it seems empirically evident that such experienced weirdness is surely shared at least by higher primates. But when we consider the range of, for example, dog encounters on a typical day in the park, we realize that weirdness is not *always* a part of the “occasion.” It might or might not be “weird” for the dogs. We have to wait to see what they do. The physical encounter of dogs in the present, and their temporally extended encounters through the scenting and discovery process, are (evidently) not usually “weird” to them, but a part of their *sensus communis*.

It seems to us that focusing overly on weirdness will not take us to the fullest account of otherness, and especially where, in human experience, the otherness can grow from a post-natural or enculturated combination of structures which, even if they are traceable to natural encounters, have taken on a dynamism of their own. It is a dynamism which permits the generalization of an individual’s portion of natural immediacy into a quite unnatural collection of responses — “unnatural” in the sense that they reverse the natural, putting what is prior as posterior and vice-versa. For example, although the others clearly have priority in the natural encounter, yet the individual post-natural response will place “us” in priority over “them.” Thus, we have the immediacy of others *to* our group, and a quite different immediacy of the other *to* our individualized experiences. This latter immediacy leads to occasions of another kind, or what we might call the “cultural immediacy of the encounter.” As fascinating as it would be to pursue the occasions of cultural immediacy, we must now move to a discussion of the individualized, post-natural portion of the experience of the other.

A Modern Alien

Contemporary philosophers and psychoanalysts apparently agree on the point that the question of the other or stranger cannot simply be extracted from the problem of subjectivity or the self. Some of them even agree that the latter problem is to be somehow solved or illuminated by reversing the whole analysis and beginning with otherness and strangeness. The reason for such reversal is quite obvious — nowadays nobody has any doubts that the traditional conception of the subject (evoked by René Descartes, developed by Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and then finding its articulations in many thinkers of both the continental and analytical traditions) can still be defended. We think not. These are philosophies of mediation, and we are convinced that the problem lies in immediate experience, which is part of the reason it is so intractable.

The picture of the human individual as being somehow isolated from his/her life world, being self-transparent, self-reliant, fully autonomous, and self-grounding; furthermore, we picture the self as being a distant and indifferent master of all his or her representations. This picture seems to be extremely naive. In fact, it always was. It was based on an artificial construction of the modes of human self-experience, and, as such, was based on a quite tricky theoretical and methodological step. It is identifiably modern in form.

The Cartesian “discovery” of this self-grounding, self-transparent, and autonomous subject — the ground of all absolutely certain knowledge — was accompanied by the significant operation of suspension of everything that could cast any shadow on this ideal construction. Everything within the field of human experience, whatever was doubtful, uncertain, unspeakable, or irrational, was relegated to the dark zone of the unknowable. Left out was the immediacy of others and of *the Other*, eliminating the ground of both nature and culture. In this way Descartes not only constructed for the first time, and unwittingly perhaps, the theory of the transcendental subject, but he also created one of the first and certainly the most sophisticated philosophical figures of strangeness — the figure of the powerful, mean, demonic Alien.

Enter the King

One wonders whether the felt necessity of the immediacy of the others, and then the Other (individualized from others), did not haunt Descartes’s mind, since it seems hyperbolic doubt as a methodological tool requires no demons. Yet, he spun from his own soul the mother of all demons, the evil deceiver. This move makes him the first great psychoanalyst. Those who believe that psychoanalysis was invented by Sigmund Freud are wrong. The only question was how to build the fence solid enough to defend the new, proud King, “His Majesty Ego,” against this dark zone, this otherness of the others (it is difficult not to think of Donald Trump or Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping, or even Kim Jong-Un). Such a zone creates a permanent danger for the stability of His Majesty’s kingdom of Light and Truth. Having denied the immediacy of others, and thus of *the Other*, these primal figures have no choice but to become, for this new King, manifestations of the royal ego.

But the energies exerted upon us naturally and through the immediacy of our social *sensus communis* are not willingly marched into the catacombs of the Ego. They rebel, resist, and persist in being immediate and other. Thus, beneath the constructed strangeness of the Ego to its own projections, there remains the primal immediacy of others (their nature) and of the Other (the individualizing work of culture). The former of these is what Person means as the concrete basis of sublime experience — and it is not always threatening.⁵ The latter, individuated response

⁵ We use the term “person” here as Kant does, for example in the Third Paralogism, A362. The use of the term “person” in Kant’s *Critiques* is reserved for a sublime experience of the other as an autonomous rational being and it can never be reduced to, for example, a judgment of taste. But it requires a reflective rather than determinate judgment, a generalization from what is not only particular

to Person is what "person" means, existentially, and this is the ground of dignity, unmediated in its presence, but dependent upon the natural aspect of *sensus communis* for its manifestation.

Kant's Suspended Immediacy

It is good to remember that, as Kant rightly pointed out, we both like and don't like the experience of the sublime. We do not like its refusal of form, but we do like the way it brings us to recognition of our power to determine ourselves individually in the feeling of liking by making a judgment. In many ways, then, we could fairly characterize the occasion of the presence of others as a demand for judging, and the presence of the others as a path to the recognition and appropriation of our individual dignity. Without the immediacy of the others, our individual dignity, if it exists, is latent and unavailable to us at the individual level.

The immediacy of the occasion is, therefore, the basis of the encounter with the eternal, the strange cut in time that makes these events call forth and absolutely require not only the act of judging, but the demand for an action which ends the suspension of time. This experience truly is what we mean by "suspense," and it cannot be held for very long. Action *will* break it, dividing the before from the action with a sublime and immediate, but *intelligible* moment. In a sense, this includes "I think, I am," but not as an argument, or even as a self-evident utterance, only as a moment that is ineffable in fact, but that inspires such inadequate utterances, as exclamations, of existing. Thus, we affirm in Descartes's great effort, the achievement of an exclamation, "I act, I am." And we then defer it as sublime, the sublimity of the other person.

That is hardly a ground for asserting a substantial subject. What we can find in the Cartesian enterprise is not only the superficial character of his conception of the subject; above all, it shows perfectly that the mode of being which is characteristic for ourselves is being referred to our boundaries — regardless of whether it takes a positive or negative form. In the most general formulation, that would mean human be-ing is always in-between same/familiar and other/strange, known and unknown, real and imaginary, a "concern" in suspense, unsustainable, and hence finite. Our finitude is grounded, experientially, in our inability to sustain the occasion of the presence of others, and the encounter with the other. We must act.

in experience, but unique, and which always fails to arrive at an adequate concept. This is the general structure of sublimity. See "The Analytic of the Sublime" in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. There is, of course, a whole tradition of philosophical personalism which treats these problems in great detail. Our version of this idea differs from the tradition in that we take "Person" as collective before it can be individuated, and in this our views are closer to those of Josiah Royce. See R.E. Auxier, *Time, Will, and Purpose: Living Ideas from the Philosophy of Josiah*, Chicago 2013, esp. chapters 7–9.

Im Anfang war die Tat

Therefore, we must leave aside all that might have been done in favour of what is to be enacted. An eternity of possibility is destroyed in releasing the suspended immediacy of others (nature) and the other (culture). As being finite, this act always directs itself in a more or less reflective or intentional manner to its boundaries. When we act, we know, after a delay, that we act, and we experience, primarily, the egress or departure of the possibilities we have eliminated. What is left afterwards is hardly a regal Cartesian ego. But *subjectivity*, as distinct from *the* subject, continues, binds the wounds of our cut in time, and weaves the after with the before, forming a cradle for the occasion and the encounter within its gauze of reflection. The knowledge of the act is less than the act, but it is *of* the act.

In more precise philosophical formulation it means that our human “essence” lies — as we have already mentioned — in setting the boundaries, in creating certain orders, and this activity always coincides with the exclusion of what is not considered “our own.” Waldenfels is quite correct when stating that the self is not something pre-existing and substantial, some substantial being who only then can relate in this or that way to its own properties and fragmentary experiences. Quite the contrary, what is primal is the experience of differentiation through which and in which the “self” is given to itself for the first time (even the word can be misleading, conjuring as it does “das Ich” and other versions of the modern subject or the Freudian Ego). The self is not only relational through and through, it originates in and from the constant process of distinguishing itself from the others, distinguishing between what is its own and what is strange, what is homey (*heimlich*) from what is unhomey (*unheimlich*).

Drawing and Bounding

The self is precisely the effect of such “drawing boundaries that distinguish an inside from an outside and thus adopt the shapes of *inclusion* and *exclusion*.”⁶ In another passage Waldenfels radicalizes this point: “This self is neither the veiled subject of one’s own act of bounding, nor the objective result of an alien act of bounding, but within the act of bounding it springs out, as it were; it appears as a cavity, as an *inside which separates itself from an outside* and thus produces a *preference in the difference*.”⁷ The metaphor of drawing is clearly inadequate; we prefer “act of bounding.” We said above that the occasion and encounter, as immediate, evade description, yet, the metaphor of drawing might be deepened by observing that one also draws water from a well, and that the well is fed from an unseen spring. Indeed, the well is a place where culture and nature cooperate. The well of our sociality, even when severely drawn down, is replenished from a spring of our natural *sensus communis*, which moves under the surface of our ontic constructions. Selves are like draughts from the work of drawing out some

⁶ B. Waldenfels, *Phenomenology of the Alien*, p. 11.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

individualizable portion of what existed before and with the common resource. We do not suggest that Waldenfels would endorse our modifications.

Even with the clarification, the self is essentially paradoxical — at one and the same time it is, as it were, one of the elements of the relation and the relation itself. Instead of the subject who is directly and intimately given to itself — the self relates to itself only by means of this *inclusive–exclusive relation*. It means its relation to itself and the relation to others, strangers, aliens overlap one another. Being nothing more than the temporary projection of particular orders, it appears to be at the same time at their limits, as bounded — the impossible non-existing place — within and without them. In other words, the rhythm of human existence is marked by a dialectic of projective self-identification and alienation. Although these two are not identical, the one does not exist without the other.

Our Secret Identity

Yet, to “identify” one-self is compulsory, as it were. To “identify” one-self is to designate a zone which stands over against us, the distance between the drawn water and the well water, and indeed, ethnically speaking, it is also to distinguish the well water from the well-spring; it is to be referred to what is external, or even more, to be reflected, as in a disturbed pool, in this externality. Waldenfels adds:

The opposition between the own and the alien does not emerge from a mere separation, but from a process of *in-* and *ex-*clusion. I am where you cannot be, and vice versa. We call a place alien if it is where I am not and cannot be and where I am nevertheless, in the manner of this impossibility.⁸

We are faced here with a two-fold paradox. First, every act of self-identification, understood as delimitation, is essentially mediated by the reference to what remains excluded. That means that the self loses itself in being taken captive by its own counterpart, and in this way escapes, so to speak, only from itself. In other words, the identifying self projects itself into the place of its own present impossibility, a return to the eternal and sublime occasion and encounter.

Second, as far as the reference to the other/stranger relies on the act of exclusion, it takes purely negative form — the self refers himself/herself *to* the stranger by *escaping from* the stranger. The simplest ontological consequence of this process of delimitation is that the self intentionally comprises what is excluded.⁹ We might say that it keeps a secret from itself. But the intentionality, which is operative here, takes on — as we will see — rather peculiar forms of radical break, disruption, resistance. The well metaphor has limits. This break of water from water is more than a calm lowering and dipping of a familiar bucket. That image might cover, for example, the occasion and encounter of families about to be joined in an approved marriage, with the breaking with the earlier order’s inclusions and exclusions encompassed in the act. It is an occasion and an encounter, and it does carry every structure we have described, but the occasions that concern us here are less

⁸ Ibidem, p. 73.

⁹ Cf. ibidem, pp. 15–16.

easily assimilated and woven into a seamless “before and after.” It is in this more violent sense that one can speak about the self in terms of exclusiveness — it is the effect of the process of exclusion, of which it itself becomes a part.

Strangers to Ourselves

If what we have said above is true, the self is always already permeated by strangeness. Waldenfels argues: “The ‘I’ is an Other because alienness [otherness] begins in one’s own house. The alien [other] reference within the self-reference explains why no one is merely who they are, and causes the chain of self-doubling.”¹⁰

Even within the realm of its “ownness,” the self is marked by the traces of what is other and strange, what precedes its own initiative and as such undermines its sovereignty, as if from within. Here we have something like the experiences that must underlie the reactions to imagined invasions of the “homeland” by refugees and alien races. We are always — at least to some extent — split, fragmented, and unable to reconnect with what has led to our acts of self-identification. We are before and at the same time behind ourselves. Our thrownness into the world (in the most radical way articulated in the fact of our birth, forever beyond our grasp, the moment when we are drawn out of our mothers like water from a well), our being in language, the non-transparency of our embodiment, the secret, enigmatic and often ambivalent stream of our thoughts, unconscious phantasies or dreams — all these phenomena indicate that we can never fully grasp ourselves.

At one and the same time we have an advantage over ourselves and are miserably behind. That is why human existence can be quite adequately described, after Waldenfels, as ecstatic strangeness/alienness.¹¹ It seems that our existence, that is, any more or less unified course of our experiences, is based on some doubling or reduplication of that before, during, and after, which we have repaired in order to include a sublime eternity within the scope of our finitude. Existence spreads over the ever-present possibility not only of self-alteration, but also of self-estrangement or self-alienation. Occasions still produce encounters. It seems that our self-reference is always already accompanied by different forms of self-eluding, in the sense that we prefer to rest upon the work we have already accomplished and maintain only the modes of alienation we have already woven into the fabric of our temporality. We act as if our past work were not the same as our present and future work. But it is. We remain strangers to ourselves and face an ever-present task.

To sum up, our being at the limit is articulated in two simultaneous, inseparable moments/aspects — first, delimitation constitutes what can be called “interiority,” understood as what is our own and homey and this limiting is done by means of exclusion of what we find unrecognizable, strange, unknown, inaccessible, unacceptable, *unheimlich*. Yet, somehow we are always aware that what we exclude is also “us and me.” My interiority is a residuum of my undifferentiated history with my kind and with all humanity. This is my common sense, a gift of our nature,

¹⁰ Ibidem, pp. 16–17.

¹¹ See ibidem, p. 51.

binding us both to our group and to the others. The interiority of my group is its residuum from what it has excluded and included from before it came to have an identifiable "essence," and from after every occasion and encounter, the presence of the others. That interiority is constituted negatively before it can ever become an identity. Second, and as a consequence, this process of constituting by means of separating produces and at the same time conceals our own strangeness.

It

But what precisely happens when I (and we) do encounter a radical strange-ness/stranger? And here we are already assuming that the natural encounter with others and the "occasion" have done their work, have individuated the self to some significant degree, and that this self now brings that setting to an encounter of radical otherness, which we now designate "strangeness" — that aspect of otherness that resists all efforts to assimilate or integrate it with the self. What is the genuine mode (or modes) of this strange experience of strangeness?

In order to answer this question Waldenfels quite adequately uses one of the ancient Greek terms for experience, namely that of *pathos*.¹² Its original meaning indicates "something that happens" in the sense of what one suffers or endures. Immediate experience is drawn from our existence and can befall us without being sought, intended, or desired. Furthermore, it usually takes on the form of an occasion/encounter that one cannot control by force. Thus, it is the immediate experience which undermines all concepts and schemata by means of which we could put it into some neat or tidy order, locate it in the organized sequence of events. Or, simply speaking, this immediate experience is given as irreducible to anything known and familiar. It appears beyond or against anticipation and expectation, before any initiative. It appears as a break and disruption of any unified course of experiences, and because of that, it also appears as an obstacle. The occasion is the encounter we never see coming. Such is its immediacy, and all immediacy.

Immediate experience touches, affects us, and agitates, puts us outside of ourselves, hits us with the prod that makes present. Thus, the strangers experienced in the mode of *pathos* are an "it" which takes on the form a *hyperphenomenon*,¹³ which is to say, *it* appears, *it* gives itself in a paradoxical mode of not being present. *It* is — to express this phenomenological situation by using Jean-Luc Marion's idiom — as if we were experiencing the pure appearing without anything that appears, and that is because the strangers always escape any forms we could impose on them. Such is sublimity.

That means not so much that the strangers, or the *it* that is strange, can be absolutely different from us. The encounter rather suggests that the strangers cannot be brought down to or derived from the realm of "ownness." Furthermore, the radical experience of the occasion, and of encountering the strangers, finds its prolongation in the strangeness of experience. As Waldenfels says, "Alienness

¹² Cf. *ibidem*, esp. pp. 26–28, 34, 36.

¹³ See *ibidem*, p. 35.

[strangeness] in its radical form means that the self in a certain way lies *outside of itself* and that every order is surrounded by the shadows of the *extra-ordinary*.¹⁴

Before We Were Us

There is no sense in the sharp and strict separation between immanent and transcendent strangeness. Since they are forms in the same (tragic?) moment, the disruption of suspense, these two forms always come together. In the occasion, there is no difference between the immanent sublimity and the transcendent sublimity. Immediacy is immediacy. Person is person. It is it. So, if I am/we are moved, agitated, shocked by strangeness which comes from without, that is only because I am/we are already haunted by the ghosts and phantoms that we have owned, humanly, ethnically or psychologically, by what is repressed, forgotten, neglected within my/our own existential project, by this “shadow of what does not fit into it.”

What is not “us” or “me” once was, or at least was held in suspense with the potency to become “us” and “me,” if not wholly, then in ways other than *it* actually did. What is set aside, deferred, eliminated, excluded, was “ours” before we were “us.” At that place it is hard to avoid questions such as: does this mean it is enough to recognize our own strangeness in order to recognize and to give justice to the strangeness which comes from without? But what does it mean to “recognize” strangeness? Is it possible at all? And above all, does such a recognition have to have positive effects? We think the best way to answer these questions is to combine the phenomenological path with some psychoanalytical insights.

Uncanny Others

The link between these two perspectives is provided by Helmuth Plessner, who describes strangeness as what is “one’s own, familiar, and homely in the other and as the other and therefore [...] is uncanny.” When one looks at the stranger one encounters “the uncanniness of the other in the inconceivable interlocking of what is one’s own with the other.”¹⁵

Why do we experience uncanniness when confronted with the others/strangers reflecting ourselves with some regard? What is so agitating in this mixture of ownness and otherness? We have suggested that immediacy is the key, both as occasion and, more broadly, as encounter. The continuing surprise to us is its primacy over self-identification, and there is a great struggle within the modern, Cartesian subject to interpret that primacy as non-threatening. In a way, the bane of the titans, their *hubris*, must have been similar, but with less reflective mediation and no interior struggle. Still, we could easily see in titanic *hubris* a pattern and image for the modern subject. Clearly the struggle becomes more intense with the

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 75.

¹⁵ H. Plessner, “The Exposure of the Human,” [in:] H. Plessner, *Political Anthropology*, transl. N.F. Schott, H. Delitz, R. Seyfert (eds.), Evanston 2018, p. 54.

Kantian turn, which grants to the modern subject an even wider range of powers, being both the knower and the imposer of limits and conditions upon all possible knowledge, casting its own form of rationality over the whole domain of intelligibility. Such a creature is quite solitary, having only empirical companions, until the moment of sublime encounter.

In his famous essay, Freud explores the enigma of the uncanny in great detail, and he provides some clue to our problem. He repeats, following Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, that: “‘Unheimlich’ is the name for everything that ought to have remained... secret and hidden but has come to light.”¹⁶ It seems then that the word carries a doubly contradictory sense — denoting what is unfamiliar and unknown, it refers at the same time to what is “known of old and long familiar.”¹⁷ And it demands the appearance of what ought not appear. It is a fair description of what we have meant by “encounter,” but with no recognition from Freud that what is visible is, at a deeper level, the unseen other or others, still concealed behind whatever has appeared.

It is not what we see in the encounter, but what we feel below it that makes the experience *unheimlich*. In accordance with Freud’s etymological investigations, *unheimlich* is based on the connection between words: *Geheim* (secret), *heimisch* (native) and *heimlich* (“homely”¹⁸). The meaning of the term *unheimlich* and of the phenomenon/appearance is based on the tension between two apparently opposite meanings: the homey and the unhomey, if these odd words can be tolerated. Freud’s intention is to show how certain things become so private and intimate that they turn from being familiar into “concealed, kept from sight, so that others do not get to know of or about it, withheld from others.” Of course, at the depths, what is withheld from the others, mundanely, is the others as *sensus communis*. In some very real sense they already know what the subject, the Ego, is hiding, and that is the collective presence of the other and the others. From being homey and familiar they become strange, “secret and untrustworthy.” We have conveniently forgotten them until there is an occasion, and they are encountered.

In short, they underwent the process of repression. The uncanny, Freud argues, “is in reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and of old established in the mind, and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression.”¹⁹ The experience of the uncanny is the return of those contents but they do not return as our own, familiar, known and friendly. They already take on the form of imaginative, or rather phantasmatic doubles which no longer come from within but unexpectedly loom up as if from behind, as externalities beyond our

¹⁶ S. Freud, “The Uncanny,” [in:] S. Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: Volume XVII (1917–1919): An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works*, London 1955, p. 224.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 220.

¹⁸ This is a problematic translation into English, but there is no good word for this meaning, combining coziness, familiarity, and a nestled secure feeling; we use “homey” above.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 241.

power, as the shadow, which — as in the story told by Hans Christian Andersen — emancipated from its subject now exercises its power over him.²⁰

[T]he quality of uncanniness can only come from the fact of the “double” being a creation dating back to a very early mental stage, long since surmounted — a stage, incidentally, at which it wore a more friendly aspect. The double has become a thing of terror, just as, after the collapse of their religion, the gods turned into demons.²¹

In other words, these others are the effect of externalization, or, to be more precise, they are imaginatively projected onto some other object or person, which from the moment of encounter onward is perceived as a dreadful, even demonic alien, an intrusive stranger entering into the everyday experience of the individual (it is important to remember that this encounter is cultural, individuated).

Making Friends with the Monster

In fact, the self tries, in this way, to defend itself against estrangement and internal division. Now, we are close to giving a provisional answer to our question. These strangers haunting us in the experience of the uncanny are so horrifying not because of their extreme otherness, but rather because they are of us and like us, or even more — “they are *more like us than our own selves*.”²² They simply appear as a mirror-image of “the repressed otherness within the self,” as Freud says. The modern subject has no resources for assimilating the terror, but fortunately the self, the residuum of our collective and individuating experience, is slightly better off. The self can *say* “I am the monster,” and can come to think it if not quite believe it. The saying is a kind of performance, but it requires the removal of the persona and the revealing of the person. It is a vulnerability to others that dissipates the vulnerability to the subject, by the subject, and for the subject which is our Kantian inheritance. A self steps from the shadow and hails the other, that is hails us, hails me. It is possible that this is a friend, although it is never certain.

Still something needs to be added in order to solve our enigma. Our hypothesis is that the experience of the uncanny is so mysterious and agitating because it reveals the deep, painful, unsurpassable dependence in the very heart of the self. The experience of the uncanny reveals *subjectivity* (which is the contrary of *the subject*) as a fragile, dynamic, and conflictual structure created by a series of imaginative projections and introjections, by means of which the sphere of ownness is to be distinguished from the sphere of dark and dangerous strangeness. The effect of these imaginative operations, this sublime oscillation and play of understanding, is far from a precise fulfillment of any anticipation, and of course it is far from the naive Cartesian promise of self-transparency and autonomy.

²⁰ H.C. Andersen, “The Shadow,” transl. J. Hersholt, H.C. Andersen Centret, http://www.andersen.sdu.dk/vaerk/hersholt/TheShadow_e.html (accessed 3.03.2019).

²¹ S. Freud, “The Uncanny,” p. 236.

²² R. Kearney, *Strangers, Gods and Monsters*, p. 75.

Recognizing Ourselves

Let us return to questions posed earlier about whether it would be sufficient to recognize our own strangeness in order to recognize and to give justice to the strangeness which comes from without, from occasions and encounters. And what would it mean to “recognize” strangeness? It seems that we are rather far from any positive answer. There is at least one psychoanalytical theory which seems to give us some hope: Julia Kristeva’s book *Strangers to Ourselves*. However, given a closer look, the optimism radiating from her work seems to be a bit fantastic. “On the basis of an erotic, death-bearing unconscious, the uncanny strangeness — a projection as well as a first working out of death drive — [...] sets the difference within us in its most bewildering shape and presents it as the ultimate condition of our being *with* others.”²³

Earlier one can read that the task of psychoanalysis is to avoid the petrification and reification of strangers, by analyzing them through our self-analysis, to recognize them by our self-recognition.

To discover our disturbing otherness, for that indeed is what bursts in to confront that “demon,” that threat, that apprehension generated by the projective apparition of the other at the heart of what we persist in maintaining as a proper, solid “us.” By recognizing our uncanny strangeness we shall neither suffer from it nor enjoy it from the outside. The foreigner is within me, hence we are all foreigners. If I am a foreigner, there are no foreigners.²⁴

Later on she presents the idea of what we might ironically call the “Holy Mountain,” as if from the prophecy of Isaiah, the world which from now on will be inhabited by “a mankind whose solidarity is founded on the consciousness of its unconscious — desiring, destructive, fearful, empty, impossible.”²⁵ According to Kristeva, all problems with strangers and foreigners are caused by our insistent lack of the acceptance of the very fact that we are split and divided within ourselves, that there is persistent strangeness within us. As soon as we decide or learn to accept our dark side, the hostility towards the strangers would turn into solidarity.

To speak in an almost ridiculously metaphorical way, Kristeva’s statements sound like saying: “As soon as I accept the fact that my body casts a shadow, the latter will disappear.” That isn’t quite right. Speaking more seriously, the fact of our *acceptance* of “uncanny strangeness” solves neither the painful fragmentation of the self nor the replacement of hostility by solidarity. Second, why should this strangeness be pleased or pacified with the fact of being *recognized*? Or once *recognized* why should it *accept* the strangeness of the other? Does Kristeva mean that the “erotic death-bearing unconscious,” which is also “destructive, fearful, empty, impossible” only because of this act of recognition, will become “erotic life-bearing,” and “constructive, peaceful, fulfilled, and for which all things are possible”? Clearly, things are much more complicated.²⁶

²³ J. Kristeva, *Strangers to Ourselves*, transl. L.S. Roudiez, New York 1991, p. 192.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ For similar but much more detailed criticism of Kristeva’s theory, see R. Visker, “The Strange(r) Within Me,” *Ethical Perspectives: Journal of the European Ethics Network* 12 [4] (2005), pp. 425–441.

Mirror, Mirror

We do not think this self-recognition solution is realistic in its optimism, but there is still something worth thinking about here. We have presented this problem of the immediacy of the others as a task of weaving what is *out of time*, that occasion which divides it into a before and an after, together *with* its past and future. A perfect continuity cannot be restored, but a workable weave can be made. If the mundane world *disappears* along with the occasion of others, it always *reappears*, even if there is an unhappy eternity within the event.

A quite different and much less optimistic story (than that of Kristeva) can be found in Jacques Lacan's work. We are thinking here about his theory of the mirror stage of development, where the hetero-genesis of subjectivity is fully based on the imaginative identification.²⁷ Summarizing Lacan, Antoine Mooij says, "Initially [Lacan's] imaginary is oriented on the mirror stage and narcissism in the sense of Freud — turning the image into a central figure — while at a later stage [of his thought] it takes on the broader meaning of anything that constitutes a whole or Gestalt which can be qualified as consistency (*consistance*)."²⁸ Earlier Mooij has pointed out:

When the cosmos, along the road of magic, shows itself with a human face, it reflects man himself, mirroring his face. The features of the physiognomy will bring this to bear on the entire world of perception: Leaves are dancing, a car looks aggressive. At this level, the observer sees himself. This brings us to the final point of the Gestalt representation. The world of the Gestalt and the image show themselves as a whole, in a closed form. Thus, myths and religions [and, we add, groups that feel threatened] tend to close themselves off and become totalitarian — it is all part of their design.²⁹

The xenophobia with which we are concerned is part of the design of recognition and acceptance. But how does this come to be? The mirror image of the child — being a reflex in the mirror or another child — serves as the basis for creating the first form of unity and kinesthetic control — *Ur-Ich*. It is not the case that the child recognizes him/herself in the other, and so there is nothing to accept. This simple imaginary identification does not imply the simple form of influence of the external, specular image on a preexisting ego. The latter is for the first time given to him/herself in this form of an alienating identification, of the sort we have discussed earlier. Note that the situation here described is cultural, presupposing the natural encounter and the occasion. This mirror stage is rather an unconscious assumption of the external image in which *the subject* recognizes itself in the *form* of the unified ego "that is I, and it is also me." It is a magical Gestalt that closes the circle of perception into a narcissistic world. This image, by which the subject is fascinated

²⁷ See J. Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience," [in:] J. Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, transl. B. Fink, New York–London 2006, pp. 75–81; for a clear and thorough exposition of the process of the subject's constitution as a series of ideal, that is, imagistic, identifications, see J. Lacan, "Presentation on Psychological Causality," [in:] J. Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, transl. B. Fink, New York–London 2006, esp. 145–157.

²⁸ A. Mooij, *Lacan and Cassirer: An Essay on Symbolisation*, transl. P. van Nieuwkoop, Leiden–Boston 2018, pp. 101–102; cf. p. 150.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 85.

and captured, and with which it identifies itself, is an imaginary response to the original experience of helplessness and fragmentation, the portents of the impending alienating *self*-identification. The creation of the *illusion* of unity, this Gestalt in the mirror, is the form of ego. Therefore, Lacan writes: "the mirror stage is a drama whose internal pressure pushes precipitously from insufficiency to anticipation."³⁰ In short, it means that biological insufficiency is supplemented, or rather transcended, by an ideal imaginary identity — a closed and impermeable Gestalt.

Misrecognition

In this sense the ego is based on a double *misrecognition*: "the ego not only, as it were, 'finds itself' at the place of the other (the first misrecognition: the ego is alienated)"; and "provides the subject with a deceptive [we would add — magical] impression of unity (the second and most fundamental misrecognition: the ego does not recognize itself as alienated)."³¹ In short, it is the other who gives the subject, eventually the ego, its own identity, and this original identification is, as it were, without the subject. The latter is its effect, which finds itself from the beginning in a state of a painful dependence or, to use Lacan's favorite term, *subjection*. On the one hand, it needs the other who shapes its own self. On the other hand, "the other is an obstacle that prevents it from reaching the unity that it aspires to."³² In other words, the subject, and later the ego-identity always carries the trace of the other, of exteriority which will never be fully internalized. The famous phrase "I am another" really means "I cannot be without this other through whom I get the I."³³ Such an "I" can neither completely exclude, nor internalize this foundational exteriority.

In this sense, original identification is, from the very beginning, intertwined with the original self-estrangement, but that need not become a closed problem, a problem without a solution, until magic is evoked in place of the temporal work of weaving the occasion into the development of the self. "I" cannot be fully at one with "myself." "I" am, so to speak, imprinted with otherness and exteriority. That is why Lacan so often uses the provocative term *extimacy*, which is to express the paradoxical relation of the subject to itself, always already mediated by the relation to the ungraspable other — "to whom I am more attached than to myself [...] since, at the most assented to heart of my identity to myself, he pulls the strings."³⁴ "My" true self, as we already suggested with regard to Waldenfels, is always already beyond or outside of itself. It is ex-centric — as Lacan holds. But this is also connected with one of the characteristics of the self that we mentioned above: it is exclusive in a double sense. First, it is covered by, or hidden

³⁰ J. Lacan, "The Mirror Stage," p. 78.

³¹ L. Chiesa, *Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan*, Cambridge 2007, p. 16.

³² R. Visker, "The Strange(r) Within Me," p. 433.

³³ Ibidem.

³⁴ J. Lacan, "The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud," [in:] J. Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, transl. B. Fink, New York-London 2006, p. 436.

behind the non-transparent veil of Ego, which pretends, in its ideal form, to take the place of the subject *tout court*. Second, it is exclusive because the centre of the subject's gravity, its external figure, is something already excluded. There never was an occasion, and so there are no encounters, from the closed Gestalt that fills perception under the magical influence of the Ego. Our xenophobic neighbours and friends and colleagues simply do not perceive the strangers, especially those neighbours who are not confronted with the strangers in person, in the flesh. The refugees on television are images, unrecognized in their mirroring, and subjected to a totalitarian magic. They are not really perceived, they are conjured. Hence, they are misrecognized twice.

The Gift of the Others

The *original* identification, which is a kind of gift, a prestation, leading to self-estrangement, provokes aggressiveness which then can be awakened in me by those who are almost like me, who are the trace of my extimate interiority, who remind me that I am never fully at home. For example, it is mainly Christians in the United States who are horrified by the *equally Christian* Central American refugees and asylum seekers dying on their borders. How deeply similar they are, in the non-recognition and their compensatory conjuring of the US Christians, is a gift given by the dying others, so that the concealment of their secret identities may remain intact. This sort of "exchange" has been well described by Marcel Mauss, especially in his essay on the person.³⁵ So, this reinterpretation that uncanniness and strangeness faces us not only with the indeterminate and indefinable character of others, but above all of my own self which in its deepest, most "intimate" structures is "neither *of* me nor genuinely *mine*; but rather it is something *about* me."³⁶ This "something about me" is never clearly represented in the others; there are some gaps and the blind spots on the surface of the mirror, a foveation and periphery. In fact, this "something about me" cannot be represented because "I" originated from it; the gift cannot be assimilated or integrated. At the same time this something cannot be clearly presentified, because it is nothing objectifiable, no thing, but also not "nothing," and as such it constantly haunts "me"³⁷ — it is the gift that keeps on giving and will not leave off until "I" am damned. That is why "I" experience the others as a threat, as suffocating, as almost a deadly danger.

The Us that We Tell Ourselves We Are

Are there remedies of psychological, ethical, and political importance, which can help in creating a positive response to strangeness within ourselves, and as an

³⁵ See M. Mauss, "A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person; the Notion of Self," transl. W.D. Halls, [in:] *The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History*, M. Carrithers et al. (eds.), Cambridge 1985, pp. 1–25.

³⁶ R. Visker, "The Strange(r) Within Me," p. 438.

³⁷ See *ibidem*.

obvious implication, to these strangers which come to us from without? It seems that first we should be more modest and less idealistic. If the strangers/strangeness remain what he/she/it/they really is/are, it always will be something dreadful, shocking, agitating and undermining our identities, our political and moral orders. These are our friends and neighbours, our fellow citizens, and ourselves in the depths of an enveloping darkness, a shadow within a shadow, doubled, cast not by the others, but by the Other that we are. The magic is hard to resist.

In every other case, we will bring it down to the level of something known, rational, transparent, whether we really know it or don't. In short, we will bring it to the conditions of our understanding, to the level of the same. Waldenfels, being fully aware of this danger, postulates a creative or productive form of response which always operates *ex post factum*, but its main point is to be open to a grey zone or some blind spots within our political and ethical orders which is introduced by the strangers. He reminds us that our response always decides about who "we" are and who "we" will be. If "we" build the walls, psychologically or physically, then we become those enclosed within them. There may be subjects and egos within the walls, but the selves no longer appear. Eventually even "my" spouse and children are other, because "I" am other and cannot learn it. And if they cannot, how can I? Hence we see that in the extreme cases, family members even identify one another to the Gestapo or KGB or secret police as threats to the closed order. They would do better to point the finger at themselves, but they simply cannot see it.

Richard Kearney³⁸ and Rudi Visker propose as a solution that we create new narratives which will not so much help us to understand this experience but by means of them we would be able to give the other/otherness a place in the course of the story, and in this way we would prevent "it" "from being everywhere and nowhere."³⁹ These narratives can provide not only the possibility of distance, but also new forms of practical understanding, and that means becoming aware of the differences between real danger, that is, the bad form of the alien or evil stranger (think of Mark Twain or Albert Camus), and the others which do not pose any threat. But above all these narrative forms give voice to *our own* strangeness, to different forms of the articulation of our self, which always is something more than rigid ego, of which Freud wrote that it is a poor creature who simply wants love and be loved.

Jonathan Lear, in one of his essays, wrote that the human mind is a differentiated unity, and that means, on the one hand, it is capable of growth. On the other hand, there is a constant risk of sudden disruption of the course of our experience, sudden irruptions of irrationality, coming precisely from the very heart of rationality.⁴⁰ Awareness of this fact cannot, as Kristeva suggests, solve the problem of

³⁸ R. Kearney, *Strangers, Gods and Monsters*; especially "Introduction," where the author proposes his vision of narrative understanding and narrative imagination, which are to help us to distinguish between good and evil others, and to understand more deeply the difference between the otherness coming from within from that which comes from without.

³⁹ R. Visker, "Strange(r) Within Me," p. 438.

⁴⁰ See J. Lear, "Restlessness, Phantasy, and the Concept of Mind," [in:] J. Lear, *Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul*, Cambridge 1999, pp. 80–122.

our own strangeness or the problem of the strangers, but at least it can help us understand that different and strange voices speak through us. Lear argues that as far we become aware of that, we can make a different use of them.

We have argued that the occasion and the encounter are sources as well as resources; that individuals are capable of returning their encounters to the well of *sensus communis*; and that *sensus communis* is as natural as it is cultural. Human beings are not compelled to interpret strangeness as threat, even if we are culturally compelled to interpret strangeness. Narrative lives in our *sensus communis*, and it is open, revisable, even danceable. Immediacy is person, the person that is community, and it is sublime, is both liked and disliked.

References

- Andersen H.C., “The Shadow,” transl. J. Hersholt, H.C. Anderesen Centret, http://www.andersen.sdu.dk/vaerk/hersholt/TheShadow_e.html (accessed 3.03.2019).
- Auxier R.E., *Time, Will, and Purpose: Living Ideas from the Philosophy of Josiah*, Chicago 2013.
- Chiesa L., *Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan*, Cambridge 2007.
- Freud S., “The Uncanny,” [in:] S. Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: Volume XVII (1917–1919): An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works*, London 1955.
- Kant I., *Critique of Judgment*, transl. W. Pluhar, Indianapolis 1987.
- Kant I., *Critique of Pure Reason*, transl. W. Pluhar, Indianapolis 1990.
- Kearney R., *Strangers, Gods and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness*, London–New York 2005.
- Kristeva J., *Strangers to Ourselves*, transl. L.S. Roudiez, New York 1991.
- Lacan J., “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud,” [in:] J. Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, transl. B. Fink, New York–London 2006, pp. 412–441.
- Lacan J., “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” [in:] J. Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, transl. B. Fink, New York–London 2006, pp. 75–81.
- Lacan J., “Presentation on Psychological Causality,” [in:] J. Lacan, *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, transl. B. Fink, New York–London 2006, pp. 128–158.
- Lear J., “Restlessness, Phantasy, and the Concept of Mind,” [in:] J. Lear, *Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul*, Cambridge 1999, pp. 80–122.
- Mauss M., “A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person; the Notion of Self,” transl. W.D. Halls, [in:] *The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History*, M. Carrithers et al. (eds.), Cambridge 1985, pp. 1–25.
- Mooij A., *Lacan and Cassirer: An Essay on Symbolisation*, transl. P. van Nieuwkoop, Leiden–Boston 2018.
- Plessner H., “The Exposure of the Human,” [in:] H. Plessner, *Political Anthropology*, transl. N.F. Schott, Heike Delitz, Robert Seyfert (eds.), Evanston 2018, pp. 53–60.

- Showalter E., *Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Media*, New York 1998.
- Visker R., "The Strange(r) Within Me," *Ethical Perspectives: Journal of the European Ethics Network* 12 [4] (2005), pp. 425–441.
- Waldenfels B., *Phenomenology of the Alien: Basic Concepts*, transl. A. Kozin, T. Stähler, Evanston 2011.

PIOTR MACHURA
ORCID: 0000-0002-0340-1905
University of Silesia in Katowice

Moral Topography of Memory, Time Control and Accumulation of Identity

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze the basis for the moral obligation to remember. As the moral relation to the past is primarily a matter of shared identity, the kind of obligation in question splits into two related issues, namely, that of political, state-oriented and state-organized memory on which the political identity rests and that of memory labour grounded in social identities based in shared, time-extended projects. Drawing upon tensions between these two, I discuss time control and the accumulation of identity as central to memory labour and, referring to John Zerzan’s critique of symbolical roots of power, pinpoint the moral basis of such an accumulation. On the basis of this, I argue for nesting the duty to remember in acknowledging the agent’s recognition of the relatedness and dependency of their agency and possibilities of flourishing which can be obtained thanks to adjusting the field of the virtue of practical wisdom so that it includes members of the time-extended community.

Keywords: memory labour, moral topography, time control, *phronesis*, social identity

Introduction: The Temporality of Moral Obligation

The relation of moral obligation to time is ambiguous. Highlighting the importance of including future generations in establishing moral duties, which gained special place in debates in ethics at least since the late 1970s,¹ has been broadly

¹ See B. Barry, “Justice between Generations,” [in:] *Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honor of H.L.A. Hart*, P.M.S. Hacker, J. Raz (eds.), Oxford 1977, pp. 268–284; J. English, “Justice between Generations,” *Philosophical Studies* 31 [2] (1977), pp. 91–104; H. Jonas, *Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation*, Frankfurt am Main 1979; A. Baier, “The Rights of Past and Future Persons,” [in:] *Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental Ethics*,

recognized as an important part of moral reasoning, and along with the growing awareness of climate change and limits of mainstream models of economic growth helped to establish one of the crucial domains of contemporary theorizing and policy. The paradigmatic line of thinking here was outlined by John Rawls in his *Theory of Justice*, where he states that, despite working in a generally individualistic framework, the parties in the original position should not be conceived as just individuals, but as “representing a continuing line of claims. For example, we can assume that they are heads of families and therefore have a desire to further the well-being of at least their more immediate descendants.”² Seen along such lines, the agent is not just an individual to whom some obligations might be ascribed, but rather he or she is a representative of a micro-community, and their decisions will shape the life opportunities of future generations, which themselves are thus — to use a term derived from business — stakeholders of their life projects. At the same time, ethical reflection on the atrocities of colonialism and 20th-century totalitarianisms gave raise to ground-breaking works on the duty to remember the victims, the moral position of the witness and the philosophy of memory in general.³

However, this vector of interest in the temporality of moral obligation has two, somewhat disproportionate, directions. For just as the agent is generally required to (*prima facie*) equally value the wellbeing of those who will face the consequences of his or her actions, the axiology of memory makes it unavoidably selective. Two groups are usually prioritized. On the one hand, there are members of one’s family, one’s immediate progenitors to whom one owes gratefulness (or feels rancour) for the conditions of one’s life. The second consists of heroes and victims who populate a much broader group of symbolic attachment. Here is where the ethics of memory splits: it obliges us to honour those who shaped our shared identity and urges us to give justice to the victims of the past atrocities⁴ on the one hand, but for those who do not have such an exposed place in the past it does not have much more to offer except for the general commitment to remember.

In what follows I will have nothing to say about commemoration of victims. Instead, I shall examine the moral topography of memory. Namely, I shall argue that the mnemonic labour becomes the core of identity when the moral obligation to remember is supported by a social framework of time control. This exposes the labour to the perils of political exploitation, but without it the scope of the moral obligation remains blurred and the possibilities of agency are limited. For it is the social identity that is the capital worked out in the mnemonic labour.

E. Partridge (ed.), New York 1981, pp. 171–183; S. Scheffler, *Why Worry about Future Generations?*, Oxford 2020; G. Kahane, “The Significance of the Past,” *Journal of The American Philosophical Association* 7 [4] (2021), pp. 582–600.

² J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition*, Cambridge 1999, p. 111.

³ W.J. Booth, *Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice*, Ithaca–London 2006; A. Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory*, Cambridge–London 2004; P. Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, Chicago–London 2004; S. Smilansky, “The Idea of Moral Duties to History,” *Philosophy* 96 (2021), pp. 155–179.

⁴ A. Berninger, “Commemorating Public Figures — In Favour of a Fictionalist Position,” *Journal of Applied Philosophy* (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12474>.

Moral Communities in Time

Consider the owner of the Nishiyama Onsen Keiunkan hotel in the Akaishi Mountains, Japan.⁵ They are not just a hotel owner, because what they own is the world's oldest hotel, established in A.D. 705 and for 52 generations managed by a single family (including adopted members). Facing the portraits of their predecessors, they do not only face managers who led the company through the disturbed times of two failed Mongol invasions, the civil wars of the Muromachi period, the revolutions of the Meiji era, World War II and rapid post-war modernization, but also people with whom they are bound by blood ties, name and social position. Let's assume that under their management the hotel has gone bankrupt.

Putting aside the nuances of Japanese culture, should the long tradition of the business be taken as an additional reason for the owner's shame and sense of failure? To whom then do they owe their regret? What difference for them may the historical fact of someone's existence several decades, or even centuries, ago, make?

The business context of the example highlights an important part of the issue under discussion, as it enables us to see those in the field of the agents' activity as stakeholders in their projects and hence joining some (perhaps local and unstable) community significant from the point of view of the agents' obligations and possibilities of acting. To take into account the temporal aspect of moral obligation, however, stresses the one-dimensionality of this group, which gathers the stakeholders and relations who are revealed by the horizontal cut of the time axis (oriented vertically). Yet, in both the case of the contract party in Rawls's original position and that of the hotel owner, what needs to be taken into account is the obligation which spreads along the time axis.

The dominant analogy here is that of familial relations. Rawls's example of the head of a family is paradigmatic, as it combines both moral responsibility, distribution of crucial economic, social and symbolic resources, and shared narrative based on common experiences. Yet what is the temporal range of an obligation derived from such a community? People might find themselves obliged to support their parents⁶ and grandparents, but in what sense might this obligation be extended to previous generations? Consider the hotel owner again: what kind of obligation might be linked to their ancestor who lived 1,300 years ago? The key question here is that of the kind of moral obligation that reaches beyond the mere duty to remember. The latter, it is worth noting, which might be analyzed in terms of the virtues of justice and *phronesis*, that is, as doing justice to the conditions

⁵ I take this as an example and claim no detailed knowledge of the Nishiyama Onsen Keiunkan hotel or of their owners.

⁶ It is worth noticing, however, that it is far from being clear whether adult children do have obligations towards their parents; see W. Sin, "Adult Children's Obligations towards Their Parents: A Contractualist Explanation," *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 53 (2019), pp. 19–32; M.C. Stuifbergen, J.J. Van Delden, "Filial Obligations to Elderly Parents: A Duty to Care?," *Medicine, Health, and Philosophy* 14 (2011), pp. 63–71. This doubt seems to signal an important issue, which cannot be fully addressed here, concerning the change in developed societies' turn from memory (and especially from its duty-bearing vision) to a more critical view in which both inherited social position and state history need to be explained (and excused) in terms of justice and privilege.

of one's own flourishing which have been established by the actions of past generations, and adjusting one's attitude (for example, by practising thankfulness), does not fulfil the duty in question. For the hotel owner is not only obliged to remember and commemorate their ancestors *qua* ancestors, their distant relatives, but being the owner of the hotel they had established and run, he or she runs, in a sense, their business, and that makes the owner's everyday acting part of his or her memory labour, which cannot be limited to the practice of memory and commemoration. Hence, what is of key importance here is that both the present owner and their ancestors are not only interlinked by personal acts of memory, but also, and primarily, that these bonds are structured and supported by their involvement in sustaining and development of the material core of memory — in this case, the hotel. The hotel is central to both the owner's and their ancestors' flourishing and it is an important part of their identity. The material (institutional) core of this identity both merges the life-projects of time-distanced relatives, strengthening the familial community, and serves the current family members (and hence the institution) as the basis for their claims of featured status, here among the many mountain hotel owners in Japan.

This seems to be a general framework for social (and political) memory which is rooted in the intentional heterogeneity of mnemonic labour. For establishing a community of memory requires one to reach beyond one's immediate experience, that is, beyond one's immediate recollections of certain persons or events. And contemporary practices of mnemonic labour, characterized by the extensive use of tools — writing (letters and memoirs) in societies of wide-spread literacy, as well as image preservation (photos and videos) in the technologically advanced world — hide its heterogeneity by the immediate accessibility of all kinds of memories. For a *recollection* is a private, first-person experience, an association the agent *has with* somebody or something, heavily loaded with emotions which can be transmitted through personal contact, within a system of shared life in which this kind of exchange is part of everyday giving and receiving.⁷ However, it is not necessarily based on the agent's intentional effort to search for and gather recollections of the past. Note that the *memory* that is obtained in this kind of acting is aimed in the intentional act, that is, one has a certain reason for looking for and sustaining it.⁸ Thus understood, the memory is developed primarily for non-sentimental reasons, just as in the cases of totemic communities or bourgeois and aristocratic families. Their genealogies are meticulously collected not for merely familial (recollecting) reasons, but because they are the sources of problematized identity, treated not as part of the everyday life of a certain micro-community, but as their way of self-presentation to other social groups and individuals or as a resource conducive to their prosperity. Seen along such lines, these kinds of familial identities are the bases for claims of a particular social status. They both strengthen the ties between members of a family, clan or tribe, highlighting their

⁷ A. MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues*, London 1999.

⁸ Thus, my distinction differs from Ricoeur's analysis of memory (*la mémoire*) taken as intention and recollection (*le souvenir*) as its object (P. Ricoeur, *Memory*, p. 22).

mutual obligations, and fund a distinction of the role and significance of these social settings from all the others the agent is part of. Thus, memory grounds the claims to distinct status (in fact, it is — along with wealth and physical power, taken as the ability to use violence — one of the key ways of establishing such a distinct status) which defines the social position of the family or clan members, and which becomes mediated by their self-presentation as group members. Thus the family (and clan as an extended family) becomes the centre of identity, which is a resource for setting one's social position and range of agency. As the latter may be based on prestige and historical significance (highlighted by memory labour), it becomes a basis of claims to power.

Memory Labour and Time Frame

Social and political memory are similarly heterogeneous, as they consist in separating people's identity from their immediate recollections and replacing them with memories of other people preserved in their reports and artefacts. To a degree, they resemble familial memory, as knowing somebody's ancestors consists not only in an ability to memorize their names, but also to "say something about them" — who they were, what they did, what they experienced (in the sense of a distinctive, formative event). That is to say, for someone to become acknowledged as one's ancestor, not only does the existence of the past person need to be recorded, but furthermore the time of their life needs to be reproduced effectively (in the sense of Hans-Georg Gadamer), that is, it needs to be included in the community's (family's) narrative,⁹ the narrative of its identity and goals, both those that have already been obtained, and those to which it aims. In this respect to remember is to include past people into the common project, in the life of a certain social institution which might be distinguished from others and which serves as an institutional core and material base for common efforts.

Two things need to be remarked here. Firstly, as noted above, two at least partially independent phenomena might here be distinguished. For, as Paul Ricoeur points out, recollecting is not intentionally homogeneous, and it may consist in both the fact of one's (or one's community's) "possessing" memories (or recollections, in the sense of the distinction I introduced above) and the activity of searching for them. The former is an individual experience effective thanks to the possibility of recreating in one's imagination past events and persons, among which recreations at least some are relevant for one's life project. At the same time, establishing a precise genealogy reaching beyond recollections and stories told by the oldest living members of the community is not only a purposeful cultivation of memory based on a certain intention, but is also an act of selecting those who will be remembered and those who will be forgotten. Thus understood, memory be-

⁹ T.L. Goodsell, J.B. Whiting, "An Aristotelian Theory of Family," *Journal of Family Theory & Review* 8 (2016), pp. 484–502.

comes a framework for the community's identity; it constitutes a timeline so that the community may overcome the limited durability of recollections.¹⁰

This leads to the second remark. In formally organized communities, such as states (perhaps except for the smallest, which can sustain communities of recollections) or religious organizations, this kind of memory cannot be a direct extension of the recollections of the community members (except, again, for the most traumatic and geographically extensive, such as floods or wars). Here again the technicization of memory labour blurs the view. For despite the abundant resources of written and audio-visual archives, what we have access to is not the recollections (the common memory in Avishai Margalit's term), but, rather, primarily records made deliberately, with an unavoidable element of propaganda, often for the use of pre-existing political structures rooted in organized memory labour.¹¹ Hence it is not only, as W. James Booth claims, that memory "is the fabric of a community's way of life,"¹² but also community itself shows up, to an important degree, as an effect of the division of mnemonic labour. This division not only points out those people who are obliged to remember, but also defines those past events and persons who deserve to be remembered and the ways in which the memories of them will replace the actual recollections. Hence, what is remembered is not a community of recollections taken as a sphere of common, recorded experience, but a line of experience defined by the hegemony of a single power centre which sets the framework of identity that, thanks to this framing, can be controlled. The basis and core of this hegemony is time control, the ability to define the current of events and their chronology for those who should take them as significant for organization of their lives, to point out the contents of the shared memory and set the standards of effective mnemonic labour.

Zerzan on Time Control

Time control is the central issue of John Zerzan's anarcho-primitivist critique. I take his stance as a form of far-reaching intervention, which enables us to look beyond the scope of the discourse of the philosophy of memory. The starting point of his analysis is social critique rather than the philosophy of memory, and instead of undertaking a detailed scrutiny of memorizing phenomena, he aims at uncovering the roots of the contemporary social and political order. His analysis, however, is not directed against the social and political *status quo*, but is developed so that it should reach the origin of the entire civilization project. According to him, this is based on the appropriation of power, which is possible thanks to alienation and control, which themselves are consequences of the "invention" of the symbolical and of time control.

The symbolical and time control are interlinked, because measurement and, in effect, time control are both primarily cultural, since they consist in abandoning

¹⁰ For a similar distinction of common and shared memory, see A. Margalit, *The Ethics*, pp. 50–54.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 52–54.

¹² W.J. Booth, *Communities*, p. xiii.

part of one's own flow of experience to a god or spirit through the shaman, the first professional to have emerged from the pristine equality of hunters-gatherers.¹³ What is of crucial importance is the transition from the immediacy of first-person experience to significance-bearing time, relating to the external reality that sets certain limits on individual consciousness. Due to this transition, time, which so far has been a dimension of individual life and can be reproduced in the memory of a certain experience by its immediate subject, and which can be mediated only by closely related people, becomes the object of actions of an external (organized) actor, whose aims are independent of the will and imagination of the subject of the recollections themselves.

In this way time becomes objectivized and presented as an independent reality of intrinsic meaning and value.¹⁴ Two aspects of this transition are worth noting. Firstly, time understood in this way becomes the subject of external control, which causes its objectification, standardization and measurement, and consequently imposes an obligation on it. Thus, the freedom to regulate the rhythm of life is gradually replaced by its regulation by an external metre, which makes room for both the symbolical and technology's growing importance. For it is in this way that discipline and routine, supported by systems of time control and the signals of its passage, are introduced into human activity, which leads to the domestication of human beings so that they become a resource in a process they do not control.¹⁵ This process intensifies with the technicization of the society and culminates in the development of its industrial form, with the domination of the rhythm of machine, timetable, and production cycle that are typical of it.¹⁶ Simultaneous with this is the reification of time as an objective dimension of life and its being presented as a realm of obligation and value, something which should not be wasted. Thus orientation in time, control over the ways it is "spent" and discipline become the main components of "civilized" life.

As Zerzan points out, "time literacy," which becomes important part of upbringing, leads to agents' self-limitation, which is a *sine qua non* of urban life. That is to say, historical development is possible only thanks to the self-domestication of humans and imposition on them of control and measurement, subjection to which is necessary for being part of a large-scale society. This leads to the second aspect of humans' subjection to the time regime: the directness of living time becomes appropriated by emerging centres of power. Time subjected to symbolization and measure is not a dimension of personal experience and is not regulated spontaneously any more. It becomes, to an important degree, a property of someone or something else — a god, a society, or the state — and hence it becomes encumbered with a value of the nature of an obligation. Here a double alienation shows

¹³ J. Zerzan, "The Case against Art," [in:] J. Zerzan, *Origins: A John Zerzan Reader*, Milwaukee-Greensburg 2010, pp. 130–138.

¹⁴ J. Zerzan, "Time and Its Discontents," [in:] J. Zerzan, *Time and Time Again*, Olimpia 2018, pp. 55, 88.

¹⁵ J. Zerzan, "The Bronze Age: Origins of the One Percent," [in:] J. Zerzan, *A People's History of Civilization*, Port Townsend 2018, pp. 74–105.

¹⁶ J. Zerzan, "Time," p. 85.

up: with one's own life and with others. In the first case, it lies in the separation of some spheres from the life of the agent so that they are neither in their direct control, nor in the shared control of an immediate inclusive community any more. This separation that forms the immediate experience of one's environment is, as noted above, the consequence of the professionalization of religion, emerging from shamans (and later priests) who establish rituals and, as a result, the symbolic. This turn in human functioning enabled the gathering of experience and its accumulation into new reasons for acting and for directing common efforts and large-scale planning, yet at the price of subjecting individual consciousness to the primacy of the will and memory aggregated in ritual. As Zerzan claims:

Time awareness is what empowers us to deal with our environment symbolically; there is no time apart from this estrangement [objectivization of the environment — P.M.]. It is by means of progressive symbolization that time becomes naturalized, becomes a given, is removed from the sphere of conscious cultural production. "Time becomes human in the measure to which it is actualized in narrative," is another way of putting it (Ricoeur 1984). The symbolic accretions in this process constitute a steady throttling of instinctive desire; repression develops the sense of time unfolding. Immediacy gives way, replaced by the mediations that make history possible — language in the foremost.¹⁷

Thus, symbolization leads not only to one mediating one's own experience, but also to structuring one's memories by a certain form, available in a given symbolic regime, of expression. The introduction of writing systems (and mnemotechnics before them) not only changes people's relation to their memories, but also those memories' displacement by memories and experiences of other people, both in practical knowledge and in social relations.¹⁸

Here is where the second kind of alienation emerges. For the tendency to control time is, according to Zerzan, interlinked with the tendency to put in order (understood also as tidiness), not only in the sense of setting a measure for oneself, but also in setting the measure for (ordering) the surrounding world.¹⁹ This not only lies at the base of the reflective (symbolic) development of the natural world, but also — and primarily — is part of the core of development of societies.

Ritual is of key importance here. Zerzan takes it — contra René Girard — as aimed first of all at toning the internal tensions in a community which has lost its natural, spontaneous unity. These conflicts, however, are not only strictly political, but are rooted in the destruction of the primal community by the introduction of religious identities that are independent of one's tribal allegiances and roots in the natural world.²⁰ Hence, time control is not only the basis of all kinds of alienation (self-distancing), but in its symbolical form, as ritual that reproduces time independently of the memories and experiences of specific agents and builds a common memory and obligations towards others (both real, such as the ruler, and

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 58.

¹⁸ J. Zerzan, "The City and Its Inmates," [in:] J. Zerzan, *A People's History of Civilization*, Port Townsend 2018, pp. 44–57.

¹⁹ J. Zerzan, "Time," p. 75.

²⁰ J. Zerzan, "Civilization Tightens Its Grip: The Axial Age," [in:] J. Zerzan, *A People's History of Civilization*, Port Townsend 2018, pp. 112–113.

irreal, such as a deity), it is crucial for the possibility of domination.²¹ For whoever controls time, frames it, and regulates its course and pace, finds themselves in the position of controlling the way in which the process of (self-)domestication of humans is organized.

Lessons from Political Memory

The merit of Zerzan's interpretation, putting aside its historical and anthropological accuracy, lies in its radicalism, which, by reaching the frontier of any possible critique of all forms of power, highlights both the perils of one-sided analysis and the lessons that should be learned from rejecting it. For it might be understood as a form of deep hermeneutics of memory which, in the course of revealing the political aspect of key questions of the phenomenology of memory as raised by Ricoeur: "What?," "How?," and "Who?,"²² reveals at least some aspects of memory labour. Hence, although I am not going to discuss Zerzan's claims at length, some of the conceptual resources he offers seem to be useful for grasping certain important relations between memory and shared identity.

What needs first to be addressed is the primal alienation that is one of the bases of shared social (focused on some supra-individual, time-extended project with which the agent is bound in their familial, professional or local allegiances, providing them with a moral framework of goods, relationships, and obligations) and political identities. These identities are similar in that they both rest on replacing, as noted above, personal recollections with memories and narratives set independently of the individual's experience. In the case of political memory this works similarly — the history of a political community (for example, a nation) is usually presented not as "people's" history in the sense used by Howard Zinn, but rather as the history of an institution which works as a core of shared identity and centre of power, as well as a hypostasis of experiences of those who populated the land under the control of this institution in the course of its development. At the same time, the shared genealogy of this population is sustained by the institution itself. Because developed and expressed as "ours," history and especially History (that is, the morally loaded justification of a political claim) consists of two features. On the one hand, since it needs to be told (written) as a coherent and concise narrative of a unifying centre (which becomes the subject of the narrative), it has to be reduced to a relatively homogeneous plot. Seen along such lines, history becomes not a story of the lives of people and communities, but rather one of nations and states, which conceals power and control over the ways in which the form of self-presentation and self-understanding of individuals and local communities is organized. The power here concerns the ways of setting the framework in which individuals and communities express themselves (in terms of forms, language and chronology of such expressions), and only secondarily the

²¹ For a discussion of the political significance of nostalgia, see J. Zerzan, "In the Beginning," [in:] J. Zerzan, *Why Hope? The Stand against Civilization*, Port Townsend 2018, pp. 3–9.

²² P. Ricoeur, *Memory*, p. 22.

actual content being expressed. Hence, the real subject of political history is in fact the power centre, which becomes legitimized in the course of a history that is told in a certain way. Political history is in fact the history of a narrow group (for example, in Eastern Europe it is primarily the history of the intelligentsia and only secondarily the history of the intelligentsia's attitude towards the rest of the nation that it helps to define), usually of one language and often of one faith (or tensions among a handful of dominant ones). What is important to note is that it is also usually a history told from the perspective of only part of the territory that the power centre makes claims to (as with the relation of Spanish history to Basques or Polish history to Silesians). Thus, the answer to the question "Who?" of the act of memory should include not only those who are in power and who dispense it, but should also include an answer to the sub-question of their dispersal.

On the other hand, the product of history writing is collective identity. Political memory is flexible in its ability to overlook territorial, ethnic and social changes, or rather to subject them to the logic of a developed narrative, while at the same time extending what are in fact absent memories to people located outside the territorial and chronological centre of the story.²³ Thus, to become part of history is to be placed within a chronological framework which might be at odds with the local history and sense of time.

Note that in the case of the hotel owner in the example discussed above a similar mechanism might be expected. For narratives concerning their lives will be adjusted to the chronology of the core project, so that the family history will say: she lived when our hotel was the most respected in the entire country, he ran the hotel during emperor's visit, etc. The chronology of the institution, of the material core of memory, thus becomes a chronology of community (both local, as in the case of a family, and political, for example national), and the identity framed in terms that are governed by this chronology becomes dominant, while the individual significance of local social processes and the dynamics of individual life (the tensions between the circumstances of life and loyalty to the long-lasting project in the historical owners' lives, their struggles with conditions of the times, etc.) place its story on the margins of the narrative on the centre of identity.

In addition, with respect to political memory, the operation of such a centralized chronology is reinforced by subjecting individual and collective life to the rhythm and norms imposed by the state, such as state holidays or the history curricula taught at schools, and by the structuring of "acknowledged" elements of local identity. Here the rise of mass media and spread of uniform literary languages are among the key tools of identity accumulation. Consider, for instance, the kind of TV and radio programmes that reproduce the experience of participants of certain historical events (especially those that cover some longer period of time, reproducing certain sequences of events day by day) and make it part of a residuum of the collective memory of people from other regions of the country, which effort, however, is not accompanied by a similar diligence in the reproduction of the experience of inhabitants of regions outside the historical core.

²³ Ibidem, pp. 84–85.

The other way in which this kind of accumulation happens is with the rituals of memory. As noted above, according to Zerzan their primary function is to ease tensions within the group and provide it with ideological glue. The reproduction of time here is also crucial, both in the sense of repeatability of such a recreation,²⁴ and as directing the participants' attention to a sequence of events focused around certain persons of that group of people who are crucial from the point of view of the identity of the political community that is being actualized in the ritual. Preproduction of the chronology of this sequence and its axiological distinction by political indication or empathetic connection establish memories of such a featured group of people as a shared recollection which defines shared past. This form of symbolization, however, might be democratically controlled only to a limited extent.

This aspect of the moral economy of the state is worth highlighting. For memory shows up as another form of capital (in the sense of Pierre Bourdieu), and the production of memory not only works through the actual recollections and the organizing of their chronology, but — in acts of power — the mnemonic labour subjects them to the unifying form of a shared memory with its distinctive chronology and controls the form of time reproduction, its periodicity and axiological direction. If it is analyzed as another form of capital, supplementing Bourdieu's own classification,²⁵ this can help to explain if not the origin, then at least the durability and vitality of state organizations and the mythologies on which they rest. For even if the origin of politics (and in consequence also the state) might be explained in terms of the rise of accumulation of primarily social and economic capital,²⁶ the tendency to sustain this kind of organization and internalize patriotic values requires another kind of labour and resource, that is, it requires control over time reproduction (historical time) as a framework of time-extended identity and justification of territorial control. The product of memory labour is thus a supra-individual, shared identity, which extends beyond immediate, person-to-person transmission of recollections and moral ties. Hence, while Booth²⁷ is right when he claims that institutions and space set the limits of a community (and both his and my standpoints are limited in being able to explain non-state, nomadic communities, such as the Roma), it is important to stress that centralization of time control and memory labour is a key factor in the durability of any project of sustaining a political community.

²⁴ Here an analogy between memory and habit as “form[ing] two poles of a continuous range of mnemonic phenomena,” pointed out by Ricoeur, might be of use (ibidem, p. 24). For the essence of the political dimension of ritual is precisely habituating the subjects to treating the message framed by the power centre as the effective act of memory which substitutes real recollection. This substitution is also two-dimensional. It is an act of domination where there is no direct social relationship with the actors of recreated event, and, at the same time, it is creating a new or updating an existing relationship of including in fabricated identity. That is why Ricoeur, while discussing habit in relation to “an experience acquired earlier,” notes that it is a matter of incorporating it “into the living present.”

²⁵ P. Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” [in:] *Handbook of Theory of Research for Sociology of Education*, J. Richardson (ed.), New York 1986, pp. 241–258.

²⁶ J.C. Scott, *Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States*, New Haven–London 2017.

²⁷ W.J. Booth, *Communities*, p. 51.

This marks an important distinction between political (state-centred and organized) and social (communal, project-oriented) identities and limits the range of the above-discussed relation. For within large-scale societies some degree of centralization seems unavoidable for the sake of sustaining their supra-individual agency. Note that among communities (Roma again being a notable example) that share identity without subjecting it to a homogenizing institutional core, the shared identity may serve as basis for certain social positions, and thus may shape the possibilities of individual action, but it does not support highly organized, collective action such as that supported (or organized) by the institutional core of the state. At the same time, individuals are subjected to the memory core, as pointed out above, independently of their life projects which remain in a complex relation to the shared aims and interests. However, in the case of social projects that are rooted in personal activity and relationships with a memory-set core (such as hotel-running in the earlier example), the identity is rather based on merging the life projects of past and current agents and as such, in a sense, it is reciprocal. For memory provides current agents with crucial goods, both material and symbolical, and as such it is oriented towards the community members' flourishing, rather than to managing their actions in accordance with some more unified aim. That is to say, that for the sake of which identity is relevant for the actual agent, is their involvement in developing a form of life for which the importance of past generations can be immediately negotiated.

In both forms of organization, however, identity is subject to a similar logic of prestige and debt, just as other forms of capital are. For, just like them, when accumulated, it offers a sense of power. This results from the efforts of the vertical extension of the community's members which enables them to set the range of goods to which an agent, as a member of the chronologically extended group, may claim a right to (territory, resources, and historical artefacts as forms of accumulated cultural capital), as well as the range of powers (based on making distinctions from others), powers whose violation allows agents to claim support from other members of the extended community and its institutional core. Yet the prestige that is based on such an accumulation needs to be — for the sake of clarity — redeemed by limiting the range of political and socio-historical identities within the political community (state) and of life programmes within the integrated collective community (such as family).²⁸

²⁸ The former consists in limiting the efficiency of these identities which are either oppressive and aim at limiting individual decision making concerning the agents' own life projects and expressions of their form of life, or — contrary — anarchistic to the extent in which their decentralisation of power makes the agency of the core, and hence, any far-reaching projects impossible. The latter consists in "loyalty" to the project (company or family) and loosening one's relation with those who themselves separate from the core project. This kind of (familial) integration proves to be potentially not less oppressive than the political homogenization.

Accumulation of Identity and Time-Oriented *Phronesis*

What is of crucial importance, however, is the mechanism of debt in which the extension of memory ties the actual agents morally with people from the past. In political memory it is not only a matter of the vitality of the myth that defines the way of representing the past,²⁹ but also of more morally loaded relations with past heroes and victims.³⁰ Here the debt obligation is framed in two ways. On the one hand, thanks to the personalization in heroic figures, it is aimed at focusing the memory labour on certain identifiable individuals who become substitutes for relatives given in personal (emotional) recollections, and the act of questioning (the unity of) such memory becomes an obscene act. The closeness of familial relations works as a moral paradigm,³¹ so that memory relations become unavoidably relations of obligation similar to those one has towards one's parents and grandparents. Failure to do justice to the memory of past generations, whether by only remembering them or by sustaining a time-extended project (family, business, state), is thus met with condemnation and the expectation of repentance. This is based on the duty of justice towards those who are the weaker part of a relation, in this case, past generations who are unable to defend their rights, protect their good name, or support their project.³²

The situation of the repentant agent, however, differs depending of the type of memory in question. The emphasis on political coherence, historical justification and identity strengthens the obligation to remember and puts it into a solid framework of political rituals, monuments and school curricula, and makes failure to meet this obligation a matter of significant and intentional effort. The political "right to forget" is thus an effect of critical work which requires a range of resources, such as some alternative or sub-identity (for example, being a member of a neglected minority). The situation of a social actor, in turn, is similar to the hotel owner's, as it rests on their allegiance to the life-project and its significance to both themselves and past agents. Hence, it is not only, as Guy Kahane puts it, that "significance of the past is past significance,"³³ but the significance of the past is in part set by the practical, everyday decisions of the agent and the meaning they give to their heritage.

Thus, the duty to remember should be seen as framed not only in terms of justice taken as virtue, but also of *phronesis*, the virtue of practical wisdom. Consider the repentance of the agent who fails to do justice to their ancestors. Their failure, when expressed in terms of the virtue of justice, may rest on an inability to recognize either the value of the work of the ancestor, the significance of the common

²⁹ A. Margalit, *The Ethics*, pp. 65–66.

³⁰ P. Ricoeur, *Memory*, p. 89.

³¹ A. Margalit, *The Ethics*, pp. 102–103.

³² L.S. Temkin, "Rationality with Respect to People, Places, and Times," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 45 [5–6] (2015), pp. 576–607.

³³ G. Kahane, "The Significance of the Past," *Journal of The American Philosophical Association* 7 [4] (2021), p. 583.

project to the life of the ancestor, or the project's significance for the life of the present agent. Moreover, the very reason for which the significance of the project of the past agent should be taken into account by the present one may seem unclear. For even if acknowledged as a historical fact, it needs to be considered not only in terms of Kahane's formula, but also as relevant and effective for the current affairs and present agent. Here, justice to the victims of past violence is established on a different basis than is justice to the founders of companies, heads of families or masters of crafts. The difference lies in the intention, that is, in the engagement with the good or aim of those actions of which memory labour forms a part. To say this is not to give up memory labour to the play of competing interests, however. It is rather to highlight its two aspects: practice-involvement and dependence on social framework. The latter consist in both a shared chronology (of family, business or state) and in the conditions of acting (set by economic and symbolic resources, social and — in the case of state organizations — international position, etc.) which work as a framework for the agent's possibilities of acting. What differentiates the two kinds of memory here is thus the engagement in sustaining the framework itself, which for political organizations is one of the key aspects of their justification. But for the social agent memory labour supports their moral topography not as framework-centred, but as agent-centred, that is, it needs to be incorporated into their system of goals, their intentions, and their life-world in general. The duty of repentance then makes sense not as a general obligation, but only when addressed to the individualized agent, that is to say, when linked to their sense of agency and the goods they aim at.

This meets Aristotle's description of *phronesis*, which is excellence in ordering individual actions so that they constitute a coherent form of life,³⁴ by enabling proper deliberation on things that are good for the agent both in particular and as a human being, that is, to aid and sustain their flourishing. Here, the "temporal" *phronesis* shows up as a disposition towards deliberation on the value of past events and projects and on the importance of one's relation to past generations in general. Justice and practical wisdom join forces in this respect, as proper deliberation highlights the importance of time-extended projects for the flourishing of the agent and provides a just measurement of distant goods, and justice, in its turn, provides a justification of the good of projects which might be obtained by the present agent.

What good, then, can be obtained by such a time-oriented virtue? The unity of life does not seem to demand this kind of supplement, as the goods that define one's flourishing are primarily those of current undertakings (with some additional role played by those that will be forced by the unpredictability of the future and the consequences of current decisions). However, two features of one's agency and flourishing call for involving the past. Firstly, the role played by significant others in one's life cannot be limited to those with whom one interacts as contemporaries. Just as in Rawls's view the interests of the future inform current decisions, so do the emotional

³⁴ Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," transl. D. Ross, [in:] Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, R. McKeon (ed.), New York 2001, VI 5 1141b.

relations with past people and events, whether they be those of love, longing and gratefulness, or of remorse, shame and pity, shape the core of every agent's emotional life. This starts with the development of emotional capacity in infancy and early life, which is reflected as near past, and recognition of the resources available to an agent is, in fact, rooted in reflection on one's heritage. Hence, although gratitude may not be the virtue central to one's overall attitude (*hexis*), the possibilities of one's flourishing need to be recognized in relation to one's own history, that is, in a narrative addressing one's location in the social setting, and the adequacy of such a narrative depends on doing justice to the acts of people from one's past. Thus, the development of just moral attitude requires acknowledgment of the role that the past plays in an agent's current affairs.

Secondly, the crucial resources available to the agent that define their possibilities for social agency, such as assets, education, emotional stability, and social position, not only are to an important (and diverse) degree inherited, but the ways in which they are made available and might be used by the agent are also defined by their past. Consider the hotel owner again. It is not only that they inherited a certain amount of wealth, the running of the business and a social status. These inherited assets are not some unidentified economic resources, but derive from and are centred upon the hotel, which defines not only the social practice towards which the owner is directed, but also certain virtues (for example, hospitality) that will be expected from them, and ties them to a certain geographical location as well. Thus, again, the ordering of the agent's aims, whether they accept their heritage and build their life on it or not, requires them to put in order not only those ends that are freely picked up by them, but also those that come from the past.

It follows from the foregoing that seen along such lines, a time-oriented *phronesis* can be seen as excellence in creating relations with the time-extended community and ascribing value to long-lasting projects. This opens the agent to seeing themselves as an episode in a narrative of great length, which covers efforts ranging beyond one's individual life, aimed at goods of supra-individual significance by a group of significant others distributed widely along the time axis. As such, it also urges the agent to limit their natural egocentrism (which is also a present-centrism). Hence, the repentance expected of those who fail to fulfil the duty to remember is based not (or at least not only) on a general obligation to render justice to the efforts of past generations, but more on a failure to judge one's own position in relation to others, which includes those distant not only in space, but also in time, and the importance of time-extended projects for one's well-being.

The second way in which the logic of debt organizes the economy of memory labour is focused, quite literally, on resources that might be lent and borrowed. For this they first need to be accumulated. As noted above, memory labour draws upon a range of capitals worked out by previous agents woven into a time-extended project of distinct significance for each person in the present. Here another distinction between the two kinds of memory labour can be discerned.

Political memory has got not only a certain topography, but also — in a literal sense — a geography. For it is not only, as Booth (and Maurice Halbwachs before him) observes, that “memories must be tied to physical objects, to a presence in

the world, a locale or space, for example, or a monument,³⁵ but they must be tied to some specific region within the historical narrative, in many cases also in the sense that the language (or dialect) of the region will work as the official language of the polity (as is the case with Castilian in Spain). Thus, the memory labour is both institutionalized and centralized so that it marginalizes the memories of the province, permitting the recollections of local history to be replaced by the timeline and moral topography of the centre. Here, the key resources are those that may serve to sustain the identity framework itself. These are both the narrative and symbolic resources of the geographical core, which can be distributed to the provinces so that they supplant local histories and those local histories that strengthen the province's relationship with the core. Yet, when there is growing awareness of local distinctiveness, a periodic updating of the dominant narrative becomes necessary, so that it can accommodate alternative and sub-narratives. Whether the full polycentricity of such a narrative as effective for identity accumulation, without reducing it to technical aspects of social management, is possible, remains an open question.

In time-extended social projects, however, it is not the strength of the framework, but the recognition that grows with accumulated time and effort, that is decisive for the efficiency of identity accumulation. This is what makes giving up one's participation in the project more and more difficult as time passes. For with every generation, and the effort it puts into sustaining the project, this project attracts growing trust, and those who are recognized as being part of the project are judged in relation to it. This makes opting out a matter of either boldly breaking up with the local community as well as giving up its accumulated resources, or trying to transform the entire project and set new goals and create new social roles. This, however, demands a vision not only of the future of the project and one's place in it, but also of its place in social environment. It also requires reshaping the narrative of the efforts and achievements of the past members of the project.

Conclusions

However misleading it could be to reduce all memory labour to the play of interests, it is clear that a moral obligation towards the past appears as unavoidably problematized — it is labour on, and is framed by, the shared, ongoing, time-extended projects that shape the identity and agency of present agents (both individual and collective). That is to say, the obligation is not set by a general moral rule (for the extension of a set of those who should be remembered would have to be infinite), but is based on acknowledging the extended time dimension of human relationships and shared agency. Hence, the first step towards an ethics of memory should not aim at highlighting the merits of past figures and the significance of past events, but rather at providing the actual agent with a sense of the relatedness of their agency. For imposing the duty to remember would be futile without prior recognition of people's allegiances to and dependency on others. Seen along such

³⁵ W.J. Booth, *Communities*, p. 78.

lines, the ethics of memory outlined above is agent-centred, with the emphasis put on including the distribution in time of those on whom every agent's self-reflective agency rests.

Thus understood, memory labour rests on the importance of the core project which sustains the relatedness of the agent to the past. Putting memory into a moral framework is thus to evaluate the importance of the project to the well-being and flourishing of the agent, and — especially in the case of politically defined memory — to reflect on both the range of memories and recollections that are being worked out, and the form in which the labour is to be conducted. From the perspective of the moral topography of memory, it is crucial to recognize the heterogeneity of memory, both in the sense of the number of local histories with complex relations to the centralized history of the dominant discourse, and also with respect to diverse time-frames. Time control and the power to set chronological orders is thus a key aspect of memory politics and it marks the difference between the two kinds of memory labour discussed. Because just as for the social agent memory is project-oriented, for the political agent it is framework-oriented, as it is by strengthening the focus on the form of memory that the centralization of labour proves itself effective.

It is thus by focusing memory labour around certain projects, whose range might vary from local companies and families to states and nations, that it might prove possible to sustain shared identities which help to capitalize common effort in far-reaching and long-lasting undertakings.

References

- Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," transl. D. Ross, [in:] Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, R. McKeon (ed.), New York 2001, pp. 927–1112.
- Baier A., "The Rights of Past and Future Persons," [in:] *Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental Ethics*, E. Partridge (ed.), New York 1981, pp. 171–183.
- Barry B., "Justice between Generations," [in:] *Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honor of H.L.A. Hart*, P.M.S. Hacker, J. Raz (eds.), Oxford 1977, pp. 268–284.
- Berninger A., "Commemorating Public Figures — In Favour of a Fictionalist Position," *Journal of Applied Philosophy* (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12474>.
- Booth W.J., *Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice*, Ithaca–London 2006.
- Bourdieu P., "The Forms of Capital," [in:] *Handbook of Theory of Research for Sociology of Education*, J. Richardson (ed.), New York 1986, pp. 241–258.
- English J., "Justice between Generations," *Philosophical Studies* 31 [2] (1977), pp. 91–104.
- Goodsell T.L., Whiting J.B., "An Aristotelian Theory of Family," *Journal of Family Theory & Review* 8 (2016), pp. 484–502.
- Jonas H., *Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation*, Frankfurt am Main 1979.
- Kahane G., "The Significance of the Past," *Journal of The American Philosophical Association* 7 [4] (2021), pp. 582–600.

- MacIntyre A., *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues*, London 1999.
- Margalit A., *The Ethics of Memory*, Cambridge–London 2004.
- Rawls J., *A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition*, Cambridge 1999.
- Ricoeur P., *Memory, History, Forgetting*, Chicago–London 2004.
- Scheffler S., *Why Worry about Future Generations?*, Oxford 2020.
- Scott J.C., *Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States*, New Haven–London 2017.
- Sin W., “Adult Children’s Obligations towards Their Parents: A Contractualist Explanation,” *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 53 (2019), pp. 19–32.
- Smilansky S., “The Idea of Moral Duties to History,” *Philosophy* 96 (2021), pp. 155–179.
- Stuifbergen M.C., Van Delden J.J., “Filial Obligations to Elderly Parents: A Duty to Care?,” *Medicine, Health, and Philosophy* 14 (2011), pp. 63–71.
- Temkin L.S., “Rationality with Respect to People, Places, and Times,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 45 [5–6] (2015), pp. 576–607.
- Zerzan J., “The Bronze Age: Origins of the One Percent,” [in:] J. Zerzan, *A People’s History of Civilization*, Port Townsend 2018, pp. 74–105.
- Zerzan J., “The Case against Art,” [in:] J. Zerzan, *Origins: A John Zerzan Reader*, Milwaukee–Greensburg 2010, pp. 130–138.
- Zerzan J., “The City and Its Inmates,” [in:] J. Zerzan, *A People’s History of Civilization*, Port Townsend 2018, pp. 44–57.
- Zerzan J., “Civilization Tightens Its Grip: The Axial Age,” [in:] J. Zerzan, *A People’s History of Civilization*, Port Townsend 2018, pp. 108–122.
- Zerzan J., “In the Beginning,” [in:] J. Zerzan, *Why Hope? The Stand against Civilization*, Port Townsend 2018, pp. 2–11.
- Zerzan J., “Time and Its Discontents,” [in:] J. Zerzan, *Time and Time Again*, Olympia 2018, pp. 47–91.

VICTORIA ROWE HOLBROOK
ORCID: 0000-0002-3423-8645
Istanbul Bilgi University

Metaphysics of Beauty in Islam*

Abstract: I summarize fundamental philosophical principles of the metaphysics of beauty in Arabic, Persian and Turkish thought, literature and culture, beginning with the Quran and hadith. As in Plato, true beauty is thought of as the destination of a journey of inner development, but through a distinctively Islamic series of “worlds.” With examples from literature and painting I show how Islamic philosophy elaborated the key role of imagination in realization of true beauty.

Keywords: beauty, Plato, Islam, metaphysics, ancient philosophy, Islamic philosophy

Beauty in Islam

The metaphysics of beauty in Islam is deeply rooted in the antique. The Quran revealed to Muhammed of Mecca between 610 and 632, and the hadith, that is, accounts of what Muhammed said and did, bear content we can recognize as Platonic, especially with regard to beauty in the sense Plato used the term *to kalòn* and its cognates to mean *both goodness and beauty*. During the Greek to Arabic Translation Movement 750–1000, *kalòn* was most often rendered as *husn* or *jamâl*,¹ terms interchangeable in the Quran and hadith. Beauty in this sense is one of the main subjects of the Quran; *husn* and its cognates occur almost 200 times in the text.² Persian *nîkū'î* and Turkish *güzellik* bear the Platonic meaning also, and the antonyms of all three signify shameful and repulsive as well as ugliness, as do those of *kalòn*.

* I thank V.T. Kondu and G. Duman, my partners in founding the “Goodness and Beauty” philosophy conversation series in Istanbul, for being partners in my thinking also.

¹ Glossarium Graeco-Arabicum, <http://telota.bbaw.de/glossga/> (accessed 13.04.2022).

² K. Murata, *Beauty in Sufism: The Teachings of Ruzbihan Baqli*, Albany 2017, p. 30.

Beauty in this sense has ontological and epistemological meaning implicit in love as desire (Greek *eros*, Arabic *'ishq*). Beauty is defined as that which is desired; beauty exists in degrees according to its nearness to its origin, degrees which require that love develop in specific ways in order to reach it; beauty is known by way of love. Love may begin as lust, but can move a person to discover beauty “in itself,” beyond the grasp of the senses. Diotima’s staircase of love, described by Socrates in Plato’s *Symposium*, shines in the structure of countless works, including narratives of Muhammed’s *mi‘râj*, in all languages wherever Islamic culture spread, in works by Jews and Christians as well, carrying the meanings of Quranic vocabulary with it.

As far as we know now, there is no single figure who decisively founded an Islamic metaphysics of beauty serving as a reference point for all who came after, as the towering Ibn Sina (Latin Avicenna; 980–1037) did for other subjects. The metaphysics of beauty is rather the sum of allusive patterns said to be prefigured in the Quran and hadith and elaborated in countless works of many kinds, verse and prose (and visual arts, architecture, music, dance and crafts), some by philosophers better known for their rational writings, like Ibn Sina, who wrote in his *Treatise on Love* that although people love the beauty of exterior form, “the real and final aim of all love is [...] the beauty of the spiritual world.”³ Authors of such works have found God to be identified with beauty, or love, or with being, or Ibn Sina’s “necessary existent” (*wâjib al-wujûd*). As Parviz Morewedge has pointed out, the course of such arguments arrives at a gap not bridged by logical demonstration.⁴ Henry Corbin called Ibn Sina’s tales “visionary recitals.”⁵ Peter Adamson has explained why “proving the existence of a necessary existent is different from proving the existence of God.”⁶ The absence of explicit statement in these works is intentional; as with psychoanalytic practice, the aim is to cultivate insight rather than to explain.

Two well-known hadiths indicate how beauty was understood by Muhammed. In the first, Muhammed says, “No one who has a dust mote’s weight of arrogance in his heart will enter paradise.” His interlocutor rejoins, “A man likes his garment and sandals to be beautiful.” Muhammed goes on to clarify the difference between arrogance and fondness for beautiful things: “Indeed, God is beautiful, and He loves beauty. Arrogance is to be insolent toward God and to despise people.”⁷ Here is one example of the prefiguring I mentioned: the implied continuity between the beauty of a sandal and the beauty of God.

The second example, a “sacred hadith,” in which Muhammed quoted God, establishes the continuity by linking beauty, love, and knowledge: “I was a hidden treasure and I loved to be known, so I created the creatures that I might be

³ E.L. Fackenheim, “A Treatise on Love by Ibn Sina, Translated,” *Mediaeval Studies* 7 (1945), p. 210.

⁴ P. Morewedge, *The Mystical Philosophy of Avicenna*, Binghamton 2001, pp. 10–16.

⁵ H. Corbin, *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital*, transl. W.R. Trask, New York 1960.

⁶ P. Adamson, “From the Necessary Existent to God,” [in:] *Interpreting Avicenna*, P. Adamson (ed.), Cambridge 2013, p. 170.

⁷ K. Murata, *Beauty in Sufism*, pp. 33–34.

known.”⁸ Here is a familiar monotheistic pattern: subject, act, and object of the act are one. Before God created the world, He was a treasure — and a treasure is by definition beautiful and good. A vast interpretive tradition has it that God generates in and from His beauty because He loves to be known and loved through His creatures’ love of the things He engenders. All beauty originates in God’s beauty; by preceding creation, beauty is assigned a certain ontological priority and God is known through love of beauty. Ahmad Ghazali (1061–1126; not to be confused with his older brother Abu Hamid) described an ontology of love in which love is the divine essence in love with its own beauty, which is the sum of its perfections. Spirit travels “the arc of descent” (or “outward track”) as love’s beloved. When spirit hears “the call,” it turns to face love, and travels back along “the arc of ascent” (“inward track”) as the lover, while love is the beloved.⁹

Metaphysics of Beauty

The status of form and imagery is crucial to the metaphysics of beauty. A treasure is also by definition hidden, in Quranic terms in the *ghayb*, usually translated as the “Unseen.” The Quran begins: “Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds,” (1:1) pointing to the plurality of worlds; it is “guidance for those who believe in the Unseen” (2:1). The *ghayb* is a world not only not seen but not heard, not touched, etc., not grasped by the senses. Corbin coined the term *mundus imaginalis* for an intermediate world that links the spiritual with the material and is accessed by the faculty of imagination: the Imaginal World he found described by Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi (1154–1191), Ibn Arabi (1165–1240),¹⁰ and many others. To clear up a growing misunderstanding, *mundus imaginalis* does not correspond to any notion articulated in antique Latin; it is the coinage of Henry Corbin, a 20th-century French phenomenologist well-schooled in Latin, to translate Arabic and Persian ‘*alam al-mithâl* (also ‘*alam al-malakût*, ‘*alam al-khayâl*;¹¹ all three usages are present in Turkish and other languages as well).

The imaginal forms populating that realm have been treated variously; in the few pages allotted here I may say that imaginal form is a state of existence in between “meaning” (*ma’nâ*) in God’s knowledge and embodiment in corporeal

⁸ W.C. Chittick, *The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-‘Arabi’s Cosmology*, Albany 1998, p. 21.

⁹ N. Pourjavady, “Ma’nâ-yi husn va ‘ishq dar adabiyat-i Farsi,” *Sophia Perennis* 2 [1] (Spring 1976), treated in V.R. Holbrook, *The Unreadable Shores of Love: Turkish Modernity and Mystic Romance*, Austin 1994, pp. 143–146.

¹⁰ The *Stanford Encyclopedia* articles on Suhrawardi and on Ibn Arabi are excellent summaries with up-to-date bibliography: R. Marcotte, “Suhrawardi,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2019 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/suhrawardi/> (accessed 13.04.2022); W. Chittick, “Ibn ‘Arabi,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/ibn-arabi/> (accessed 13.04.2022).

¹¹ H. Corbin, “*Mundus Imaginalis* or the Imaginary and the Imaginal,” *Les Amis de Henry et Stella Corbin*, <https://www.amiscorbin.com/bibliographie/mundus-imaginalis-or-the-imaginary-and-the-imaginal/> (accessed 13.04.2022).

form. Meaning, imaginal, and embodied states are an ontological series subsisting simultaneously. Before God created, the things He would create were “entities” (*‘ayn*) in His knowledge. Through creation, these entities first acquire imaginal, then corporeal form. But after acquiring corporeal form, we continue to subsist as entities and imaginal forms as well. When we die, we shed corporeality and return to our imaginal forms to await Resurrection Day, but it is also possible to access the imaginal realm before death. The position of the imaginal realm corresponds to that of the soul between spirit and body. The perceptual faculties are located in the soul, and thus the forms one apprehends through imagination may be distorted by the state of one’s soul.

Wendy M.K. Shaw has explained that the insistence of modern art historians upon an Islamic prohibition against images provides no account for their ever-present role in Islamic philosophy and artistic culture of all kinds. Images are celebrated for their beauty, but understood as *insufficient* to represent reality, because the “worlds” of reality are many and vary in degrees of reality, as are the conditions of the individual human faculties apprehending them. While the aesthetics developed in Christian contexts favours the visual, the Islamic is a “perceptual culture” that prioritizes sound while addressing all the faculties. Imaginal forms, including the contents of dreams, are apperceived not only by the sense of sight but hearing, smell, taste and touch. Where the Christian miracle is the embodied God, the Islamic miracle is the aural revelation of the Quran (“recitation”). God creates by speaking (Quran 2:117).¹² God’s speech conveys unseen meanings to the embodied world by means of imaginal forms, and the return journey to meaning leads back through imaginal form.

Beauty and Love

At the end of his Persian *Spiritual Couplets (Mathnawī)*, Mevlana Rumi (1207–1273) reinterpreted an old tale of three princes who come upon a Fortress of Forms full of images so beautiful that the princes lose their minds.¹³ The word “form,” *ṣūra*, was used during the Translation Movement to render *eidōs*,¹⁴ and has the meaning of imaginal as well as intelligible form. Like intelligible forms, the images in Rumi’s tale are not perceived by the five senses, although as non-corporeal images accessed by imagination, they are “seen.” The most beautiful of all the images there is of a Chinese princess. The three princes fall in love with her and set off to win her hand. Rumi described the failures of the first two, while of the third he said only: “And the third was the laziest of the three / He carried away all — both form and meaning” (6:4876),¹⁵ explaining that those who know God are the laziest of people because they rely upon God to work for them, while others rely upon their own efforts.

¹² These are fundamental points reiterated throughout W.M.K. Shaw, *What Is “Islamic” Art?*, Cambridge 2019.

¹³ R.A. Nicholson (ed., transl., intro, commentary), *The Mathnawī of Jalālūddīn Rūmī*, 8 vols., London 1925–1940, vol. 6, verses 3583–end.

¹⁴ Glossarium Graeco-Arabicum, <http://telota.bbaw.de/glossga/> (accessed 13.04.2022).

¹⁵ My translation.

The story of the third prince was retold by Galip (1757–1799), Şeyh (director) of the Galata Mevlevi Cloister in Istanbul (order of Mevlana Rumi), with his Turkish verse romance *Beauty and Love*.¹⁶ The second half relates the “return journey” of Galip’s hero Love, who is instructed to obtain the alchemy that is the bride-price for marriage with the heroine Beauty. He immediately falls into a bottomless well, where he is imprisoned by a demon who wants to eat him; a witch demands he marry her and crucifies him when he refuses; he traverses a sea of fire (after declining offers to board ships of wax), and on the farther shore, beyond the trials of gluttony and lust, is lured into the Fortress of Forms by a Chinese princess who looks exactly like Beauty. Love is bewildered by the two-dimensional pictures she has painted: “The forms there from matter were disengaged / Presenting themselves uniquely half-faced” (1832). The princess intends to murder him, and he burns the Fortress down, becoming now as insubstantial as thought: “Without matter he was but a mere form / Significance rare without letter borne” (1902). He reaches the Land of the Heart and is greeted by the Sacred Spirit, who tells him he has always been here: “For Love is but Beauty, and Beauty, Love” (2059). Love has journeyed through his own maturing imagination, through the elements of earth, water, fire and air, confronted by distorted imaginal forms of his own (Aristotelian) vegetal, animal, and intellectual souls as he traverses the worlds of embodiment and imagination to arrive at the world of meaning. There the story ends: “Speech has to the realm of silence arrived” (2069). All things are made of God’s speech; they emerge from the “Unseen” realm of meaning, acquire imaginal, then corporal form, and return the way they came.

I will end with reference to a miniature painting treated by Shaw.¹⁷ We see Plato surrounded by animals his music has made to fall into a deep sleep.¹⁸ If he can make animal souls sleep, he can make them wake; he can make them do anything he wishes. The painting illustrates a story from *Iskandarnama*, one of five books in the Persian *Khamsa* of Nizami Ganjavi (1141–1209), with a passage calligraphed in the miniature. At a gathering at the court of Alexander the Great, Aristotle declares that he has opened the path to all knowledge. Plato withdraws to sit in an empty wine cask and meditate on the night sky. He listens to the sublime music of the spheres, constructs an organ based on its intervals, and plays the music, with the effects shown in the painting. Plato demonstrates that his mastery surpasses Aristotle’s; he shows that he can, by means of beautiful sound, convey philosophy, which originates in the Unseen, to the soul in the world of embodiment.

Attributed to Madhu Khanazad, the painting was done in the Mughal Empire in India during the last decade of the 16th century, the early years of European penetration there. Khanazad introduced elements not found in Nizami’s book. The panels in the altarpiece placed on top of Plato’s organ depict Europeans in scenes familiar in Islamic lore, painted with Western-style perspective, which is not employed in the rest of the miniature. He shows us that Europeans, and the

¹⁶ Şeyh Galip, *Beauty and Love/Hüsn-ü Aşk*, transl. V.R. Holbrook, 2 vols., New York 2005.

¹⁷ W.M.K. Shaw, *What Is “Islamic” Art?*, p. 79 ff.

¹⁸ See “B20004-51,” British Library, <https://imagesonline.bl.uk/asset/1355/> (accessed 13.04.2022).

perspective technique in their altarpieces, can be domesticated and mastered by the beauty of Plato's philosophy, all the more powerful for being Unseen.

Nader El-Bizri, like his teacher Morewedge, has pointed to commonalities between Avicennian metaphysics and phenomenology. Having begun with the Islamic approach to imagery as "insufficient," we may recall Martin Heidegger's warning to our age of the "World-Picture," the perspective-based, mechanical image of the world our science has helped us to produce, and which has moved us to destroy the natural world.¹⁹ The point made by both is that if we allow ourselves to be duped by insufficient representations of beauty, we will fail to realize our human being.

References

- Adamson P., "From the Necessary Existent to God," [in:] *Interpreting Avicenna*, P. Adamson (ed.), Cambridge 2013, pp. 170–189.
- Ahmed S., *What Is Islam?*, Princeton 2016.
- Chittick W., "Ibn 'Arabi," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/ibn-arabi/> (accessed 13.04.2022).
- Chittick W.C., *The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-'Arabi's Cosmology*, Albany 1998.
- Corbin H., *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital*, transl. W.R. Trask, New York 1960.
- Corbin H., "Mundus Imaginalis or the Imaginary and the Imaginal," Les Amis de Henry et Stella Corbin, <https://www.amiscorbin.com/bibliographie/mundus-imaginalis-or-the-imaginary-and-the-imaginal/> (accessed 13.04.2022).
- El-Bizri N., *The Phenomenological Quest: Between Avicenna and Heidegger*, Albany 2000.
- Fackenheim E.L., "A Treatise on Love by Ibn Sina, Translated," *Mediaeval Studies* 7 (1945), pp. 208–228.
- Ghazzali A., *Sawânih*, transl., commentary, notes N. Pourjavadi, London 1986.
- Glossarium Graeco-Arabicum, <http://telota.bbaw.de/glossga/> (accessed 13.04.2022).
- Harries K., *Philosophy of Architecture: Lecture Notes*, Yale University Fall Semester 2016, <https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/8/1250/files/2012/09/Philosophy-of-Architecture-1wsooyk.pdf> (accessed 13.04.2022).
- Holbrook V.R., *The Unreadable Shores of Love: Turkish Modernity and Mystic Romance*, Austin 1994.
- Marcotte R., "Suhrawardi," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2019 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/suhrawardi/> (accessed 13.04.2022).
- Morewedge P., *The Mystical Philosophy of Avicenna*, Binghamton 2001.
- Murata K., *Beauty in Sufism: The Teachings of Ruzbihan Baqli*, Albany 2017.

¹⁹ K. Harries, *Philosophy of Architecture: Lecture Notes*, Yale University Fall Semester 2016, <https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/8/1250/files/2012/09/Philosophy-of-Architecture-1wsooyk.pdf> (accessed 13.04.2022), pp. 42–54.

- Nicholson R.A. (ed., transl., intro, commentary), *The Mathnawi of Jalalu'ddin Rumi*, 8 vols., London 1925–1940.
- Pourjavady N., “Ma'nā-yi ḥusn va 'ishq dar adabiyat-i Farsi,” *Sophia Perennis* 2 [1] (Spring 1976).
- Şeyh Galip, *Beauty and Love*, transl. V.R. Holbrook, 2 vols., New York 2005.
- Shaw W.M.K., *What Is “Islamic” Art?*, Cambridge 2019.
- Suhrawardi, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, J. Walbridge, H. Ziai (ed., transl.), Provo 1999.

ENGIN ERDEM
ORCID: 0000-0002-6545-4033
Ankara University

The Place of God in Metaphysics: A Short Analysis of Ibn Sīnā's Critique of Aristotle

Abstract: This article deals with Ibn Sīnā's criticisms of Aristotle regarding what the place of God should be in the science of metaphysics. From Aristotle's point of view, the existence of God is proved by the proof of motion in physics and is held as a subject matter in a science that comes after physics, which is metaphysics. According to him, metaphysics is the most sublime science because God is its subject matter. The most striking criticism against Aristotle's conception of metaphysics was put forward by Ibn Sīnā. From Ibn Sīnā's point of view, the most important problem encountered in Aristotle's understanding of metaphysics is that ontology and theology are intertwined. According to him, God cannot be a subject matter in metaphysics, rather, proving the existence of God is the aim of metaphysics. The subject matter of metaphysics is being *qua* being, and its aim is to prove the Necessary Existent that is the principle of existence. Accordingly, for Ibn Sīnā, metaphysics is an *ontological* science in terms of its subject and a *theological* science in terms of its aim. This new conception of metaphysics, developed by Ibn Sīnā, had a profound effect not only on Islamic thought but also on Western philosophy. In a way, the ontotheological notes of Islamic and Western thought from the Middle Ages to the present have progressed through the metaphysical symphony composed by Ibn Sīnā.

Keywords: Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā, metaphysics, God, ontology, theology

Part I

Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), Avicenna, was a Muslim philosopher who inherited the intellectual accumulation of the previous Greek philosophy and the early Islamic theological tradition, and succeeded in establishing an original metaphysical system by subjecting them to critical analysis. Aristotelian metaphysics has a special place in the philosophical system of Ibn Sīnā. Ibn Sīnā is generally referred to as an Aristotelian philosopher; however, his philosophy can also be read as a critique of Aristotle. Ibn Sīnā's Aristotelianism is not a case of blindly imitating Aristotle's footsteps, but of his original quest to transcend Aristotle by critically analyzing his philosophy.¹ He tells in his life story that he read Aristotle's book, *Metaphysics*, 40 times, but he could not understand the contradictions in that book, and the issue became clear in his mind when he read al-Fārābī's small treatise on that book, *On the Aims of the Metaphysics*.² The new metaphysical system developed by Ibn Sīnā by criticizing Aristotelian metaphysics is the most important breaking point in the relationship between ontology and theology in both Islamic and Western philosophical traditions. This article aims to analyze Ibn Sīnā's criticisms of Aristotle about the place of God in metaphysics, and then to present a general framework for the profound effects of Ibn Sīnā's ontotheological conception of metaphysics in the Islamic and Western philosophical traditions.

The basis of the disagreement between Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā is related to the place of God in the science of metaphysics. According to Aristotle, every science must have a subject matter, and every science differs from other sciences in terms of the subject it deals with.³ So, if metaphysics is a science, what is the subject matter of it? According to Aristotle, metaphysics, in its original expression *first philosophy*, is a universal science that deals with being *qua* being. This science should also be called *theology*, since it also deals with God.⁴ Accordingly, from the point of view of Aristotle, there are two subject matters for the science of metaphysics: being *qua* being and God. For Aristotle, every science must have a subject matter, but no science can prove the subject it deals with.⁵ In this case, from where did metaphysics obtain the God of which it was the subject of research? To understand this point, it would be appropriate to look at Aristotle's views on the science of physics. According to him, physics is a theoretical science that deals with the corporeal things in terms of being mobile and stationary. He claims that when the motion in the world is analyzed in physics, it will be concluded that there

¹ O. Lizzini, "Ibn Sina's Metaphysics," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2020 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/ibn-sina-metaphysics/> (accessed 14.04.2022); E. Erdem, "İbn Sīnā Metafizigi," [in:] *Metafizik: Filozofların Metafizik Sistemleri*, A. Çiğen (ed.), Bursa 2019, pp. 196–204.

² W.E. Gohlman, *The Life of Ibn Sīnā: A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation*, transl. W.E. Gohlman, Albany–New York 1974, pp. 32–34.

³ Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, transl. J. Barnes, Oxford 2002, 71b–72b.

⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, transl. C.D.C. Reeve, Indianapolis 2016, 1026a5–30.

⁵ Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 76b5–30.

is a first mover not moved by someone else at the beginning of the chain of causes. Later, Aquinas will identify this first mover with God in his *the first way*.⁶

According to Aristotle, after the existence of God was proved as a first mover in physics, it is transferred as a subject matter to the meta-physics, that is, to the science that comes after physics. To put it more clearly, God, the subject matter of metaphysics, is proved in physics. The fact that the science that Aristotle called *first philosophy* was later called *metaphysics*, in the sense that comes after physics, is not just a matter of orderings of his books by the commentators; but it is an issue related to his conception of God. From Aristotle's point of view, because of the fact that metaphysics deals with both being *qua* being and God, it is a universal science in one aspect and a particular science in another. Again, according to him, the value of every science is determined in terms of its subject matter, accordingly, metaphysics is the most honorable of all sciences, that is the queen of the sciences, since it deals with God, the most sublime being.⁷

The point that Ibn Sīnā objects to is precisely related to the place of God in the science of metaphysics. In the first article of his book, entitled *al-Shifā' /The Healing*, he examines the place of metaphysics among the sciences and what the subject matter and aim of this science are.⁸ According to him, the most important problem that arises in Aristotle's understanding is how to reconcile the universality of ontology and the particularity of theology in the same science.⁹ Ibn Sīnā agrees with Aristotle that metaphysics is a universal science that deals with being *qua* being, *al-mawǧūd bi-mā huwa mawǧūd*. However, according to him, God cannot be the subject matter of metaphysics. Metaphysics is a universal science that deals with being *qua* being and God as a particular being cannot be a subject matter in this science.¹⁰ First of all, God is not a corporeal being; therefore, the existence of God can not be proved by starting from the science of physics, of which the subject matter is corporeal things. Since God is not a corporeal being, His existence must be proven in a science that deals with the field of existence that is separate in all respects from matter and all material qualities.¹¹

According to Ibn Sīnā, the subject matter of each science is proven in another science that precedes that science, and metaphysics, on which the principles of all particular sciences are based, is at the top of the hierarchy of sciences.¹² When God is accepted as the subject matter of metaphysics, as in Aristotle, God must either be proven in another science that comes before metaphysics or his existence must be self-evident. However, for Ibn Sīnā, it is not possible to prove the existence of God

⁶ St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, transl. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, vol. 1, Notre Dame 1981, Pt. 1 Q. 2 Art. 3, p. 13.

⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1026a5–30.

⁸ Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Ilāhiyyāt min al-Shifā' = The Metaphysics of The Healing: A Parallel English–Arabic Text*, transl. M.E. Marmura, Provo–Utah 2005, pp. 1–6.

⁹ J. Aertsen, "Why Is Metaphysics Called 'First Philosophy' in the Middle Ages," [in:] *The Science of Being as Being: Metaphysical Investigations*, G.T. Doogan (ed.), Washington 2012, p. 55.

¹⁰ Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Ilāhiyyāt min al-Shifā'*, p. 3.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 3–4.

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 11–12.

neither in physics, mathematics, ethics, nor any other science.¹³ Because, none of the aims of these sciences is to prove the existence of God, and it is out of the question for these sciences to realize such an aim in terms of their subject matters. As for the self-evidency of the existence of God, this is also not true according to Ibn Sīnā. If that were the case, there would have been no discussion of His existence. Therefore, for him, the existence of God is neither self-evident nor is the way closed to prove the existence of God; on the contrary, there is evidence of His existence.¹⁴

Looking at Ibn Sīnā's understanding of philosophy of science, it is seen that every science should have the principles on which it is based, the subject it researches, the problems it discusses and the aim it tries to achieve.¹⁵ Accordingly, the basic principle on which metaphysics is based is that the knowledge of being is self-evident. For him, there is no doubt that something exists.¹⁶ The concepts such as *being*, *one*, *thing* and *necessary* are the most basic concepts that we have a priori knowledge of.¹⁷ These primary notions, which are the most common and trans-categorical terms, are the subject matter of metaphysics. As *the doctrine of first principles* was in Aristotle before, Ibn Sīnā also put forward *the doctrine of primary notions* for the first time in metaphysical thought.¹⁸ Because of the fact that our knowledge on being is self-evident, metaphysics does not derive its subject matter from any other science; on the contrary, the subjects of all particular sciences are ultimately based on metaphysics. In this respect, it is more appropriate to call metaphysics a science that comes *before* physics, not after it.¹⁹ Ibn Sīnā makes the point that the existence of God is not a subject matter of metaphysics, rather it is something that it seeks to prove. In other words, the aim of metaphysics is to prove the existence of the Necessary Existent, which is the principle of existence, by analyzing the being *qua* being. Therefore, the aim of metaphysics is to know the existence of God.²⁰ The order of the subjects and the way they are handled in Ibn Sīnā's book, *al-Shifā'*, are compatible with his metaphysical conception. Analyzing the ontological issues such as existence, essence, substance, accident, causality and universals in the first seven articles of this book, he explains the theological issues such as the existence of God, his attributes and prophecy starting from the eighth article.²¹ For Ibn Sīnā, it is true that metaphysics is called theology and that it is the most supreme science. However, the reason why metaphysics is the most supreme science is not because its subject matter is God, as Aristotle claims, but because it aims to prove the existence of God.²²

Also, Ibn Sīnā's criticisms of Aristotle about what the place of God should be in metaphysics make it clear how his method in proving the existence of God should

¹³ Ibidem, pp. 3–4.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 4.

¹⁵ Ibn Sīnā, *Kitābu 'ṣ-Ṣifā': II. Analitikler*, transl. Ö. Türker, İstanbul 2006, p.102.

¹⁶ Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb an-Najāt*, M. Fakhry (ed.), Beirut 1982, p. 271.

¹⁷ Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Ilāhiyyāt min al-Shifā'*, p. 22.

¹⁸ J. Aertsen, "Avicenna's Doctrine of the Primary Notions and Its Impact on Medieval Philosophy," [in:] *Islamic Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, A. Akasoy, W. Rawen (eds.), Leiden–Boston 2008, p. 24.

¹⁹ Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Ilāhiyyāt min al-Shifā'*, p. 17.

²⁰ Ibidem, p. 12.

²¹ Ibidem, p. 257.

²² Ibidem, pp. 11–12.

be named. Different views have been put forward as to whether the method he follows in proving the existence of God falls within the scope of ontological or cosmological arguments. Considering Ibn Sīnā's metaphysical conception, as outlined above, it is more appropriate to call his way *the metaphysical proof*.²³ From the point of view of Ibn Sīnā, as Aristotle claimed, even if the existence of a God was proven with a physical proof, it cannot be proven that God is one as there might be many first movers, and the unity of God is not a problem for Aristotle. However, as Henry of Ghent says, since the metaphysical proof aims to prove the existence of God as the Necessary Existent, and this concept excludes multiplicity by definition, Ibn Sīnā, in proving the existence of God, also explains His unity.²⁴

Evaluated in the light of Ibn Sīnā's criticisms, it is seen that the most important problem in Aristotle's metaphysics is that ontology and theology are intertwined.²⁵ Ibn Sīnā, who offers a consistent explanation of the place of God in metaphysics, has put the relationship between ontology and theology on a scientific basis. In this respect, as Jan Aertsen says, this approach of Ibn Sīnā should be called *the second beginning of metaphysics*.²⁶ To summarize, in Ibn Sīnā's understanding, metaphysics is an *ontological* science, since it deals with being *qua* being; it is a *theological* science as it aims to prove the existence of God.²⁷ Considering the subject and aim of metaphysics as a whole, it can be said that for Ibn Sīnā metaphysics is an *ontotheological* science. Here, it would be useful to mention the following point. Contemporary Polish philosopher Piotr Jaroszyński systematically analyzes the history of Western philosophy by focusing on the concepts of *metaphysics* and *ontology* in his book titled *Metaphysics or Ontology?* According to Jaroszyński, for the metaphysical philosophers, being *qua* being has a reality on its own apart from mind. Whereas, for those who have ontological understanding, being *qua* being has only mental reality.²⁸ Jaroszyński claims that Ibn Sīnā is not a metaphysician, but a philosopher on the line of ontology.²⁹ However, considering Ibn Sīnā's emphases on the reality of being *qua* being and his views on the fact that there is no essence and existence distinction in God, it is not easy to say that this assessment about him is accurate. Actually, when the tradition of Islamic thought is evaluated with respect to Jarantksy's metaphysics and ontology distinction, it can be said that Ibn Sīnā stands on the metaphysical line, whereas the late *Ash'arī kalam*, which started with al-Ghazālī, is closer to the ontology line.

²³ A. Bertolacci, "Avicenna and Averroes on the Proof of God's Existence and the Subject-Matter of Metaphysics," *Medioevo* 32 (2007), pp. 83–84; E. Erdem, *Varlıktan Tanrı'ya: İbn Sina'nın Metafizik Delili*, İstanbul 2016, p. 274.

²⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Henry of Ghent's Summa: The Questions on God's Existence and Essence (Articles 21–24)*, transl. J. Decorte, R.J. Teske, Paris–Leuven 2005, p. 153.

²⁵ J. Aertsen, "Why Is Metaphysics Called 'First Philosophy,'" p. 55.

²⁶ J. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (Ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez*, Leiden 2012, p. 75.

²⁷ A. Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitāb al-Šifā': A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought*, Leiden–Boston 2006, p. 107.

²⁸ P. Jaroszyński, *Metaphysics or Ontology?*, transl. H. McDonald, Leiden–Boston 2018, p. 6.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 218–222.

Part II

Ibn Sīnā's conception of metaphysics deeply influenced both the later Islamic and Western philosophical traditions. It is seen that the philosophical and theological texts in the tradition of Islamic thought after Ibn Sīnā were organized in accordance with his metaphysical conception. Ever since, philosophical and theological issues have begun to be handled in the same texts within a new organizational scheme, not in separate texts. Accordingly, the texts of the many philosophical theologians, such as Fakhr al-Dīn Al-Rāzī and Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, in the late period of Islamic thought, have been basically divided into two main parts as *general metaphysics/ilāhiyyāt-ı āmma* and *special metaphysics/ilāhiyyāt-ı hāssa*.³⁰ In the part of general metaphysics, ontological issues such as existence–non-existence, the essence and existence distinction, the commonality of existence, the predication of existence and causality are discussed. In the part of special metaphysics, theological issues such as the existence of God, divine attributes, prophecy, and life after death are held. Interestingly, the Aristotelian and Avicennian dispute over the place of God in metaphysics has turned into a discussion of the relationship between metaphysics and *kalam*/Islamic theology in late Islamic thought. According to some thinkers, like al-Urmavī, the existence of God must be proved in metaphysics and then treated as a subject matter in *kalam*.³¹ On the other hand, according to thinkers such as al-Ījī and al-Jurjānī, proving the existence of God should be the aim of *kalam*, not metaphysics, because the latter is not an Islamic science.³²

Ibn Sīnā's conception of metaphysics has also been significantly influential in the line of Western philosophy from the Middle Ages to modern philosophy. The issue of whether Ibn Rushd (Averroes), who argues that God is the subject matter of metaphysics in line with Aristotle, or Ibn Sīnā, who argues that God is the aim of metaphysics, is right, has been one of the most important discussion topics of medieval Christian thinkers such as Albertus Magnus, St Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus. As Étienne Gilson said, in order to understand the intellectual profile of a philosopher in medieval Christian thought, it is sufficient to look at whether this philosopher considers Ibn Sīnā or Averroes great.³³ In the first section of his book, titled *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, Duns Scotus tackles the question of “Is the subject of metaphysics being or God?” and takes the side of Ibn Sīnā, who argues that God is the aim of metaphysics, against Ibn Rushd, who claims that God is the subject matter of metaphysics like in Aristotle.³⁴

³⁰ E. Erdem, “İbn Sīnā Metafizigi,” p. 212.

³¹ S. el-Urmevi, “Metafizik (Tanrı-bilim) ve Kelam Arasındaki Fark Üzerine/On the Difference between Metaphysics and al-Kalam,” transl. E. Erdem, *Journal of Islamic Research* 27 [3] (2016), pp. 445–446.

³² S.Ş. Cürcânî, *Şerhu'l-Mevâkıf*, transl. Ö. Türker, vol. 1, İstanbul 2011, pp. 55–56.

³³ E. Gilson, *Ortaçağda Felsefe: Patristik Başlangıçtan XIV. Yüzyılın Sonlarına Kadar*, transl. A. Meral, İstanbul 2007, p. 347.

³⁴ John Duns Scotus, *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, transl. G.J. Etzkorn, A.B. Wolter, vol. 1, New York 1997, Book I, Question One, p. I, p. 13.

More importantly, the organization of Francisco Suárez's book, titled *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, which Martin Heidegger describes as the most important work between the late medieval philosophy and early modern philosophy,³⁵ is based on the discussion of the place of God in metaphysics. Suárez touches upon this issue right at the beginning of his book and says that Ibn Sīnā, who argues that the aim of metaphysics is to prove the existence of God, is right.³⁶ It is one of the most important innovations in the history of Western metaphysics that Suárez divided the aforementioned book into two main parts as *metaphysica generalis* and *metaphysica specialis*.³⁷ The distinction of general metaphysics and special metaphysics was transferred to Immanuel Kant through Christian Wolff and Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, and the main structure of his book, *Critique of Pure Reason*, is in accordance with this distinction.³⁸ According to Kant, the ontological argument belongs to general metaphysics, while the cosmological and teleological arguments belong to specific metaphysics.³⁹ Lastly, the conflict between Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā about the place of God in metaphysics, as Amos Bertolacci points out, is not limited to these two philosophers only, rather, it makes it necessary to visit the main routes of the long journey of metaphysics from Athens to Buhārā, Cordoba, Paris, Cologne and Königsberg.⁴⁰

References

- Aertsen J., "Avicenna's Doctrine of the Primary Notions and Its Impact on Medieval Philosophy," [in:] *Islamic Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, A. Akasoy, W. Rawen (eds.), Leiden–Boston 2008, pp. 21–42.
- Aertsen J., *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (Ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez*, Leiden 2012.
- Aertsen J., "Why Is Metaphysics Called 'First Philosophy' in the Middle Ages," [in:] *The Science of Being as Being: Metaphysical Investigations*, G.T. Doogan (ed.), Washington 2012, pp. 53–69.

³⁵ M. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, transl. A. Hofstadter, Indianapolis 1988, p. 80.

³⁶ F. Suárez, *The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God: Metaphysical Disputations 28–29*, transl. J.P. Doyle, South Bend 2004, p. 55.

³⁷ B. Cantens, "Ultimate Reality in the Metaphysics of Francisco Suárez," *Meaning* 25 [2] (2002), pp. 77–78.

³⁸ J. Grondin, *Introduction to Metaphysics from Parmenides to Levinas*, transl. L. Soderstrom, New York 2012, pp. 104–105.

³⁹ M. Grier, "Kant's Critique of Metaphysics," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2018 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/kant-metaphysics/> (accessed 14.04.2022).

⁴⁰ A. Bertolacci, "From Athens to Buhārā, to Cordoba, to Cologne: On the Transmission of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in the Arab and Latin Worlds during the Middle Ages," [in:] *Circolazione dei saperi nel Mediterraneo. Filosofia e Scienze (secoli IX–XVII). Circulation des savoirs autour de la Méditerranée. Philosophie et sciences (IXe–XVIIe siècles). Atti del VII Colloquio Internazionale della Società Internazionale d'Historie des Sciences et de la Philosophie Arabes et Islamiques. Firenze, 16–18 febbraio 2006*, G. Federici Vescovini, A. Hasnawi (eds.), Firenze 2013, pp. 217–218.

- Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, transl. C.D.C. Reeve, Indianapolis 2016.
- Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, transl. J. Barnes, Oxford 2002.
- Bertolacci A., "Avicenna and Averroes on the Proof of God's Existence and the Subject-Matter of Metaphysics," *Medioevo* 32 (2007), pp. 61–97.
- Bertolacci A., "From Athens to Buhārā, to Cordoba, to Cologne: On the Transmission of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in the Arab and Latin Worlds during the Middle Ages," [in:] *Circolazione dei saperi nel Mediterraneo. Filosofia e Scienze (secoli IX–XVII). Circulation des savoirs autour de la Méditerranée. Philosophie et sciences (IXe–XVIIe siècles). Atti del VII Colloquio Internazionale della Société Internationale d'Histoire des Sciences et de la Philosophie Arabes et Islamiques. Firenze, 16–18 febbraio 2006*, G. Federici Vescovini, A. Hasnawi (eds.), Firenze 2013, pp. 217–233.
- Bertolacci A., *The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitāb al-Šifā': A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought*, Leiden–Boston 2006.
- Cantens B., "Ultimate Reality in the Metaphysics of Francisco Suárez," *Meaning* 25 [2] (2002), pp. 73–92.
- Cürcânî S.Ş., *Şerhu'l-Mevâkıf*, transl. Ö. Türker, vol. 1, İstanbul 2011.
- Erdem E., "İbn Sînâ Metafiziği," [in:] *Metafizik: Filozofların Metafizik Sistemleri*, A. Çüçen (ed.), Bursa 2019, pp. 196–220.
- Erdem E., *Varlıktan Tanrı'ya: İbn Sina'nın Metafizik Delili*, İstanbul 2016.
- Gilson E., *Ortaçağda Felsefe: Patristik Başlangıçtan XIV. Yüzyılın Sonlarına Kadar*, transl. A. Meral, İstanbul 2007.
- Gohlman W.E., *The Life of Ibn Sīnā: A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation*, transl. W.E. Gohlman, Albany–New York 1974.
- Grier M., "Kant's Critique of Metaphysics," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2018 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/kant-metaphysics/> (accessed 14.04.2022).
- Grondin J., *Introduction to Metaphysics from Parmenides to Levinas*, transl. L. Soderstrom, New York 2012.
- Heidegger M., *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, transl. A. Hofstadter, Indianapolis 1988.
- Henry of Ghent, *Henry of Ghent's Summa: The Questions on God's Existence and Essence (Articles 21–24)*, transl. J. Decorte, R.J. Teske, Paris–Leuven 2005.
- Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Ilāhiyyāt min al-Shifā' = The Metaphysics of The Healing: A Parallel English–Arabic Text*, transl. M.E. Marmura, Provo–Utah 2005.
- Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb an-Najāt*, M. Fakhry (ed.), Beirut 1982.
- Ibn Sīnā, *Kitābu'ş-Şifā': II. Analitikler*, transl. Ö. Türker, İstanbul 2006.
- Jaroszyński P., *Metaphysics or Ontology?*, transl. H. McDonald, Leiden–Boston 2018.
- John Duns Scotus, *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, transl. G.J. Etzkorn, A.B. Wolter, vol. 1, New York 1997.
- Lizzini O., "Ibn Sina's Metaphysics," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2020 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/ibn-sina-metaphysics/> (accessed 14.04.2022).
- St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, transl. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, vol. 1, Notre Dame 1981.

- Suárez F., *The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God: Metaphysical Disputations 28–29*, transl. J.P. Doyle, South Bend 2004.
- el-Urmevî S., “Metafizik (Tanrı-bilim) ve Kelam Arasındaki Fark Üzerine/On the Difference between Metaphysics and al-Kalam,” transl. E. Erdem, *Journal of Islamic Research* 27 [3] (2016), pp. 442–447.

ILONA BŁOCIAN
ORCID: 0000-0002-5604-4278
University of Wrocław

Mnemic Images in the Early Works of Sigmund Freud

Abstract: Freud was interested in the problem of memory from the time of his very early works. The processes taking place in memory, imaging, remembering and forgetting images focused his attention and were one of the pillars of shaping his conception of the unconscious and mind as “the storehouse of total memory,” which in one of his works he compared to “the Eternal City of Rome” (*Culture and Its Discontents*), which accumulate images-memories gathered throughout life. Shifts, changes, deformations, strong emotional components determine the specificity of many processes of remembering and forgetting, a specific “coding” of information in the form of visual, acoustic and other images. Nowadays, there are indications of Freud’s views in various dimensions of scientific research on memory and the consciousness of the importance of these approaches in our culture and its discovery of the role of autobiographical memory.

Keywords: image, mnemic image, screen memories, memory, autobiographical memory, psychoanalysis

Like many of his followers, as well as his reformers and commentators, Sigmund Freud quite early recognized the importance of both phenomena and processes in the operation of memory. He also understood the importance of mental images themselves and their relationship to external reality. His conception regarding the latter issue, so fundamental from the point of view of philosophical approaches to memory, is widely discussed in the contemporary research on the psychology of memory. As Zofia Rosińska remarks, references to memory and mnemic experience are scattered throughout his work and one gets the impression that Freud discov-

ered a new paradigm in understanding these phenomena (Rosińska 2003: 81–82). We also owe to Freud the discovery of autobiographical memory which plays an important role in contemporary research in various scientific disciplines (ibidem), although the work of Hermann Ebbinghaus is also mentioned as pioneering in this area, especially on the forgetting curve and the influence of personal experiences in memory processes (Rybak-Korneluk et al. 2016: 959). It needs to be stressed also that Larry R. Squire mentioned conceptions of F.P.G. Maine de Biran, William James and Henri Bergson (Squire 2004: 171) among early considerations of different kinds of this “faculty of mind.” Bergson devoted much attention to memory and the relationship between duration, image and memory in his works. *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (1970 [1888]) certainly precedes the developed forms of Freud’s conception.¹

Freud attaches a great importance to memory, its specific activity in various periods of life, including early childhood, but also its connection with imagery, symbolism and trauma (Błocian 2007: 6–7). The concepts of memory, its imagery, its content and the notion of the unconscious, are closely related in entirety of his conception. Anna Herzyk observed: “The thought of Sigmund Freud and modern neuropsychology intersect in many different ways, but the most important are the analogies regarding the subject of research and reflection on the nature of unconscious mental processes, which was manifested in the creation of neuropsychology — a new branch in clinical neuropsychology” (Herzyk 2017: 190).

It is deep memory, crypto-memory, and cryptomnesia that were at the root of understanding the mind as a store of total information and the hypothesis of the functioning of the unconscious, the polypsychic nature of the psyche and the model of the mind as a cluster of the conscious self and many unconscious sub-personalities (Ellenberger 1994; Błocian 2017). Nowadays, hidden, deep memory is also called implicit memory (“intuitive information processing”; Underwood 2004).

In the most general and basic terms, it is defined as “recording, storing and reproducing experience” (Maruszewski 2000: 137) at the individual and collective level. It is differentiated as understood as a process and as an ability. Therefore, if it is understood as recording images related to experiences, its role in storing information that may be used for orientation in the environment, solving problems and finally survival increases. Are the images and their sequences (stored by short-term and long-term, deep memory)² a registration of real experiences? Or

¹ Randall Auxier remarked the time relations between early works of Bergson and Freud; an extended form of presenting the problem of image in terms of Bergson; cf. Auxier 2014; Bergson 1970 [1888]. Bergson emphasizes in this work many of the processes that Freud later recognized as important, for example that “the deep-seated conscious states have no relation to quantity, they are pure quality” or that in the dreamer’s imagination two images can overlap and create one, like in Gaton’s photography (Bergson 1950: 136).

² At the turn of the 60s and 70s, there were, among others, ultra-short-term, short-term and permanent memory (the model of Richard Atkinson and Richard Shiffrin; see Malmberg, Raaijmakers, Shiffrin 2019), then — declarative and non-declarative memory (Squire 2004), short-term and permanent memory (Hebb 1949). It was treated as a “storage” (gathering information about experiences), but it was also associated with different levels of information processing (Craig, Lochkart 1972).

rather a specific, modified form influenced by factors of individual and collective memory? Memory refers to the data of the outside world, the individual itself and the relationship between the person and the outside world (Maruszewski 2000: 165). The composition of these dimensions is a significant cluster of problems. At its source, memory was primarily pictorial, because the first pre-literary forms of artifacts related to human activity assumed this shape and it is dated in those beginnings according to the time of the creation of rock painting and symbolism related to burial customs. Its first forms are therefore pictorial and symbolic. The image, even in contemporary culture, is still primarily a carrier of information documenting the course of an event, act, process — it happens both in the sphere of photography (watching the world; Sontag 2009; “undoubted usefulness of photography in acquiring knowledge,” “increasing knowledge on the photographed objects”; Walden 2008: 111), documentary photography confirming by eye “a certain state of affairs, although many studies also focus on showing the discrepancy or even ‘shady interests’ between art and truth” (Sontag 2009) and in the whole bearing of the central question of semiology, whether “analogous representation (‘copies’) can create true systems of signs” (Barthes 1985: 289). It is used both in the media and in science, where photographs, images as information carriers constitute the axis around which the spoken, transmitted, researched and interpreted content develops (an image is an “observation instrument,” “provides better visibility of reality”; Wunenburger 2011: 185 ff.) In this perspective, it is emphasized that considering the image, imaging processes and imagery, we also indicate that seeing itself is a central aspect of our way of being, and that our contemporary culture is “to an increasing extent visual culture” (Sztompka 2005: 11–12).

The image, despite significant possible transformations, deformations, delusions, is related to the states of reality, both external to the mind and mental. This relationship is very complex and it is also demonstrated by contemporary psychological research on memory. The culminating conclusion is the statement that memory “is the basic mechanism of storing experience” (Maruszewski 2000: 163).

Freud’s research on images of memory is of great importance. In psychological research on memory, it is also noted: “Freud’s hypothesis on the role of early childhood trauma gained support from the least expected side”³ (Maruszewski 2000: 169). In his view, the most significant also seem to be the forms of data transformation, their selection, the formation of certain specific chains of association, that is, their entire complex dynamics and the ways of functioning and determining the ways of creating new elements in memory. A considerable question in these areas is still how the mnemonic experiences of a person relate to the events in his biography, how does the experience of the external world compare to those concerning oneself and the formation of complex relations between them, and how the descriptive data relate to the strongly affective aspects memory activities.

³ That is, from the research on the relationship of parental care in animals and the secretion of neurotransmitters that inhibit the activity of fear centres.

“Double Conscience”

At the root of the symptoms of hysterical neurosis lies the intrusion of the content of the “second consciousness.” It is characterized by many symptoms that are troublesome for individuals. Freud dealt with it already during his scholarship in France; namely, he observed the research of Jean-Martin Charcot at the Salpêtrière Hospital (he often refers to them,⁴ including in the work *Quelques considerations*;⁵ Freud 1893: 38–55). This does not mean that he was not critical of his and his students’ interpretation of the phenomenon of hysteria (*L’hérédité*; Freud 1896: 407–422).

Beng-Yeong Ng writes that hysteria has “a long and colourful history”; often means “dramatic behaviour,” includes “a mechanism, a concept, a pattern of symptoms, and even a personality style” (Ng 1999: 287). The axis of Freud’s considerations and research is the recognition that its condition is splitting off consciousness from proper awareness of certain contents (“the whole stock of imaginative products”; Freud 1895 (hereinafter SH): 16) functioning outside its control. It occurs as a result of the overlapping of traumatic experiences and reactions in the form of symbolic and image codes and creations of the rich imagination of patients influencing a kind of hypnoid state. According to Freud, it is also a condition for hysterical neurosis.

Its symptoms are numerous; examples include paralysis and paresis of parts of the body, partial or complete aphasia, anaesthesia or tremors in various parts of the body; after Freud, many symptoms are classified as conversion symptoms, that is, linking (changing) the emotional factor into a somatic symptom: paralysis, anaesthesia, blindness or silence (Jarosz 1980: 187). Freud combines hysteria and hypnosis: “We should like to balance the familiar thesis that hypnosis is an artificial hysteria by another — the basis and *sine qua non* of hysteria is the existence of hypnoid states.” “Pathological ideas” form the basis for the emerging and dissolving content; they retain great vitality and freshness, as if “bypassed” by the control of the conscious ego, not succumbing to forgetfulness over time. “Double conscience” (Ger. *zweite Bewußtsein*), the second consciousness is the basis of any hysteria, because it interferes disruptingly with the usual ways of human functioning and adaptation: “the products of hypnoid states intrude into waking life in the form of hysterical symptoms” (Freud SH: 9). It deepens the relationship between them; this relationship is “the second consciousness”: “in hysteria groups of ideas [Ger. *Vorstellungsgruppen*; GW 1: 95] originating in hypnoid states are present and that these are cut off from associative connection with the other ideas, but can be

⁴ Freud writes about Charcot’s conception of hysteria in *Studies on Hysteria*: “Charcot, as is well known, has given us a schematic description of the ‘major’ hysterical attack, according to which four phases can be distinguished in a complete attack: (1) the epileptoid phase, (2) the phase of large movements, (3) the phase of ‘attitudes passionelles’ (the hallucinatory phase), and (4) the phase of terminal delirium” (Freud 1985: 9).

⁵ Freud writes there that he was Charcot’s student between 1885 and 1886 (Freud 1893: 38). He notes here what is important for the problem of psychological determinants of hysteria, and concerns the phenomenon of paralysis: “I will first observe that hysterical paralysis is much more often accompanied by disturbances of sensibility than organic paralysis, which are usually deeper and more frequent in neurosis than in organic symptomatology” (Freud 1893: 46).

associated among themselves, and thus form the more or less highly organized rudiment of a second consciousness, a condition seconde” (SH: 10). These groups of ideas, groups of images, form the disturbance and the characteristics of the symptom. They also take control not only over the current form of behaviour, but due to the length of the process, ultimately over the entire existence of the individual. Freud studies the biography of patients; many of its events are purely internal and therefore cannot be verified by comparison with the memories of their other witnesses; but much is subject to it. Traumatic hysteria is based on actual painful experiences, such as the death of loved ones, parents, divorce, and early childhood experiences. They affect people with vivid imaginations and the ease of creating internal symbolic imagery, which are the basis of the activity he calls “private theatre” in various forms of fear of a snake showing up on the wall, loss of the ability to speak in the mother tongue, but keeping it in a foreign language, hydrophobia, or hallucinations. The vividness of the image is often precisely related to pathogenic memories. The “second consciousness,” that is the unconscious, can already in these early works of Freud be characterized primarily by vivid image codes in which it expresses its content. They appear to be related to real events of individual experiences (Freud reconstructs them frequently), but the connection is complex. The connection of unconscious processes, the ability to imitate (“map”) and the development of the emotional sphere is nowadays sometimes noticed and re-interpreted, for example in the works of Antonio Damasio (2018).

Contemporary research on biographical memory confirms the role of emotionally (positive or negative) marked images of events that are experienced in early childhood, for example in studies by L. Murray and C. Treverthen (1985) on real and sham interactions between mothers and children, or creating the basis for cognitive scripts (Abelson, Schank 1977), especially un verbalized emotional scripts and their impact on the development of emotional intelligence. During a series of works and analysis of cases undertaken and reconstructed in *Studies on Hysteria*, Freud searches for possible forms of influencing behavioural disorders and symptoms of neuroses. An important conclusion can be drawn from them, also today, that early experiences affect the development and possible disturbances of the emotional sphere of an individual and its adaptation to the requirements of life, understanding other people and the ability to create emotional bonds.

“There Is in General No Guarantee of the Data Produced by Our Memory”

In the early stages of his research, he is primarily interested in effectively influencing the causes of persistent symptoms of neuroses, especially hysterical neurosis. In 1899 he publishes *Über Deckerinnerungen (Screen Memories)*. Here he follows Catherine and Victor Henri’s research on memory. In reference to them, he writes:

In the majority of significant and in other respects unimpeachable childhood scenes the subject sees himself in the recollection as a child, with the knowledge that this child is himself; he sees this child, however, as an observer from outside the scene would see him (Freud 2001 [1899]: 321).

So it seems obvious that a certain transformation is taking place here. A memory that is based on an experience in the past and does not contain any transformations could not involve the image of itself from the point of view of an outside observer, yet in a certain class of images of memory it does. Screen memories are defined by Freud as: “recollection of this kind, whose value lies in the fact that it represents in the memory impressions and thoughts of a later date whose content is connected with its own by symbolic or similar links, may appropriately be called a ‘screen memory’” (ibidem: 319).

So there are many images stored in memory that the individual does not know why he remembered them. They seem neutral, indifferent to many biographically important events. They are accompanied, yet it is not known why the images of the events themselves or even those that would be semantically associated with them with a strong affective stigma are not remembered. This is what happens with images that are only accompanying, neutral in this respect, and even at first glance having no meaning at all. Sometimes they are kept alive and with almost photographic likeness, they are almost copies of images perceived by the senses. Thirty-eight-year-old patient of Freud recalls the remembered image of yellow flowers and the taste of bread: “The yellow of the flowers is a disproportionately prominent element in the situation as a whole, and the nice taste of the bread seems to me exaggerated in an almost hallucinatory fashion” (ibidem: 312). He even directly says: “The scene appears to me fairly indifferent and I cannot understand why it should have become fixed in my memory” (ibidem: 311). Therefore, the operation of memory is not a simple and obvious storage of information related to particularly important events from the point of view of an individual biography. It is not a simple process of registering impressions related to “fear, shame, physical pain, disease and death” as in the research by C. and V. Henri. A strong affective and emotional basis modifies the functioning of memory. Nowadays, it is noted that if there are disturbances in emotional communication, they may affect, especially in the early stages of life, further mental development, as well as neurodegenerative changes in the brain (Maruszewski 2000: 168). Symptoms, writes Freud, can be understood through a series of conflict and denial processes (*Verdrängung*; Freud 1899: 537). They most often take place around the main and strong sources of drive (*mächtigen Triebfedern*), love and hunger.

According to Freud, the veils of memory have a certain purpose, they replace unpleasant or painful meanings of experiences, forming an image that indicates with the unusual vividness of forms and colours beyond itself towards the “source experience.”

References

- Abelson R.P., Schank R.C., 1977, *Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures*, Hillsdale.
- Auxier R., 2014, “Image and Act: Bergson’s Ontology and Aesthetics,” *Sztuka i Filozofia* 45, pp. 60–77.

- Barthes R., 1985, "Retoryka obrazu," *Pamiętnik Literacki* LXXVI [3], pp. 289–302.
- Bergson H., 1950, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, transl. F.L. Pogson, London.
- Bergson H., 1970 [1888], *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*, Paris.
- Błocian I., 2007, "Erupcje lawy: popędy, uczucia, namiętności – psychoanaliza i jej badania życia emocjonalnego człowieka. Wstęp," [in:] *O uczuciach, namiętnościach i szaleństwie w ujęciu psychoanalizy*, I. Błocian, R. Saciuk (eds.), Toruń, pp. 5–22.
- Błocian I., 2017, "Nieświadomość i polipsychizm," [in:] *Rzecz piękna, mądra, dobra... T. 3, Wszystkim jest jedno: oryginalna polifonia filozofii*, S. Barć, P. Korobczak, A. Lorzcyk (eds.), Wrocław, pp. 169–181.
- Craik F.M., Lockhart R.S., 1972, "Levels of Processing: A Framework for Memory Research," *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior* 11 [6], pp. 671–684.
- Damasio A., 2018, *Dziwny porządek rzeczy. Życie, uczucia i tworzenie kultury*, transl. A. Jankowski, Poznań.
- Ellenberger H.-F., 1994, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry*, London.
- Freud S., 1893, "Quelques considérations pour une étude comparative des paralysies motrices organiques et hystériques" [Vergleichung der hysterischen mit der organischen Symptomatologie], [in:] S. Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 1, pp. 39–55.
- Freud S., 1895, *Studies on Hysteria*, www.sigmundfreud.net/studies-on-hysteria-pdf-ebook.jsp (accessed 20.12.2021).
- Freud S., 1896, "L'hérédité et l'étiologie des névroses," [in:] S. Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 1, pp. 407–422.
- Freud S., 1899, "Über Deckerinnerungen," [in:] S. Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 1, pp. 531–554.
- Freud S., 2001 [1899], "Screen Memories," [in:] *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume III (1893–1899): Early Psychoanalytic Publications*, J. Strachey (ed.), London, pp. 299–322.
- Hebb D.O., 1949, *The Organization of Behavior*, New York.
- Hebb D.O., 1973, *Podręcznik psychologii*, Warszawa.
- Herzyk A., 2017, *Neuropsychologia kliniczna wobec zjawisk świadomości i nieświadomości*, Warszawa.
- Jarosz M., 1980, "Nerwice," [in:] M. Jarosz, S. Cwynar, *Podstawy psychiatrii*, Warszawa.
- Malmberg K.J., Raaijmakers J.G.W., Shiffrin R.M., 2019, "50 Years of Research Sparked by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968)," *Memory & Cognition* 47, pp. 561–574.
- Maruszewski T., 2000, "Pamięć autobiograficzna jako podstawa tworzenia doświadczenia indywidualnego," [in:] *Psychologia. Podręcznik akademicki*, J. Strelau (ed.), vol. 2, Gdańsk, pp. 21–30.
- Maruszewski T., 2010, "Pamięć autobiograficzna i tożsamość," *Czasopismo Psychologiczne* 16 [1], pp. 21–30, <http://czasopismopsychologiczne.pl/files/articles/2010-16-pami-autobiograficzna-i-tosamo.pdf> (accessed 15.12.2020).
- Murray L., Trevarthen C., 1985, "Emotional Regulation of Interactions between Two-Month Olds and Their Mothers," [in:] *Social Perception in Infants*, T.M. Field, N.A. Fox (eds.), Norwood, pp. 177–197.

- Ng B.-Y., 1999, "Hysteria: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Its Origins and History," *History of Psychiatry* 10, pp. 287–301.
- Rosińska Z., 2003, "Doświadczenie mnemiczne, czyli fenomen pamięci według Zygmunta Freuda," [in:] *Nieświadomość jako odrębne królestwo*, I. Błocian, R. Saciuk (eds.), Toruń, pp. 79–90.
- Rybak-Korneluk A., Wichowicz H.M., Żuk K., Dziurkowski M., 2016, "Pamięć autobiograficzna i jej znaczenie w wybranych zaburzeniach psychicznych," *Psychiatria Polska* 50 [5], pp. 959–972.
- Sontag S., 2009, *O fotografii*, transl. S. Magala, Kraków.
- Squire L.R., 2004, "Memory Systems of the Brain: A Brief History and Current Perspective," *Neurobiology of Learning and Memory* 82, pp. 171–177.
- Sztompka P., 2005, *Socjologia wizualna. Fotografia jako metoda badawcza*, Warszawa.
- Underwood G., 2004, *Utajone poznanie. Poznawcza psychologia nieświadomości*, transl. R. Białas, A. Słabosz, Gdańsk.
- Walden S., 2008, "Prawda w fotografii," [in:] *Fotografia i filozofia. Szkice o pędzlu natury*, transl. I. Zwiech, S. Walden (ed.), Kraków, pp. 111–134.
- Wunenburger J.-J., 2011, *Filozofia obrazów*, transl. T. Stróżyński, Gdańsk.

MARTA DIXA
ORCID: 0000-0003-4605-9182
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu

Miejsce hipotezy „napędu kulturowego” w wyjaśnianiu ewolucji gatunku ludzkiego

The “Cultural Drive” Hypothesis in Explaining the Evolution of the Human Species

Abstract: The main purpose of this work is to show the internal theoretical connections of the two fundamental paradigms that describe the evolution of the human species, that is, the Lamarckian paradigm and the Darwinian paradigm. In carrying out this task, I begin by presenting the two evolutionary concepts. Understanding the content of these paradigms allows us to focus on the argumentation proposed by modern evolutionary biologists on the issue of the evolution of *Homo sapiens*; more precisely, on the paraphrased concept of “genetic drive.” Employed so far in a narrow range of genetic phenomena, it was — thanks to Allan Wilson — transformed into the concept of “cultural drive” and used to explain innovations appearing in not only genetic but also cultural endowments of the human species. This type of application of the concept of cultural drive in the structure of the *Homo sapiens* theory of evolution has recently been proposed by Kevin Laland. Then I show what kind of deviations (expressed in the variability of biological endowments, that is, in the form of exaptations and spandrels) are produced by the cultural factors of the evolution of *Homo sapiens* and how they can not only be included in the mechanisms of species evolution (as interpreted on the basis of the Lamarckian paradigm), but also how they constitute the “material” on which civilization changes take place.

Keywords: cultural drive, Lamarckism, theory of evolution, natural selection, spandrel, exaptation

Wprowadzenie

Celem tekstu jest wykazanie, że choć w próbach rekonstrukcji mechanizmów ewolucji gatunku ludzkiego ujmuje się zasadniczo działanie czynników biologicznych, to nie one jedyne decydują o jej przebiegu i historii człowieka. Obok nich coraz istotniejszy wpływ miały i mają czynniki kulturowe, w tym społeczne. Czynniki te działają „szybciej” i częściej niż czynniki ewolucji biologicznej. I choć te ostatnie są zależne od przebiegu procesów dziedziczenia, to podlegają one wpływom czynników i mechanizmów kulturowych.

W argumentacji za powyższą ideą pomocne będzie wykorzystanie pojęcia „napędu genowego” (*gene drive*), którego sparafrazowaną wersję względem udziału czynników kulturowych w pojmowaniu ewolucji człowieka zaproponował Allan Wilson (1985). Punktem wyjścia upowszechnionej w genetyce molekularnej idei napędu genowego, jest nadpisanie niepożądanego wariantu genu przez gen pożądanym. Za sprawą tego rodzaju modyfikacji genetycznej potomstwo w populacji zyskuje więcej niż 50% szans na dziedziczenie danej cechy, co w sprzyjających warunkach prowadzi do upowszechnienia się owego wariantu genu w całej populacji.

Propozycja Wilsona polega zatem na wprowadzeniu — po dokonaniu stosownej parafrazy idei „napędu genowego” — idei „napędu kulturowego” (*cultural drive*), która działa na ludzkich wytworach mentalnych (z oczywistych względów także kulturowych) tak, jak napęd genowy operuje na molekułach, będących składnikami uposażeń dziedzicznych.

W rozumieniu Wilsona ludzie wytwarzają w toku swego życia wytwory kulturowe, w tym innowacje, które uznać można za „drobne” odpowiedniki mutacji genowych. Nowości te — poprzez upowszechnienie kulturowe — często przyczyniają się do wyznaczenia nowych dróg rozwoju cywilizacyjnego. Jedną z przesłanek tego rozumowania jest pogląd, że im gatunek posiada relatywnie większy mózg, charakteryzuje się odpowiednio rozwiniętymi, czy bardziej złożonymi zachowaniami oraz umiejętnościami społecznymi, tym szybciej ewoluuje. Idea ta przez dość długi czas pozostawała niezauważona. Dopiero pod koniec XX wieku zwrócili na nią uwagę badacze, którzy zaproponowali wprowadzenie do korpusu wiedzy biologii ewolucyjnej idei „dziedziczenia nisz kulturowych”. Jednym z nich jest Kevin Laland, który pokazuje, jak i na ile idea Wilsona może być przydatna w wypracowaniu nowej koncepcji rozwoju ewolucyjnego nazywanej teorią „konstrukcji nisz”.

Tok myślowy tego tekstu wyznaczy określenie statusu zazwyczaj rozpatrywanych przez badaczy czynników ewolucji rodzaju ludzkiego. Dlatego w tym miejscu odwołam się do dwóch paradygmatycznych ujęć teorii ewolucji: teorii Karola Darwina oraz koncepcji Jean-Baptiste’a Lamarcka. Następnie scharakteryzuję mechanizm napędu kulturowego w rozumieniu jego twórcy, a pomysł biologa behawioralnego Kevina Lalanda wykorzystam w objaśnieniu transformacji ewolucyjnych dokonujących się w formie egzaptacji i pendentów. Podam też argumentację za tym, że egzaptacje i pendentowy, wyinterpretowane na gruncie koncepcji Lamarcka jako innowacje, dokonujące się poprzez działanie napędu kulturowego — włączyć można w mechanizmy ewolucji gatunkowej.

Darwinowski versus Lamarckowski paradygmat ewolucyjny

W 1859 roku Karol Darwin w dziele *O powstawaniu gatunków* przedstawił teorię ewolucji, zwaną teorią doboru naturalnego. Stała się ona jedną z najważniejszych nowożytnych koncepcji naukowych. Teoria ta przyjmuje, że uczestnikiem procesu ewolucji jest gatunek — zbiór osobników wzajemnie do siebie podobnych, które mają wspólnego przodka, zmieniając się w czasie, oraz dają początek nowym gatunkom (Darwin 1959). „Celem” każdego osobnika, należącego do danego gatunku, jest pozostawienie jak największej liczby swych „kopii”, czyli osobników potomnych. Organizmy, które posiadają korzystne cechy, mają większą szansę na reprodukcję, a także na przeżycie, ze względu na adaptację do warunków środowiskowych. Te osobniki, które nie zdołają uformować predyspozycji do przeżycia (adaptacji) w danych, zmieniających się warunkach, podlegają selekcji. W sztafecie pokoleń przeżywa zatem „najstosowniejszy”. Darwin uważał, że jest to klucz do wyjaśnienia ewolucji świata ożywionego.

Koncepcja Lamarcka, przedstawiona światu pół wieku przed koncepcją Darwina, przyjmuje z kolei, że uczestnikami procesu ewolucji są organizmy, ponieważ gatunki jako takie nie istnieją. Organizmy mają zdolność wykształcania potrzebnych im przystosowań (dotyczy to różnych typów uposażeń: organów, typów zachowań, cech itd.), które wyznaczają ewolucyjny ciąg historycznych zmian wyposażenia biologicznego organizmów (Lamarck 1960)¹. W tym ujęciu osobniki są zdolne do generowania różnorodności w pewnych, ale zadanych dziedzicznie ramach (co określić można jako tzw. „przyżyciowy aktywizm”). Ten właśnie fakt wyeksponował głównie Lamarck, gdy Darwin przyjmował, że utrzymują się przy życiu tylko te populacje, które dysponują cechami, otrzymanymi od rodziców, umożliwiającymi im przetrwanie w określonych warunkach środowiskowych. Dlatego w ujęciu Darwina oznacza to, że organizm jest niezdolny do wykształcenia — w toku swego życia — odpowiednich przystosowań (ten punkt widzenia określić można jako tzw. „przyżyciowy pasywizm”). Warunki środowiskowe nie wpływają zatem bezpośrednio na wyposażenie biologiczne populacji, a jedynie selekcionują te, które mają cechy nieodpowiednie do tych warunków. Tak więc ujęcie Lamarcka zakłada zdolność organizmów do dziedziczenia cech nabytych, gdy w ujęciu Darwina zagadnienie to jest kwestią uboczną². Poniższe zestawienie ilustruje porównanie obu paradygmatów.

¹ Szerokie i bardzo interesujące ze względu na opracowanie wielu aspektów koncepcji Lamarcka przynosi praca zbiorowa pod red. S.B. Gissis i E. Jablonki (2011) *Transformations of Lamarckism: From Subtle Fluids to Molecular Biology*.

² Darwin, nie znając mechanizmu przekazu cech dziedzicznych, nie wykluczał wystąpienia zjawiska dziedziczenia cech nabytych. Jest to jednak kwestia uboczna w Darwinowskiej teorii ewolucji, bo nie jest ona niezbędna do zrozumienia działania doboru naturalnego, gdy w poglądach Lamarcka idea ta gra zasadniczą rolę.

Tabela 1. Porównanie składowych teorii Darwina i koncepcji Lamarcka

Darwin	Lamarck
Ewolują gatunki	Ewolują organizmy
Adaptacja organizmów prowadzi do ewolucji gatunków	Ewolucja organizmów prowadzi do ich adaptacji
Bierna rola organizmu: „przyżyciowy pasywizm”	Aktywna rola organizmu: „przyżyciowy aktywizm”
Środowisko to czynnik selekcyjny	Środowisko to źródło bodźców do zmiany/ewolucji
Mechanizmem ewolucji jest dobór naturalny	Mechanizmem ewolucji jest krzyżowanie oraz (aktywne) przeciwdziałanie niekorzystnym warunkom życia
Tylko przydatne w danych warunkach wariacje cech gatunkowych będą przekazane następnemu pokoleniu	Wszystkie cechy, wymagane w danych warunkach życia, zostaną przekazane przez rodziców następnemu pokoleniu*

* Szczególną gwarancję dziedziczenia cechy nabytej postuluje tzw. II prawo Lamarcka, zgodnie z którym nabyte zmiany mogą zostać przekazane potomstwu, o ile wystąpią u obojga rodziców (Łastowski 2009).

Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie tekstu K. Łastowskiego, *Lamarck i Darwin. U podstaw idei ewolucji* (2020).

Idea ewolucyjna Lamarcka nie znalazła uznania jako naukowa teoria biologicznej ewolucji zwierząt i roślin. Współcześnie zwrócono jednak uwagę na Lamarckowski charakter kulturowej ewolucji gatunku ludzkiego. Tę osobliwość zauważa m.in. wybitny amerykański ewolucjonista Stephen Jay Gould, gdy pisze:

Ewolucja kulturowa postępowala naprzód w tempie, do którego procesy darwinowskie nie są w stanie się nawet przybliżyć. Ewolucja darwinowska *Homo sapiens* trwa nadal, ale w tempie tak powolnym, że jej wpływ na historię jest teraz niewielki. Ten przełomowy punkt w dziejach Ziemi osiągnięty został dzięki wyzwoleniu procesów lamarkistowskich. Ewolucja kulturowa człowieka ma, w przeciwieństwie do naszych dziejów biologicznych, charakter lamarkistowski. To, czego uczy się jedno pokolenie, przekazywane jest następnemu bezpośrednio w procesie uczenia się i w formie pisanej. Cechy nabyte są dziedziczone w technologii i kulturze. Ewolucja lamarkistowska postępuje błyskawicznie i ma charakter kumulatywny (Gould 1991b: 159).

Chociaż pod wieloma względami jako ludzie jesteśmy podobni do innych zwierząt, będąc wytworem historii ewolucyjnej opisywanej w kategoriach Darwinowskich, to na oderwanie się od biologicznych korzeni pozwala nam nasza kultura. Kulturowa elastyczność pozwoliła *Homo sapiens* na stworzenie interaktywnego społeczeństwa, które swoją złożonością i stopniem komplikacji wewnątrzgatunkowych przewyższa inne gatunki.

Mechanizm napędu kulturowego w procesach ewolucji gatunku ludzkiego

Wilsona hipoteza „napędu kulturowego”

Jednym z ważnych odkryć genetyków w XX wieku było ustalenie dotyczące „czasu ewolucyjnego”. Idea ta przyjmuje, że mutacje gromadzą się w genach ze stałą prędkością w czasie we wszystkich liniach rodowych roślin i zwierząt. Pozwoliło to lepiej zrozumieć procesy ewolucyjne na poziomie molekularnym oraz na poziomie organizmalnym, na którym ujawniają się efekty dziedziczne. Biochemik Allan Wilson (1985) zauważył jednak, że odkrycie to pomija związek między ewolucją molekularną a organizmalną; autor ten podkreśla również fakt, że tempo zmian niektórych organizmów — w szczególności ssaków — jest szybsze niż innych istot żywych³ (Wilson 1985).


Co więc sprawia, że organizmy ssaków ewoluują tak szybko? Wilson argumentuje, że występują dwie podstawowe presje, aby ewoluować poprzez adaptację: presja zewnętrzna i wewnętrzna. Presję zewnętrzną wywierają czynniki pochodzące ze zmian geologicznych, takich jak erozje, czy orogeneza, które napędzają zmiany środowiska. Presja ewolucyjna, tworzona przez napęd geologiczny, utrzymuje się na stałym, niskim poziomie; wtedy zmiana geologiczna jest wynikiem powolnych i stopniowych procesów, które zachodziły przez długi czas (Rampino 2017). Jednak szybkie tempo ewolucji ssaków może być spowodowane głównie, jak utrzymuje Wilson, powstaniem u ssaków w toku ewolucji dużego mózgu. Duży mózg, generując „ewolucyjne ciśnienie”, stanowi wewnętrzną presję ewolucyjną, prowadząc do zmian kulturowych. Presja ewolucyjna, tworzona przez napęd kulturowy wywiera znacznie silniejszą presję, czyli powoduje *przyspieszenie* występowania zmian w toku ewolucji.

Termin „napęd kulturowy” w rozumieniu Wilsona oznacza zatem występowanie cykli sprzężeń zwrotnych dodatnich pomiędzy czynnikami kulturowymi a dyspozycjami biologicznymi⁴. Tok rozumowania Wilsona można zrekonstruować wedle schematu 1. Pokazuje on, jak zdolność do opracowywania nowatorskich rozwiązań i kopiowania korzystnych zachowań kulturowych prowadzi do ewolucyjnego utrwalenia tendencji do zwiększania rozmiarów mózgu, co daje jednostce przewagę w ewolucyjnym „wyścigu zbrojeń” — „im większy mózg, tym większe tempo ewolucji biologicznej gatunku” (Wilson 1985: 173). Innymi słowy, pokazuje to, jak upowszechnienie nowego, korzystnego nawyku (tj. innowacji),

³ Za przykład, który Wilson wykorzystuje w swej argumentacji, służą mu dwie grupy zwierząt: płazy (w szczególności żaby) oraz ssaki. Choć mnogość gatunków żab jest ogromna, posiadają one tak wiele anatomicznych podobieństw, a ich ewolucja przebiega na tyle wolno, że są one systematycznie przypisane do jednego rzędu. W przypadku łozyskowców, należących do ssaków wyższych, różnice są na tyle znaczące, że zoologowie klasyfikują je aż w 21 rzędach. Tempo zmian organizmu w przypadku ssaków zachodzi znacznie szybciej niż w przypadku żab, jednak mutacje punktowe kumulują się w DNA ssaków w tym samym tempie, co u żab (Wilson 1985).

⁴ Przez sprzężenie zwrotne dodatnie rozumiem powiązanie dwóch czynników tak, że jeśli czynnik *A* wpływa na czynnik *B* tak, że wzrasta jego natężenie, to czynnik *B* zwrótnie wpływa na *A* tak, że zwiększa również jego natężenie.

poprzez transmisję kulturową, prowadzi do zwiększenia produkcji neuronów i dendrytów w mózgu osobnika, czego efektem jest większy rozmiar mózgu w stosunku do wielkości ciała. Większy mózg sprzyja zwiększonej innowacyjności i społecznemu uczeniu się, co dodatkowo poprawia wydajność kopiowania zachowań kulturowych, a tym samym zwrótnie wpływa na objętość mózgu. Ciągłe opracowywanie i propagowanie innowacji z udziałem mechanizmów społecznych i kulturowych skutkuje pojawieniem się nowej presji selekcyjnej. Wtedy zazwyczaj gatunek szybko poddaje się tego typu naciskom selekcyjnym, które równocześnie sprzyjają utrwalaniu się mutacji komplementarnych, co powoduje przyspieszenie wzrostu oraz rozwój funkcji mózgu i tym samym zwiększa tempo ewolucji genetycznej gatunku.



Schemat 1. Sprzężenia zwrotne dodatnie szczególnie istotne pomiędzy zachowaniami społecznymi a genami w ujęciu A. Wilsona

Źródło: opracowanie własne.

Wilsonowskie rozumienie ewolucji gatunku wskazuje zatem na napęd kulturowy jako czynnik determinujący rozwój mózgu w dwojakim sensie: (1) stwarza możliwości dynamicznego ewoluowania danej formy gatunkowej oraz (2) „mobilizuje” zwierzęta do wykorzystywania środowiska na nowe sposoby.

Lalanda rozumienie napędu kulturowego i jego miejsce w ewolucji gatunku ludzkiego

Biolog behawioralny i ewolucyjny Kevin Laland, jeden ze współtwórców koncepcji „konstruowania niszy”, charakteryzuje tę ideę następująco:

Budowa niszy to bardzo ogólny proces, w którym organizmy modyfikują swoje własne i/lub nawzajem posiadane nisze, poprzez ich metabolizm, ich działania, i ich wybory. Nie ogranicza się to do ludzi: liczne zwierzęta tworzą gniazda, nory, dziury, sieci i poczwarki; rośliny zmieniają poziomy gazów atmosferycznych i modyfikują cykle składników odżywczych; grzyby i bakterie rozkładają materię organiczną; bakterie utrwalone składniki odżywcze. Cechą charakterystyczną konstrukcji niszy nie jest organizm modyfikujący środowisko jako takie, ale chodzi raczej o modyfikację *związku* między organizmem a jego środowiskiem i dlatego budowa niszy obejmuje wybór siedlisk, rozproszenie i migrację (Laland, Kendal, Brown 2007: 53).

Istotą tej wypowiedzi jest zatem dostrzeżenie, że organizmy są aktywnym ogniwem środowiska, napędzającym zmiany w środowisku ich życia.

W artykule pt. *Jak ludzie stali się wyjątkowymi stworzeniami? Ewolucja bez precedensu* (2018a) Laland rozwija ideę konstrukcji niszy. Ukazuje ludzkie osiągnięcia i ich wyjątkowość jako efekt naszej zdolności do pozyskiwania wiedzy i korzystania ze zbiorowego zasobu doświadczeń w celu opracowania innowacyjnych rozwiązań. Jednak zdolności takie jak społeczne uczenie się⁵ oraz innowacyjność obserwuje się także u wielu gatunków zwierząt. Wydaje się, że trafną ilustracją opisanego tu zjawiska są zachowania krukowatych, wykorzystujących samochody do rozłupywania orzechów, młodych samic muszek owocowych kierujących się przy wyborze samca wyborami starszych samic, czy delfinów używających muszli do łowienia ryb (Laland 2018a). Dlaczego zatem przedstawiciele innych gatunków nie mają tak złożonej kultury jak ludzie? Zapewne jest to związane z precyzją przekazywania wiedzy — w co zaangażowane jest uczenie się i nauczanie. W procesach uczenia się i nauczania mamy bowiem do czynienia z transmisją informacji o wysokiej wierności, co pozwala kulturze ludzkiej zwiększać swą złożoność i różnorodność. W przypadku gatunku ludzkiego transmisja kulturowa jest zatem podstawowym elementem ewolucji kulturowej, decydującym o jej dynamice. Tylko ludzie przekazują wiedzę kolejnym pokoleniom z wystarczającą precyzją tak, aby tworzyć bogatą kulturę. Precyzyjne nauczanie wymaga jednak użycia bardziej zaawansowanych narzędzi, co, jak twierdzi Laland (2018a), stworzyło warunki do pojawienia się mowy — język pozwalał na obniżenie kosztów, zwiększenie dokładności i rozszerzenie zakresu edukacji.

Zasadniczym zagadnieniem poruszonym przez Lalanda w przywołanym artykule jest występowanie zależności między wielkością mózgu a społecznym uczeniem się oraz innowacyjnością. W szczególności autor omawia, jak praktyki kulturowe, takie jak nauczanie, naśladowanie czy kopiowanie, przyspieszyły ewolucyjny rozwój w procesie, który Laland — omawiając koncepcję cytowanego wyżej Wilsona — nazywa także mechanizmem „napędu kulturowego”. Laland przyjmuje Wilsonowskie rozumienie tego terminu, zauważa jednak, że wymaga ono bardziej szczegółowego

⁵ Społeczne uczenie się rozumiane jest jako uczenie się od innych, a dokładniej „uczenie się, na które wpływa obserwacja, lub interakcja z innym zwierzęciem (zazwyczaj specyficznym), lub jego produktami” (Heyes 1994: 207).

opracowania, m.in. w kwestii związku między rozmiarem mózgu a społecznym uczeniem się:

krytyczny związek między rozmiarem mózgu a społecznym uczeniem się został raczej wywnioskowany niż zademonstrowany [przez Wilsona — M.D.]⁶, jako oparty na dość swobodnej lekturze literatury naukowej. [...] Pozostaje zatem pytanie, w jaki sposób uczenie się społeczne może napędzać ewolucję mózgu, gdy niektórym zwierzętom, nawet z miniaturowymi mózgami, udaje się z powodzeniem naśladować inne (Laland 2018b: 125–126).

W eksperymencie Kevina Lalanda i Luke’a Rendella (Rendell *et al.* 2010), dotyczącym zależności pomiędzy społecznym uczeniem się a rozmiarami mózgu, działającej w strategii społecznego uczenia się, wykazano, że zwycięską strategią jest stawianie na jakość i wydajność procesu uczenia się. Skłoniło to autorów do wyprowadzenia wniosku, że „zwierzęta nie potrzebują dużych mózgow, żeby naśladować, potrzebują ich po to, żeby naśladować dobrze” (Laland 2018a: 24).

Opanowanie umiejętności precyzyjnego nabywania i przekazywania wiedzy oraz korzystania z zasobu nagromadzonych doświadczeń przyczyniło się równocześnie do wynajdowania innowacyjnych rozwiązań; właśnie ludzie czynili to lepiej aniżeli jakikolwiek inny gatunek, chociaż elementy ewolucyjnie wytworzonych zachowań, przypominające ludzkie zachowania kulturowe, odkrywamy także w zachowaniach innych gatunków⁷.

I choć zgodnie z twierdzeniem Lalanda istotnym wyjaśnieniem wyjątkowych zdolności umysłowych i kulturowych ludzkości na gruncie teorii ewolucji jest społeczne uczenie się i naśladowanie, to jednak, jak się wydaje, to wysublimowane zdolności, jak kształcenie się⁸ oraz maksymalizacja rozwiązań optymalnych, działały izolująco na gatunek ludzki, separując go od reszty świata przyrody, czyniąc

⁶ Podniesiona tu przez Lalanda kwestia „wynioskowania niż zademonstrowania” — przez Wilsona — związku między mózgiem a społecznym uczeniem się ma zasadniczo charakter uwagi metodologicznej, a nie biologicznej. Jest to o tyle istotne, że odkrywcy poznawczo zabieg Wilsona polega na dokonaniu parafrazy pojęcia „napędu genetycznego” w określenie „napędu kulturowego”, którego źródła trudno doszukać się w wiedzy biologicznej, ponieważ jego rodowód tkwi raczej w kreatywnej intuicji teoretyka niż badacza empiryka.

⁷ Interesującym na to przykładem, oprócz wron, muszek owocowych i delfinów, są kapucynki czubate — wyjątkowo inteligentne małpy, których przysmakiem są nasiona palmy orzechowej. Kapucynki muszą wykonać szereg czynności zanim dostaną się do wnętrza orzecha: odnajdują najdojrzalsze z nasion; odrywają pierwszą, łykowatą warstwę orzecha i upuszczają orzech na ziemię, pozostawiając go na tydzień w nasłonecznionym miejscu. Po tym czasie szukają najbardziej płaskiego głazu i twardego kamienia, które posłużą im, odpowiednio, jako kowadło oraz młot, po czym próbują rozłupać nasiono za pomocą uderzeń w jego powierzchnię. Zanim jednak młody osobnik nauczy się radzić sobie z twardym orzechem, dużą część dzieciństwa spędza na naśladowaniu poczynań osobników dorosłych i bardziej doświadczonych. Takie anegdoty z życia przyrody to coś znacznie więcej niż tylko urokliwe historyjki, albowiem na ich podstawie skonkludować można, że tak właśnie pojmowany napęd kulturowy daje osobnikom różnych gatunków szansę podnoszenia sprawności, co tym samym stwarza przewagę ewolucyjną nad innymi.

⁸ Jest oczywiste, że procesy uczenia się oraz kształcenia nie są tym samym. Klawiter *et al.* definiują uczenie się jako „zmiany elementu, dzięki którym podwyższa się jego zakres adaptabilności ze względu na daną własność” (1979: 93). Natomiast kształcenie jest to taka „działalność człowieka, której celem jest uczenie się, a więc zwiększenie zakresu adaptabilności ze względu na daną własność. Kształci się więc w zakresie *A* ten, kto świadomie zmierza do tego, aby nauczyć się zachowywania własności *A*” (Klawiter *et al.* 1979: 94).

człowieka gatunkiem wyjątkowym. Zdolności te nie redukowały występujących zmian jedynie do funkcji adaptacji do nowych warunków, ponieważ umożliwiały one wykształcenie przystosowań ponadoptymalnych.

Udział „produktów ubocznych” ewolucji kulturowej: egzaptacje i pendentwy w usprawnianiu ewolucji *Homo sapiens*

W *O powstawaniu gatunków* mianem „adaptacji” Darwin określa cechę, która została wykształcona przez organizmy w toku epigenezy przy udziale doboru naturalnego względem funkcji, którą aktualnie ona pełni (Darwin 1959). I chociaż adaptacje są głównymi produktami procesu ewolucyjnego, nie są jego jedynymi produktami. Obok cech adaptacyjnych występują także czynniki, które zostały włączone do pełnienia nowej funkcji, ale współwystępują z innymi, adaptacyjnymi cechami. Jeśli czynnik zostaje włączony do systemu, bądź pojawia się jako nowa, wcześniej niewystępująca właściwość organizmu, to można przyjąć, że ma on status pendentwy lub egzaptacji⁹.

Historia badań nad statusem ewolucyjnym pendentwy i egzaptacji rozpoczęła się w końcu lat 70. XX wieku. Pojawił się wtedy pogląd, że teoretycy ewolucyjni nadmiernie koncentrują się na poszukiwaniu adaptacyjnych wyjaśnień poszczególnych cech. Wśród radykalnie myślących darwinistów panowało bowiem przekonanie, iż każda cecha wyłoniona poprzez dobór naturalny posiada swoje adaptacyjne wyjaśnienie¹⁰.

W 1979 roku Stephen Jay Gould i Richard Lewontin poddali zdecydowanej krytyce tę koncepcję¹¹. Jej istotą było stwierdzenie, iż nie każda cecha organizmu powstała jako najlepsze z możliwych rozwiązań dla organizmu, oraz że niektóre cechy mogły rozwinąć się analogicznie do pendentyw (ang. *spandrel*) w architekturze — trójkątnych przestrzeni zakrzywień sufitu powstałych jako uboczne konsekwencje ograniczeń architektonicznych (Łastowski, Reuter 2020).

Gould i Lewontin pokazują, że pendentwy, choć powstały jako efekt uboczny, może zacząć wtórnie pełnić użyteczną funkcję (np. ozdobną) — początkowe architektoniczne ograniczenie (polegające na łukowatej konstrukcji stropu) może zacząć pełnić funkcję znaczeniową (kiedy np. zostanie wypełnione freskami). W systemie pojęciowym biologii ewolucyjnej termin ten rozumiany jest jako nieadaptacyjna cecha organizmu, uformowana jako efekt uboczny cechy adaptacyjnej¹² (Łastowski, Reuter 2020).

⁹ Skrótowe objaśnienie obu tych pojęć podają: K. Łastowski i M. Reuter w artykule pt. *Ewolujące umysły. Koncepcje, hipotezy, argumenty empiryczne* (2020).

¹⁰ Pogląd ten określany jest mianem skrajnego adaptacjonizmu lub ultraselekcjonizmu.


¹¹ Por. Gould, Lewontin 2011.

¹² Niektórzy badacze (Davies 2010) za pendentwy uznają takie właściwości jak: dół pachowy, pępek, czerwień krwi czy biel kości. Natomiast według Goulda, klasyka tej problematyki, pendentwami są także produkty kultury ludzkiej, jak np. pisanie oraz czytanie (Gould 1997).

Nieco później Stephen Jay Gould i Elisabeth Vrba (1982), w artykule *Exaptation: A Missing Term in the Science of Form*, wyróżnili jeszcze jeden rodzaj cechy, która nie powstała na drodze doboru naturalnego — egzaptację. W ogólnym ujęciu egzaptacja rozumiana jest jako wykorzystanie struktury lub cechy organizmu na potrzeby funkcji innej niż ta, dla której pojawiła się ona w drodze doboru naturalnego (Gould, Vrba 1982).

Interesujący przykład egzaptacji stanowią ptasie pióra. Pierwotną ich funkcją (jeszcze jako „prapiór”) była termoregulacja. Z czasem zaczęły one pełnić ewolucyjnie nową funkcję, czyli umożliwiły latanie. Zanim jednak to nastąpiło, ptaki wykorzystywały swoje upierzone i rozpościerane skrzydła do rzucania cienia na powierzchnię wody, aby dostrzec ryby pod jej powierzchnią (Gould, Vrba 1982).

Zatem możliwe jest już zestawienie czynników, które występują, a niekiedy nawet działają obok mechanizmu doboru naturalnego (ukazuje to schemat 2). Schemat ten obowiązuje przy założeniu, że pomiędzy czynnikami towarzyszącymi cechom adaptacyjnym a cechami adaptacyjnymi (korzystnymi) zachodzi korelacja, która nie występuje pomiędzy czynnikami okazjonalnymi, a cechami adaptacyjnymi. Jako że zarówno egzaptacje, jak i pendentywy mogą zacząć pełnić użyteczną funkcję, są one czynnikami ewolucyjnymi nieadaptacyjnymi, ale towarzyszącymi cechom adaptacyjnym.



Schemat 2. Czynniki ewolucji gatunkowej

Źródło: opracowanie własne.

Przekonanie, że nie zachodzi potrzeba wyjaśniania adaptacyjnego istotności każdej cechy organizmu, żywił sam twórca teorii ewolucji, Karol Darwin, który „Wstęp” do dzieła *O powstawaniu gatunków* zakończył słowami: „Jestem ponadto przekonany, że dobór naturalny był głównym, choć nie jedynym, czynnikiem przekształcającym gatunki” (Darwin 1959: 7). Otwartość na inne teorie wyjaśniające mechanizmy przyrody ożywionej doprowadziła go do opisanego, m.in. w dziele *O pochodzeniu człowieka* (2009), innego niż dobór naturalny mechanizmu selekcyjnego — doboru płciowego. Zauważył on bowiem, że sama adaptacja przy udziale działania doboru naturalnego nie jest w stanie wyjaśnić wystąpienia w ewolucji niektórych cech

organizmów¹³, bo nie zawsze chodzi o przetrwanie, czy o sprawność (*fitness*) organizmu, a o jego przystosowanie z ewentualnym udziałem jeszcze innych czynników.

Organizmy podlegają nieustannemu naciskowi selekcyjnemu, który odsiewa te jednostki, które umiejętności przystosowawczych nie posiadają. Cechy, które stanowiły adaptację we wcześniejszych warunkach, w nowych mogą ulec selekcji. Przeżywają te osobniki, które w zmienionych warunkach zaczynają wykorzystywać zdolność do nabywania nowych cech, czyli zdolność uczenia się, bądź też dysponują pewnym nadmiarem właściwości gotowych do wykorzystania w postaci egzaptacji i pendentywów. Jeśli zmieniają się okoliczności życiowe, to nie jest wykluczone, że innowacja (egzaptacja lub pendentyw) zostanie włączona, jako istotny składnik optimum adaptacyjnego. Zacznie więc pełnić funkcję przystosowawczą, której wcześniej nie pełniła. Jeżeli tego rodzaju dyspozycje rozszerzyć na gatunek ludzki, to zmiany dokonujące się w kulturze, modyfikujące okoliczności życia ludzkiego, sprawiają tym samym, że niektóre pendentywy stają się egzaptacjami, a niekiedy nawet adaptacjami.

Aby jednak doszło do współdziałania doboru naturalnego z innymi czynnikami, w tym z innowacjami, niezbędne jest spełnienie następujących warunków: (1) wygenerowanie innowacji (staje się ona pendentywem); (2) testowanie przydatności innowacji w określonych warunkach kulturowych; (3) jeśli innowacja usprawnia jakiś rodzaj ludzkich działań, staje się egzaptacją; (4) jeżeli egzaptacja upowszechnia się, bo np. jest korzystna ekonomicznie (w relacji poniesionych kosztów wobec zysków), staje się adaptacją.

Przy spełnieniu powyższych warunków można ukazać warianty przemian ewolucyjnych, zarówno wytwarzanych w procesie ewolucji naturalnej (biologicznej), jak i pojawiających się w przemianach kulturowych. Zasadnicza różnica polega jednak na tym, że mimo iż źródła tych zmian są odmienne: biologiczne (w tym genetyczne) oraz kulturowe (pozagenetyczne), to istotą owej różnicy pozostaje tempo dokonujących się zmian. Zmiany biologiczne (genetyczne) dokonują się w kolejnych pokoleniach (międzypokoleniowo), a więc w długich okresach czasu. Zmiany w kulturze dokonują się wewnątrzpokoleniowo (w znacznie krótszych przedziałach czasu). Dlatego konsekwencje związane z pojawieniem się pendentywów oraz egzaptacji w procesach przemian kulturowych można rozpatrywać jako konsekwencję przyspieszenia ewolucyjnego w kulturze, czyli jako następstwo napędu kulturowego.

Kulturowe oraz biologiczne mechanizmy ewolucji gatunku ludzkiego

Zagadnienie powiązania biologicznych zasad rozwoju ludzkiego organizmu z zasadami rozwoju uposażeń kulturowych oraz ich zmianami w toku życia ludzkiego podejmowane było wielokrotnie i na różne sposoby. Problem ten jest bowiem wy-

¹³ Przykładem takiej cechy, która nie podnosi sprawności organizmu (angażuje zasoby energetyczne i nie jest przydatna w konkurencyjnej walce z innymi), jest pawia ogon. Ozdobny ogon pawia przyciąga samicę, sygnalizując zdrowie i dobre geny właściciela, zwiększając szansę samca na pozostawienie potomka.

zwaniem nie tylko dla biologii człowieka, antropologii fizycznej i kulturowej, ale okazuje się również wyzwaniem dla innych dyscyplin, wspomagających badania nad naturą gatunku ludzkiego oraz jej zmianami¹⁴.

Waga wzajemnych powiązań pomiędzy ewolucyjną naturą ludzkich działań oraz ich kulturowym uwarunkowaniem sprawia, że poświęca się im specjalne studia metateoretyczne i opracowania przeglądowe. Są one przedmiotem analiz i polemik w takich dziedzinach nauki jak: archeologia, antropologia ewolucyjna, antropologia behawioralna, antropologia kognitywna, biologia ewolucyjna, psychologia ewolucyjna czy socjobiologia, a także ewolucyjnie zorientowane nauki społeczne.

Jednym z istotnych wniosków jest to, iż nie sposób, także obecnie, jednoznacznie odpowiedzieć na pytanie, jak dalece zasady rozwoju biologicznego człowieka wpływają ograniczająco na jego rozwój kulturowy, a także jak dalece zasady rozwoju kulturowego wnikają w sferę ludzkiej biologii i formują oraz „napędzają” zmiany rozwojowe natury ludzkiej. Zdaje się, iż zasadne jest założenie o kontroli działania wpływów czynników kulturowych przez czynniki zadane ewolucyjnie (za: Kaczmarek, Łastowski 2004). Jak więc widać, jest to złożone zagadnienie i aby móc dalej jasno je analizować przyjmę ważne upraszczające ustalenie terminologiczne. Mianowicie biologiczną stronę natury ludzkiej będę określała mianem „czynnika biologicznego”, natomiast kulturową — mianem „czynnika kulturowego”. W procesach epigenetycznego rozwoju ludzkiego czynnik biologiczny działa systematycznie, czyli ciągle, z mniej więcej stałym natężeniem, choć zarazem wiemy o nim to, iż dopuszcza on pewne zakresy elastycznych reakcji¹⁵.

Natomiast o czynniku kulturowym wiadomo, że zawierają się w nim właściwie dwie składowe: stała oraz zmienna. Pierwsza z nich to kulturowa tradycja, a więc składnik zasadniczo niezmiennie przekazywany z pokolenia na pokolenie, druga zaś to nabywane kompetencje kulturowe, które są zasadniczo zmiennie w każdym ludzkim pokoleniu¹⁶. Oba te czynniki: biologiczny i kulturowy działają w procesie ludzkiej epigenezy¹⁷.

W świecie zwierząt czynnik biologiczny działa zachowawczo, bo jest on zasadniczo niezmienny. Podobnie jest z czynnikiem kulturowym — jeśli o takim mówić można w przypadku zachowań zwierząt — cechuje się on również małą elastycznością w procesach rozwoju. U człowieka jest wyraźnie inaczej: czynnik biologiczny,

¹⁴ Wystarczy, że wymienimy kilkanaście prac z tych, w których badacze usiłują dokładniej określić prawidłowości wzajemnego powiązania biologicznej i kulturowej strony uposażeń rodzaju ludzkiego. Do takich opracowań, opublikowanych w ciągu ostatnich trzydziestu lat, należą m.in. prace następujących autorów: Łastowski (1992); Kaczmarek, Łastowski (2004); Richerson, Boyd (2005); Laland, Brown (2006); Richerson, Boyd, Henrich (2010); Soukup (2010); Laland, Odling-Smee, Myles (2010); Whiten *et al.* (2011); Mesoudi (2011); Nettle *et al.* (2013); Andersson, Törnberg, Törnberg (2014); Burkart, Schubiger, van Schaik (2017); Smith, Gabora, Gardner-O’Kearney (2018); Kozłowski (2018).

¹⁵ Antropologowie fizyczni mówią w takim przypadku wprost o plastyczności rozwojowej organizmu ludzkiego.

¹⁶ Nabywanie kompetencji kulturowej to złożony proces, którego najistotniejszym mechanizmem jest uczenie oraz kształcenie się.

¹⁷ Epigeneza jest bowiem procesem rozwoju określanym przez interakcyjne powiązanie względnie stałych dyspozycji zadanych dziedzicznie oraz względnie zmiennych czynników zawartych w kulturowej tradycji; te ostatnie podlegają zarazem dynamicznie działającym czynnikom społecznym.

choć jest względnie stały, bo zdeterminowany genetycznie przez procesy dziedziczenia, to jednak podlega istotnie wpływowi czynnika kulturowego. Powoduje to, że względnie stała składowa czynnika kulturowego, czyli tradycja, także zmienia się z pokolenia na pokolenie, bo wymusza to ów element kulturowy. Zatem pytanie, jakie postawione zostało w tej części pracy, dotyczy miejsca i udziału napędu kulturowego wobec zachowawczego charakteru tradycji w kulturze ludzkiej. Tym samym mechanizm, jakim jest napęd kulturowy, wchodzi w skład ludzkiej niszy kulturowej, która jest odpowiednikiem niszy ekologicznej w świecie zwierząt.

Jeśli więc napęd kulturowy jest istotnym składnikiem niszy kulturowej (i ekologicznej zarazem) w gatunku ludzkim, to dlatego, że: (1) w gatunku ludzkim nisza ta podlega permanentnej zmianie, zarówno co do jej „zawartości”, jak i zakresu; (2) zachowaniu „ciągłości” niszy w gatunku ludzkim służy tradycja¹⁸; (3) ramy funkcjonalnego działania tradycji wyznaczone są czasem trwania jednego pokolenia; (4) ponieważ w gatunku ludzkim tradycja ulega modyfikacjom, w ramach czasowych kolejnych pokoleń (ze względu na to, że pojawiają się jej nowe elementy), zawartość „treściowa” przekazywanej tradycji także się zmienia. Na tej podstawie orzec możemy, iż zmienność tradycji w kolejnych pokoleniach jest rezultatem działania napędu kulturowego; choć niektóre z innowacji, występujące w kulturze, a zarazem pozostające w zgodzie z tradycją, stają się elementami niezbędnymi dla dalszego trwania tradycji (bo np. z pendentywów stają się egzaptacjami, bądź nawet adaptacjami). Te zaś elementy tradycji, wygenerowane przez napęd kulturowy, które nie pełnią istotnej funkcji w przekazie tradycji, bądź zanikają, bądź też pozostają neutralne — są pendentywami. Działanie napędu kulturowego polega na tym, że wytwarzane w kulturze modyfikacje jej treści zazwyczaj (bo nie wszystkie i nie zawsze) stają się — w kolejnych pokoleniach — elementami istotnymi tradycji kulturowej.

Zachodzenie jakichkolwiek zmian w przypadku zwierząt jest jednak możliwe jedynie z pokolenia na pokolenie, a więc dokonuje się w stałej (dla danego gatunku) jednostce czasu. W przypadku gatunku ludzkiego w zasadzie nigdy nie dochodzi do dziedziczenia niszy w wersji wcześniejszej. Innymi słowy, w gatunku ludzkim nisza jest wyraźnie modyfikowana z pokolenia na pokolenie, co nie występuje w świecie zwierząt. Jest ona modyfikowana poprzez wytwory kulturowe, jakie wytwarza i specyfikuje dobór kulturowy. Stąd bierze się stałość „tradycji” w świecie zwierząt oraz jej zmienność w świecie człowieka.

Istotne elementy kreatywności ludzkiej, takie jak innowacje i wynalazki, są przekonującą ilustracją działania napędu kulturowego, który usprawnia zachowania przekazywane w drodze tradycji. Przykładami takich ludzkich wytworów, które — wedle przyjętych tu ustaleń — uznać można za czynniki składające się na działanie napędu kulturowego, są: (1) wynalezienie penicyliny (składowa kultury przetrwania); (2) uprawa roślin i hodowla zwierząt (składowa kultury przeżywania); (3) wynalezienie telefonu i stworzenie World Wide Web (WWW) (składowa kultury komunikacji); (4) wynalezienie silnika spalinowego (składowa kultury komunikacji); oraz (5) wynalezienie zasad „ruchomej” czcionki drukarskiej (składowa kultury druku).

¹⁸ Badacze zajmujący się tym zagadnieniem mówią w takich razach o dziedziczeniu niszy ekologicznej, mając na uwadze właśnie jej kulturowy charakter (Laland 2018b; Laland, Odling-Smee, Myles 2010).

Analiza powyższych przykładów skłania do wniosku, że w kulturze adaptacyjnej jest wszystko to, co „skraca czas”¹⁹ (pozwala nam na szybsze osiągnięcie celu) i zarazem jest optymalne (bo np. okazuje się efektywne w sensie ekonomicznym). Ponieważ jednak napęd kulturowy wywiera silną presję, powodując przyspieszenie występowania zmian, konsekwencją tego są: (1) wypieranie jednych innowacji przez drugie (eliminacja mniej sprawnych systemów)²⁰ oraz (2) transformacje ewolucyjne (jak np. przekształcanie niektórych cech adaptacyjnych w egzaptacje, czyli w rozwiązania ewolucyjnie potencjalnie korzystne).

Powszechnie uznaje się, że kultura może chronić pewne warianty genetyczne przed działaniem biologicznej selekcji, charakteryzującą się nawet niskim dostosowaniem do otaczającej rzeczywistości (Feldman, Laland 1996). Na przykład udoskonalenie i poprawa poziomu opieki zdrowotnej to dowód na działanie i wpływ kultury, która w efekcie osłabia selekcję osobników obarczonych zaburzeniami genetycznymi, stwarzając im szansę przeżycia i rozmnażania w odpowiednio zmodyfikowanym środowisku życia.

Szczególnie interesującym przykładem innowacji kulturowej (a więc zmieniającej wyposażenie kulturowe gatunku ludzkiego, a zarazem odciskającej istotnie swe piętno na przekazie wyposażenia dziedzicznych) jest opracowanie zabiegu zapłodnienia pozaustrojowego, czyli zabiegu *in vitro*. Innowacja ta jest wynalazkiem naukowym, który powstał na pewnym etapie rozwoju nauki (a więc również kultury), ale zarazem umożliwiającym ingerencję w czynniki biologiczne determinujące powstawanie nowego organizmu. Zastosowanie tego zabiegu wobec organizmu kobiety sprawia, że uruchomione zostają — za przyczyną czynnika kulturowego — odpowiednio zestrojone czynniki biologiczne. Innymi słowy, innowacyjny (ponieważ wytworzony przez i na gruncie wiedzy ludzkiej) czynnik kulturowy powoduje, iż czynnik biologiczny (odpowiedni zestaw genów) zostaje zmuszony do uruchomienia procesu rozwojowego w epigenecie. Jest to kolejny przykład, który dobitnie ilustruje właśnie działanie tego, co nazywamy w tej pracy napędem kulturowym. Co więcej, działanie tego napędu jest — wedle wiedzy naukowej — określone w tak precyzyjny sposób, że uruchamiając proces embriogenezy (zakładamy tu skuteczność tego typu procedury) dajemy niejako nowemu organizmowi gwarancję sukcesu adaptacyjnego. Jeśli jednak proces rozwoju nowego organizmu nie zostanie uruchomiony, bądź też jego przebieg zakończy się niepowodzeniem, oznacza to, że innowacja ta, mająca napędzić proces rozwojowy, okazała się nieskuteczna w działaniu, np. poprzez niekompletność wiedzy zastosowanej w tej procedurze.

¹⁹ Tę osobliwą dyspozycję ludzkiego umysłu podnosi i analizuje szczegółowo prof. A. Klawiter (por. referat pt. *O skrącaniu czasu* wygłoszony w Zakładzie Logiki i Kognitywistyki, 11.12.2019 r.). Nie tak przekonująco, jak to wypowiada prof. A. Klawiter, ale podobnie sądzi M. Tomasello, gdy pisze: „proces transmisji kulturowej jest w miarę powszechnym procesem ewolucyjnym, który pozwala indywidualnym organizmom zaoszczędzić wiele czasu i wysiłku, nie mówiąc już o ryzyku, dzięki wykorzystaniu istniejącej wiedzy i zdolności członków własnego gatunku” (Tomasello 2005: 10).

²⁰ Uproszczenie, przyspieszenie i obniżenie kosztów procesu komunikowania się (a więc wyższa sprawność w procesie komunikowania się) poprzez pojawienie się internetowego systemu informacyjnego WWW w krótkim czasie doprowadziło do postępującego eliminowania (wypierania) silnika spalinowego.

Innym wynalazkiem kulturowym, który wpływa na biologiczną stronę natury ludzkiej, jest cesarskie cięcie. Ze względu na to, że głowa rodzącego się niemowlęcia przekracza rozmiary kanałów rodnych matki, poród jest bolesny i niebezpieczny²¹; w wielu przypadkach kończył się on śmiercią matki lub dziecka, bądź obojga. Cesarskie cięcie to rodzaj ingerencji w dobór naturalny, która „zdejmuje” z organizmu tę ostrą cechę selekcyjną, dając szansę na adaptację młodego organizmu, który z powodów genetycznych ma trudności, aby to kryterium doboru naturalnego przekroczyć²². Innymi słowy, ingerencja w proces przebiegu porodu, powodowana względami kulturowymi, może być zinterpretowana jako czynność przynależna do doboru kulturowego, która umożliwia wymknięcie się spod testu doboru naturalnego.

Oczywiście występują także nieprzystosowawcze elementy kulturowe, które pokazują, że „kultura nie podąża za interesem genów w każdym przypadku” (Soukup 2010: 193):

Bardzo dobrze pokazuje to przykład bolesnej historii South Fore w Papui Nowej Gwinei. Plemię to zaadoptowało w latach trzydziestych praktykę endokanibalizmu, jako część biesiady pogrzebowej. Wierzyli, że dusza zmarłego pozostaje uwięziona w martwym ciele, dopóki nie zostanie ona strawiona w łonach krewnych kobiet. Podczas biesiady kobiety (a także dzieci) zjadały mózgi zmarłych członków społeczeństwa. Wraz z mięsem przynoszone były niebezpieczne priony, które później powodowały śmiertelną chorobę zwyrodnieniową układu nerwowego. Ta choroba była wersją choroby Creutzfeldta-Jakoba, którą tubylcy nazywali *kuru* (w sensie: strach lub drżenie). Ale tubylcy nie łączyli się z sobą choroby i obrządku pogrzebowego, bo okres utajony *kuru* był zbyt długi i dlatego tubylcy nie mogli zrozumieć związku pomiędzy *kuru* i uczta pogrzebową. Zamiast tego zinterpretowali *kuru* jako wynik działań szamanów. Gdyby nie medyczne badania, które ujawniły źródło choroby, oraz terminowe interwencje władz, które zabroniły odbywania znacznej części rytuału pogrzebowego, plemię South Fore mogło wymrzeć²³ (Soukup 2010: 193).

Napęd kulturowy generuje innowacje (nowe rozwiązania ewolucyjne w toku życia organizmów ludzkich). Wytwarza zatem właściwości, które określilibyśmy jako pendentywy, czyli produkuje efekty uboczne względem już występujących ludzkich cech adaptacyjnych. Za tego rodzaju cechy adaptacyjne uznać można: (1) ukształtowaną w toku wczesnych lat życia motorykę ciała; umiejętność poruszania się chodem na dwóch kończynach daje kolejne możliwości urozmaicenia tego typu motoryki (np. sprawny bieg, poruszanie się na rowerze itp.); (2) stosowne do umiejętności użycia mowy uformowanie morfologiczne i funkcjonalne aparatu komunikacji słownej (innowacją jest tu możliwość uruchomienia zdolności mowy w różnych językach); (3) posiadanie dłoni z przeciwstawnie, do reszty palców, położonym kciukiem (ta właściwość nie tylko przydaje się do nabycia, w toku życia osobniczego, zdolności pisania, ale także umożliwia wyrafinowane posługiwanie

²¹ Ewolucyjnie korzystną cechą gatunku ludzkiego jest posiadanie dużego mózgu, co daje człowiekowi ogromną ewolucyjną przewagę nad innymi gatunkami. Jednakże im większy mózg, tym samym większe głowy niemowląt, które żeńska część populacji musi wydać na świat. Powiększenie rozmiarów miednicy w toku ewolucji, aby poród odbywał się bez potencjalnych komplikacji i prawdopodobieństwa śmierci, utrudniłoby lub uniemożliwiło z kolei poruszanie się na dwóch nogach (Rosenberg, Trevathan 1995).

²² Rozszerzam tu argumentację, jaką zaproponowali M. Kaczmarek i K. Łastowski (2004) w artykule pt. *Ewolucja a epigenetyka* — por. s. 170.

²³ Por. Lindenbaum 1979.

się narzędziami); (4) nowe praktyki uprawy roślin i hodowli zwierząt, które doprowadziły do powstania instytucji wymiany towarowej, a w dalszej konsekwencji powstania nadprodukcji dóbr materialnych; a także (5) użycie symboli w formie rzeźb kamiennych i rysunków naskalnych, co zaowocowało powstaniem języka oraz sztuki: powstanie i rozwój języka usprawnił proces przekazu informacji o świecie, natomiast rozwój komunikacji w kierunku wytworów estetycznych (dzieł sztuki naskalnej) powiązany był z wyrazem emocji wobec zdarzeń otaczających człowieka; okazał się zatem wyrazem utrwalania i zapamiętywania stanów emocjonalnych, które podnosiły szansę przetrwania ludzi.

Gdy produkt uboczny cechy adaptacyjnej sam stanie się adaptacją, to powrót do wcześniejszego stadium, jak zauważa Michael Tomasello, jest niemożliwy. Zjawisko to nazywane jest „efektem zapadki”²⁴. Na ten temat Tomasello pisze dokładniej:

Proces kumulatywnej ewolucji kulturowej opiera się nie tylko na inwencji twórczej, ale — w mniejszym stopniu — na wiernym przekazie społecznym, który funkcjonuje jak „zapadka”, nie pozwalając cofnąć się do poprzednich stadiów. W ten sposób nowo powstały czy zmodyfikowany wytwór lub praktyka kulturowa zachowują osiągniętą formę, przynajmniej w przybliżeniu, dopóki nie zdarzy się kolejna modyfikacja czy ulepszenie (Tomasello 2005: 12).

Proces kumulatywnej ewolucji kulturowej ujmuje Tomasello w dwóch fazach: pierwsza faza to wymyślenie (inwencja) przedmiotu lub działania; druga faza to użycie czy też zastosowanie przedmiotu lub działania. W ten sposób dokonuje się postęp kulturowy, ponieważ efekty zastosowania nowych rozwiązań usprawniają działania praktyczne w kulturze; nie ma więc powrotu do stadiów wcześniejszych. Użyta w cytacie idea „zapadki” może być uznana za kryterium przekształcania zjawiska będącego pendentem w egzaptację lub adaptację. Tomasello także odnotowuje, że „proces transmisji kulturowej [...] pozwala indywidualnym organizmom zaoszczędzić wiele czasu i wysiłku [...] dzięki wykorzystaniu istniejącej wiedzy i zdolności członków własnego gatunku” (2005: 10). To twierdzenie nasuwa pytanie, dlaczego, w świetle tylu udogodnień, kultura innych zwierząt nie jest tak złożona jak kultura człowieka? Zarówno Tomasello (za: Kummer, Goodall 1985), jak Laland (2018a) twierdzą, iż nasz sekret tkwi nie tylko w naszej niezwyklej innowacyjności, ale także we wspomnianym już wielokrotnie w tej pracy społecznym uczeniu się:

Wiele osobników należących do gatunków naczelnych innych niż ludzie jest zdolnych do tworzenia inteligentnych innowacji, lecz inne osobniki z ich gatunku nie angażują się w taki rodzaj uczenia się społecznego, który umożliwiałby działanie kulturowej „zapadki” w czasie historycznym (Tomasello 2005: 12).

Cytat ten można rozumieć jako wskazanie przez Tomasello na pendentny charakter zachowań innowacyjnych w świecie zwierząt.

Z przedstawionych przykładów, poświadczających innowacyjną zdolność myślenia i działania gatunku ludzkiego oraz komentarzy do nich, wnosić można, iż

²⁴ „Ewolucyjną zapadką” N. Humphrey nazywa sytuację, gdy „jakaś społeczność osiągnie pewien poziom złożoności, wówczas pojawić się muszą nowe rodzaje nacisku wewnętrznego, których działanie zwiększy tę złożoność jeszcze bardziej. [...] Dlatego, że w społeczności [tego rodzaju] intelektualni przeciwnicy zwierzęcia są członkami tej samej społeczności hodowlanej. A w takich okolicznościach nie ma już odwrotu” (za: Lewin 2004: 221).

dziedziczenie niszy u ludzi to dziedziczenie, w którym czynnikiem aktywnie działającym i zarazem kreującym innowacje, usprawniające uposażenia gatunkowe, jest napęd kulturowy, czyli mechanizm dodatkowego sprzężenia zwrotnego napędzającego zmiany kulturowe i biologiczne.

Transformacje ewolucyjne takie jak egzaptacje i pendentyny są wskaźnikami tego, że napęd kulturowy działa, a jego źródło tkwi, jak się zdaje, w paradygmacie Lamarckowskim; funkcjonalna przydatność zaś innowacyjnie generowanych elementów tradycji, jakie działają w tym napędzie, to myślenie według paradygmatu Darwinowskiego.

Kwestię wykorzystania teorii doboru naturalnego w wyjaśnianiu zjawisk rozwoju kulturowego podnosi oprócz Goulda także argentyński badacz tych zagadnień Santiago Ginnobili. Pisze on bowiem:

Krytycy podejścia darwinowskiego do badań nad ewolucją zachowań ludzkich i społecznych często wyrażają swój sprzeciw, twierdząc, że ewolucja kulturowa jest Lamarckowska. Przez to mają na myśli dwie rzeczy. Po pierwsze, w przeciwieństwie do doboru naturalnego, w Lamarckowskich mechanizmach używania i nieużywania oraz dziedziczenia cech nabytych, zmiany w organizmie powstają jako rozwiązanie problemu środowiskowego, tj. zmienność nie jest ślepa; a po drugie, że nabyta cecha jest przekazywana potomstwu przez naśladowanie lub uczenie się (Ginnobili 2016: 1).

Teorie Lamarcka i Darwina przedstawiane są często jako teorie przeciwstawne w takim sensie, że zwolennicy jednej z nich rozumiani są jednocześnie jako przeciwnicy drugiej. Pomimo opozycyjności tych dwóch podejść, teorii tych nie należy interpretować ani jako ze sobą sprzecznych, ani alternatywnych. Przedłożona w pracy argumentacja sugeruje wyraźnie, że we współczesnej biologii gatunku ludzkiego rozumienie procesu jego ewolucji oraz dokonywanie się postępu w wszystkich jego obszarach (ze szczególnym zaznaczeniem postępu cywilizacyjnego) wiąże się z działaniem specjalnego czynnika ewolucji *Homo sapiens*, a mianowicie napędu kulturowego.

Napęd kulturowy: ogniwo między Lamarckiem i Darwinem

Publikacja *O powstawaniu gatunków* zasadniczo zmieniła dyskusję na temat pochodzenia biologicznego człowieka. O tym, dlaczego ewolucja gatunku ludzkiego przebiegła odmiennie od wszystkich pozostałych gatunków, nie dowiemy się jednak, korzystając jedynie z teorii Darwina. Teoria ta, przydatna w zrozumieniu głównie biologicznego aspektu ewolucji *Homo sapiens*, wymaga rozszerzenia o inne elementy teoretyczne. W pierwszej kolejności wizję Darwinowską ewolucji człowieka należy wesprzeć ideami zawartymi w koncepcji Lamarcka. I choć jest to już wizja historycznie odległa, to jednak zawiera sugestię nader istotną w wyjaśnianiu ewolucji człowieka. Jeśli chcemy zrozumieć ewolucję gatunku ludzkiego, który wyposażony jest w kulturę, musimy skorzystać z koncepcji Lamarcka, bo tradycyjna teoria biologiczna (w Darwinowskim ujęciu) nie uwzględnia kultury jako czynnika szczególnie intensywnie działającego w historii gatunku *Homo sapiens*. W podobny sposób podchodzą do badań nad procesem ewolucji ludzi badacze zajmujący

się próbami odpowiedzi na pytania o udział czynników społeczno-kulturowych w biologicznym wymiarze naszej ewolucji:

Znalezienie satysfakcjonującego wyjaśnienia ewolucji naszych zdolności umysłowych i ich ekspresji w kulturze jest wyzwaniem naukowym, które nazywam „niedokończoną symfonią Darwina”. Karol Darwin zaczął się interesować tymi kwestiami około 150 lat temu, ale, jak sam przyznał, jego zrozumienie tych kulturowych aspektów ewolucji *Homo sapiens* było „niedoskonałe” i „fragmentaryczne”. Na szczęście, inni badacze przejęli od niego pałeczkę i większość z tych, którzy prowadzą badania w tej dziedzinie, ma poczucie, że odpowiedź jest na wyciągnięcie ręki (Laland 2018a: 22).

Argumentacja Lalanda na rzecz tej tezy polega na tym, że w swej pracy (2018a) przedstawia i rozwija on ideę napędu kulturowego. Pojęcie napędu kulturowego rozumiane jest jako mechanizm, który w naturalny sposób przyspiesza, poprzez wytwarzane w kulturze innowacje oraz wynalazki, przebieg ewolucji *Homo sapiens* w ten sposób, że czynniki te zmieniają uposażenia kulturowe gatunku ludzkiego w ramach jednopokoleniowego przedziału czasu i przez to działają w tempie nieporównywalnie szybszym niż procesy ewolucji biologicznej:

w ewolucji człowieka nie było gwałtownych przełomów. Ewolucja ta z punktu widzenia biologicznego to przede wszystkim stopniowe powiększanie mózgu, ściślej — kory nowej, a jeszcze ściślej — przede wszystkim płatów czołowych. Jej siłą napędową był szereg dodatknych sprzężeń zwrotnych. Od pewnego etapu ewolucja biologiczna została zdominowana przez ewolucję kulturową, również napędzaną dodatkowymi sprzężeniami zwrotnymi (Kozłowski 2018: 148).

Kulturowa presja selekcyjna z udziałem napędu kulturowego sprawiła, że ludzie, dostosowując się do dynamicznie zmieniającego się otoczenia, wykazują się wyjątkową innowacyjnością oraz umiejętnościami znacznie bardziej złożonymi niż te, które występują u innych zwierząt. Dostosowania te pociągają za sobą formowanie się transformacji ewolucyjnych w formie egzaptacji oraz pendentywów, czyli rozwiązań potencjalnie korzystnych.

Zwykle w próbach wyjaśniania ludzkiej wyjątkowości naukowcy sięgają do Darwina — do teorii doboru naturalnego, która stanowi fundament w rozumieniu wszelakich zmian ewolucyjnych. Jednak, co podkreślę ponownie, tak osobliwej dyspozycji jak ludzki umysł nie sposób wyjaśnić, odwołując się wyłącznie do teorii Darwina. Aby zrozumieć osobliwości, które powstają w toku ewolucji kulturowej człowieka (a więc będące produktem naszej umysłowej innowacyjności), w tym takie jak egzaptacje czy pendentywy, należy odwołać się również do teorii Lamarcka. Teoria ta zakłada, że nabyte przez organizmy w toku życia cechy mogą zostać przekazane kolejnemu pokoleniu. Gdy cechy te okazują się korzystne, np. ekonomicznie, zyskują miano cechy adaptacyjnej i zazwyczaj upowszechniają się. Zjawisko wytworzenia nowych właściwości w toku życia ludzkich pokoleń, a następnie uczynienie z nich korzystnych dyspozycji do przetrwania również jest rezultatem działania mechanizmu napędu kulturowego.

Zatem obraz ewolucyjnej zmienności gatunku ludzkiego pokazuje, że jego autorem w dużym stopniu jesteśmy my sami. Wyjątkowa inteligencja i kreatywność człowieka oraz niezwykle zdolności do nauczania i naśladowania sprawiają, że otrzymujemy od naszych przodków coraz bardziej bogate dziedzictwo kulturowe,

które w niebywale szybkim tempie w trakcie kolejnych pokoleń rozwijamy. Ta kulturowa aktywność stała się motorem ewolucyjnych przemian — powiększyły się nie tylko nasze mózgi, ale także zwiększyło się tempo ewolucji genetycznej gatunku. Uargumentowany istotny wpływ kultury na naturę jest na tyle ważny, iż pokazuje, że pojęcia kultury oraz pojęcia natury nie należy sobie przeciwstawiać. Istotą powiązań pomiędzy nimi jest bowiem ich wzajemne uzupełnianie. Ten fenomen właśnie zaświadcza o wyjątkowości człowieka.

Bibliografia

- Andersson C., Törnberg A., Törnberg P., 2014, *An Evolutionary Developmental Approach to Cultural Evolution*, „Current Anthropology” 55 [2], s. 154–174.
- Burkart J., Schubiger M., van Schaik C., 2017, *The Evolution of General Intelligence*, „Behavioral and Brain Sciences” 40, e195.
- Davies S., 2010, *Why Art Is Not a Spandrel*, „British Journal of Aesthetics” 50, s. 333–341.
- Darwin K., 1959, *O powstawaniu gatunków drogą doboru naturalnego*, tłum. S. Dickstein, J. Nusbaum, Warszawa.
- Darwin K., 2009, *O pochodzeniu człowieka*, tłum. M. Ilecki, Warszawa.
- Feldman M.W., Laland K.N., 1996, *Gene-Culture Coevolutionary Theory*, „Trends in Ecology and Evolution” 11 [11], s. 453–457.
- Ginnobili S., 2016, *Cultural Adaptations: Is It Conceptually Coherent to Apply Natural Selection to Cultural Evolution?*, [w:] *Darwin’s Legacy: The Status of Evolutionary Archaeology in Argentina*, M. Cardillo, H. Muscio (red.), Oxford, s. 1–11.
- Gissis S.B., Jablonka E. (red.), 2011, *Transformations of Lamarckism: From Subtle Fluids to Molecular Biology*, London.
- Gould S.J., 1991a, *Exaptation: A Crucial Tool for Evolutionary Psychology*, „Journal of Social Issues” 47, s. 43–65.
- Gould S.J., 1991b, *Niewczesny pogrzeb Darwina*, tłum. N. Kancewicz-Hoffman, Warszawa.
- Gould S.J., 1997, *Evolution: The Pleasures of Pluralism*, „New York Review of Books” 44 [11], s. 47–52.
- Gould S.J., Lewontin R.C., 2011, *Pendentywy w katedrze św. Marka a paradygmat Panglossa. Krytyka programu adaptacjonistycznego*, tłum. K. Bielecka, „Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki” 2–3 [31], s. 63–85.
- Gould S.J., Vrba E.S., 1982, *Exaptation: A Missing Term in the Science of Form*, „Paleobiology” 8 [1], s. 4–15.
- Heyes C.M., 1994, *Social Learning in Animals: Categories and Mechanisms*, „Biological Reviews” 69 [2], s. 207–231.
- Kaczmarek M., Łastowski K., 2004, *Ewolucja a epigeneza*, [w:] *Poznańskie Studia z Filozofii Humanistyki*, t. 7 [20], K. Łastowski (red.), Poznań, s. 157–193.
- Klawiter A., Łastowski K., Nowak L., Patryas W., 1979, *Adaptacja — uczenie się — praktyka*, [w:] *Poznańskie Studia z Filozofii Nauki*, t. 4, K. Łastowski, L. Nowak (red.), Warszawa–Poznań, s. 91–99.

- Kozłowski J., 2018, *Ewolucja człowieka jako seria dodatnich sprzężeń zwrotnych*, „Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce” 65, s. 145–176.
- Kummer H., Goodall J., 1985, *Conditions of Innovative Behaviour in Primates*, „Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London” B308, s. 203–214.
- Laland K.N., 2018a, *Jak ludzie stali się wyjątkowymi stworzeniami? Ewolucja bez precedensu*, „Świat Nauki” 10 [326], s. 20–27.
- Laland K.N., 2018b, *Darwin’s Unfinished Symphony: How Culture Made the Human Mind*, Princeton.
- Laland K.N., Brown G., 2006, *Niche Construction, Human Behavior, and the Adaptive-Lag*, „Evolutionary Anthropology” 15, s. 95–104.
- Laland K.N., Kendal J., Brown G., 2007, *The Niche Construction Perspective: Implications for Evolution and Human Behaviour*, „Journal of Evolutionary Psychology” 5 [1–4], s. 51–66.
- Laland K.N., Odling-Smee J., Myles S., 2010, *How Culture Shaped the Human Genome: Bringing Genetics and the Human Sciences Together*, „Nature Reviews Genetics” 11, s. 137–148.
- Lamarck J.B., 1960, *Filozofia zoologii*, tłum. K. Zaćwilichowska, Warszawa.
- Lewin R., 2004, *Human Evolution: An Illustrated Introduction*, New Jersey.
- Lindenbaum S., 1979, *Kuru Sorcery*, Boston.
- Łastowski K., 1992, *Czynnik społeczno-kulturowy w biologicznym obrazie ewolucji gatunku ludzkiego*, [w:] *Biologiczne i społeczne uwarunkowania kultury*, t. XXXV, J. Kmita, K. Łastowski (red.), Warszawa–Poznań, s. 17–26.
- Łastowski K., 2009, *Dwieście lat idei ewolucji w biologii. Lamarck — Darwin — Wallace*, „Kosmos” 3–4 [58], s. 257–271.
- Łastowski K., 2020, *Lamarck i Darwin. U podstaw idei ewolucji*, [w:] *idem, Idee ewolucji w biologii i humanistyce*, Poznań, s. 91–118.
- Łastowski K., Reuter M., 2020, *Ewoluujące umysły: koncepcje, hipotezy, argumenty empiryczne*, [w:] K. Łastowski, *Idee ewolucji w biologii i humanistyce*, Poznań, s. 557–590.
- Mesoudi A., 2011, *Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory Can Explain Human Culture and Synthesize the Social Sciences*, Chicago.
- Nettle D., Gibson M., Lawson D., Sear R., 2013, *Human Behavioral Ecology: Current Research and Future Prospects*, „Behavioural Ecology” 24, s. 1031–1040.
- Rampino M., 2017, *Reexamining Lyell’s Laws*, „American Scientist” 105, s. 224–231.
- Rendell L., Boyd R., Cownden D., Enquist M., Eriksson K., Feldman M.W., Fogarty L., Ghirlanda S., Lillicrap T., Laland K.N., 2010, *Why Copy Others? Insights from the Social Learning Strategies Tournament*, „Science” 328, s. 208–213.
- Richerson P.J., Boyd R., 2005, *Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution*, Chicago.
- Richerson P.J., Boyd R., Henrich J., 2010, *Gene-Culture Coevolution in the Age of Genomics*, „Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences” 107 [2], s. 8985–8992.
- Rosenberg K., Trevathan W., 1995, *Bipedalism and Human Birth: The Obstetrical Dilemma Revisited*, „Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews” 4 [5], s. 161–168.
- Smith C., Gabora L., Gardner-O’Kearny W., 2018, *Extended Evolutionary Synthesis Paves the Way for a Theory of Cultural Evolution*, „Cliodynamics” 9, s. 84–107.

- Soukup M., 2010, *Culture as Biological Adaptation*, „Anthropologie” XLVIII/2, s. 189–194.
- Tomasello M., 2005, *Kulturowe źródła ludzkiego poznania*, tłum. J. Rączaszek, Warszawa.
- Whiten A., Hinde R., Laland K.N., Stringer C.B., 2011, *Culture Evolves*, „Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London” 366, s. 938–948.
- Wilson A., 1985, *The Molecular Basis of Evolution*, „Scientific American” 253 [4], s. 164–173.

RECENZJE

MATEUSZ WOCH
ORCID: 0000-0002-7967-4301
Uniwersytet Wrocławski

Metapolityczna synteza św. Tomasza z Akwinu

François Daguet, *Myśl polityczna św. Tomasza z Akwinu*, tłum. Tomasz Pękała, Teologia Polityczna, Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa 2021, ss. 619.

Filozofia polityki św. Tomasza z Akwinu, najbardziej znana i historycznie najdonioślejsza propozycja teoretycznego ujęcia polityki z okresu średniowiecza, jest przedmiotem licznych opracowań. Jednak stosunkowo niewiele z nich ma charakter przekrojowy i może być traktowane jako wyczerpujące opracowanie całości metapolityki Akwinaty. Książka François Dagueta jest przejawem ambicji stworzenia syntetycznej analizy Tomaszowej myśli polityczno-społecznej i już z tego powodu jest warta zainteresowania badaczy i wszystkich tych, którzy interesują się historią myśli politycznej.

Dominikanin François Daguet (ur. 1957) to francuski teolog i dyrektor Instytutu św. Tomasza z Akwinu w Tuluzie. Do jego głównych zainteresowań należą: eklezjologia, teologia religii, nauka polityczno-społeczna Kościoła Katolickiego w ujęciu tomistycznym. Daguet jest absolwentem Instytutu Nauk Politycznych w Paryżu, zaś doktorat kanoniczny uzyskał na Uniwersytecie Fryburskim. Jest autorem licznych prac teologicznych i eklezjologicznych oraz opracowań z zakresu katolickiej filozofii politycznej i nauki społecznej. *Myśl polityczna św. Tomasza z Akwinu* została nagrodzona w roku 2016 Prix René Laurentin Akademii Nauk Moralnych i Politycznych w Paryżu oraz nagrodą Prix Biguet Akademii Francuskiej.

Monografia składa się z ośmiu rozdziałów, które poprzedza spis skrótów (głównie tytułów pism Akwinaty) oraz lista wykorzystanych przez polskiego tłumacza wydań tekstów św. Tomasza i Arystotelesa. Książkę wieńczy kilkunastostronicowe podsumowanie, posłowie do polskiego wydania oraz indeks osób. Każdy z rozdziałów stanowi opis konkretnego wątku myśli politycznej Tomasza, który Daguet uważa za istotny i konstytuujący tomistyczną metapolitykę. Te wątki są opisane w następującej strukturze.

Rozdział pierwszy stanowiący analizę statusu polityki, miejsca w ludzkim życiu, jakie nadał jej Akwinata, jest najbardziej „teoretyzującym” segmentem książki i stanowi jednocześnie podstawę do rozważań snutych w następnych rozdziałach. Daguet, przywołując Tomaszowy pogląd o przynależności polityki do porządku nauk praktycznych i przewodnim, organizującym (polityka jako „nauka architektoniczna”) charakterze dla praktycznego wymiaru ludzkiego życia, sięga do myśli Arystotelesa, podkreślając związek między rozważaniami Stagiryty a filozofią polityczną Tomasza. Autor wielokrotnie podkreśla zależność między polityką a etyką, traktując tę pierwszą jako rozwinięcie i pełniejszą realizację drugiej — wyraża się to w jednej z podstawowych dla książki tez, przewijającej się w każdym z jej rozdziałów, głoszącej prymat wymiaru wspólnotowego ludzkiego życia, nad jego wymiarem indywidualnym w tradycji metapolitycznej arystotelesowsko-tomistycznej, co Daguet uzasadnia w wielu miejscach monografii, powołując się na teksty obu myślicieli. Następną, kluczową tezę, wyrażaną w tym rozdziale, jest związek polityki i całego życia etycznego z rozumem, pełniącym funkcję konstytuującą „polityczność” człowieka i realizujące ją instytucje społeczne. Głosząc ciągłość tej konkretnej koncepcji polityki od Arystotelesa do Tomasza, autor zauważa różnice między nimi, które są opisane w rozdziale drugim, poświęconym problematyce dobra.

To właśnie przy okazji analizy problemu dobra w polityce, pojętego zgodnie z arystotelesowsko-tomistyczną tradycją jako przedmiot ludzkiego dążenia, francuski teolog rozważa wnikliwie różnice między arystotelesowskim „szczęściem” a Tomaszowym „dobrem najwyższym” i „dobrem wspólnym”. Daguet, kładąc nacisk na odmienne konteksty historyczne i światopoglądowe, zwraca uwagę czytelnika na transformację nauki perypatetyckiej dokonaną przez Akwinatę na kanwie chrześcijańskiej teologii, której głównym przejawem było przeformułowanie i rozbudowanie arystotelesowskiej koncepcji „najwyższego dobra”, które Tomasz utożsamiał z chrześcijańskim Bogiem, odchodząc od arystotelesowskiego naturalizmu.

Trzeci segment książki poświęcony jest relacji między antropologią a teorią polityki w myśli Doktora Anielskiego. Zasadniczą tezę tego rozdziału jest zniuansowanie teorii politycznej Akwinaty i jej balansowanie między naturalizmem, płynącym z arystotelesowskich inspiracji, a intencją dochowania pełnej wierności chrześcijańskiej wizji człowieka, wynikającej z Biblii i nauki Ojców Kościoła. Daguet zwraca tu uwagę na używanie przez Tomasza arystotelesowskiej dialektyki części i całości, w opisie relacji między osobą a społecznością i państwem oraz związku między dobrem indywidualnym a dobrem wspólnym.

Rozdział czwarty to analiza tak istotnego w czasach Tomasza problemu koegzystencji władzy świeckiej i duchownej. Autor wiele uwagi poświęcił przybliżeniu czytelnikowi kontekstu historycznego i ideowego, czyli nasilonemu od XI wieku napięciu między *potestas temporalis* a *potestas spiritualis*; rozwiązaniom problemu, z którymi Tomasz polemizował (augustynizm polityczny, gelazjanizm, cesaropapizm); uzasadnieniom poszczególnych doktryn na podstawie przekazu biblijnego oraz kontrastowi między stanowiskiem Tomasza a tendencjami nowożytnej filozofii politycznej, wobec których Daguet jest mocno krytyczny. Autor, przywołując Tomaszowe ujęcia relacji między tym, co doczesne, a tym, co odwieczne, opisuje stanowisko Tomasza, głoszące odrębność, ale nie rozdzielność dwóch władz, ich

współdziałanie, ale nie mieszanie, poddaje je analizie w kontekście całego systemu filozoficznego, wypracowanego przez Akwinatę.

Następny rozdział pracy ma charakter zdecydowanie bardziej praktyczny, traktuje bowiem o problemie właściwego uporządkowania państwa, by mogło ono spełniać swoją naczelną funkcję, czyli realizację wieloaspektowo i analogicznie pojętego dobra. To uporządkowanie odbywa się według tradycji arystotelesowsko-tomistycznej przez wyrabianie cnót w członkach społeczności. Stąd Daguet dokonuje opisu podstaw aretologii św. Tomasza, skupiając się na cnotach, mających wymiar przede wszystkim wspólnotowy — czyli sprawiedliwości i roztropności oraz tych, które regulują właściwie stosunki między ludźmi żyjącymi w państwie, takimi jak: wdzięczność, uczciwość, cześć i szacunek.

Podążając za słowami autora, który opisując relację między ustrojem państwa a wspólnotą polityczną, posługuje się arystotelesowską koncepcją złożenia formy i materii (forma organizująca i aktualizująca materię, analogicznie: ustrój państwowy organizuje i kieruje społecznością); rozdziały szósty i siódmy należy potraktować jako analizy owej formy, którą stanowią prawo oraz ustrój polityczny. W części poświęconej problematyce prawa, Daguet skupia się na Tomaszowej dychotomii *ius* i *lex*, problemowi często pojawiającemu się w badaniach dotyczących myśli politycznej Akwinaty, następnie poddaje analizie istotę Tomaszowego rozumienia prawa jako „rozporządzenia (*ordinatio*) rozumu dla dobra wspólnego nadanego i publicznie obwieszczonego przez tego, kto ma pieczę nad wspólnotą”¹. W odniesieniu do tak pojętego prawa, autor analizuje problematykę jego obwieszczenia (*promulgatio*), zakresu jego obowiązywania i relacji prawa stanowionego do prawa odwiecznego i naturalnego. Rozdział ósmy natomiast to analiza stanowiska Akwinaty w kwestii najlepszych rządów. Warto podkreślić, że autor zachowuje ostrożność badawczą i zwraca uwagę na niemożność jednoznacznego określenia Tomasza jako monarchisty, ze względu na niekompletność tekstów źródłowych, bądź ich historycznie uwarunkowaną nieobiektywność, jak jest to w przypadku znanego tekstu *De regno*, pedagogicznego dziełka, nieukończonego i napisanego na zamówienie króla Cypru Hugona II. Krytycznie analizując pozostawione przez Tomasza pisma, Daguet skłania się ku stanowisku o preferowaniu przez Doktora Anielskiego ustroju mieszanego.

W ostatnim rozdziale pracy w pełni ujawnia się splot dziedzin stanowiących główne zainteresowania autora — eklezjologii, teologii i filozofii politycznej. W nim francuski badacz analizuje wątek politycznego wymiaru wspólnoty Kościoła, obecny w pismach Tomasza jedynie śladowo. Analiza składa się z krytycznego rozważenia analogii państwo–Kościół oraz powraca tu wątek relacji między wspólnotą polityczną, świecką a wspólnotą religijną.

Po opisanu zawartości książki należy podjąć się jej oceny, poprzez wypunktowanie zalet i wad. Poczynając od tych pierwszych, należy wpięć uwagę na najważniejszą, wspomnianą już we wstępie — *Myśl polityczna św. Tomasza z Akwinu* to książka, autorowi której nie można odmówić ambicji napisania ob-

¹ Tomasz z Akwinu, *Suma Teologiczna*, I–II, q. 90, a. 4, tłum. P. Belch, online: http://katedra.uksw.edu.pl/suma/suma_13.pdf (dostęp: 18.02.2022).

szerszej, przekrojowej pracy, która będzie zawierać kompletny wykład filozofii polityczno-społecznej św. Tomasza. Czy ta ambicja znajduje realizację w książce? Uważam, że tak. Książka Dagueta stanowi opis wszystkich najważniejszych komponentów Tomaszowej metapolityki, a jednocześnie zawiera argumentację za prezentowanymi tezami, opartą na wszystkich aspektach systemu filozoficznego Akwinaty. Daguet nie ogranicza się do perspektywy jedynie teologicznej lub etycznej, powołując się wielokrotnie na twierdzenia metafizyczne i epistemologiczne, wysnute lub wprost wyciągnięte z pism XII-wiecznego teologa i filozofa. Daguet korzysta zarówno z praktycznego wymiaru nauki Tomasza, jak i jego teoretycznych, spekulatywnych uzasadnień, zachowując przy tym klarowność wywodu, poprzez podzielenie opisywanej problematyki na podrozdziały i zawarte w nich bardziej szczegółowe, konkretne kwestie. Dzięki temu książka jest wyjątkowo „przejrzysta”, umożliwiając szybkie znalezienie wątków, które interesują czytelnika. Przekrojowy charakter pracy, przy zachowaniu tej klarowności i przystępności, jest osiągnięciem godnym podkreślenia. Ta przystępność wynikająca ze struktury pracy idzie w parze z przystępnością treści. Daguet podejmowane wątki analizuje właściwie od podstaw, zwłaszcza w pierwszych rozdziałach, poświęconych teoretycznemu aspektowi filozofii politycznej Tomasza. Autor, stawiając zasadnicze tezy interpretacyjne wobec myśli Akwinaty, ukazuje ich kontekst. Uzasadnia pojawienie się danego wątku lub twierdzenia, tłumacząc jego rolę w systemie filozoficznym Tomasza lub w kontekście historycznym. Jest to szczególnie widoczne przy analizie samego teoretycznego ujęcia zjawiska polityki w myśli Tomasza oraz jego antycznego inspiratora — Arystotelesa. Każda z postawionych tez bądź przytoczonych koncepcji ma swoje uzasadnienie, co sprawia, że książka ta pomimo swoich rozmiarów i bogactwa opisywanej problematyki ma stosunkowo niski próg wejścia. Daguet stosuje znany wszystkim tomistom aparat pojęciowy, ale stosuje do niego objaśnienia, tłumaczące używane pojęcia i terminy. Ośmielę się postawić tezę, że prezentowana w książce wiedza jest przyswajalna nawet dla tych czytelników, którzy nigdy wcześniej nie mieli kontaktu z teorią polityczną Tomasza i Arystotelesa. Trzeba tu bowiem zaznaczyć, że chociaż przedmiotem pracy jest metapolityka Akwinaty, to przy okazji analizy tejże Daguet zawarł wszystkie najważniejsze koncepcje konstytuujące myśl Stagiryty. Przesadne raczej byłoby twierdzenie, że jest to książka „popularnonaukowa” — oczywiście w odniesieniu do filozofii — ale wydaje się uzasadnionym stwierdzić, że dzieło Dagueta może pełnić pewną funkcję popularyzatorską w przypadku opisywanej tradycji filozofii polityki. Jest to zresztą intencja wyrażona przez autora wprost, we wstępie książki oraz w przedmowie, napisanej przez szwajcarskiego teologa kard. G. Cottiera. Należy jednak postawić pytanie — czy ta funkcja popularyzatorska nie jest ograniczona do chrześcijan? Odpowiedź na niniejsze pytanie zawrę w dalszej części recenzji.

Wywód Dagueta w znacznej części jest odpowiednio szczegółowy i wyczerpujący (jednak nie wszędzie, ale to wynika z zasadniczej wady dzieła, o której będzie dalej), gęsto usiany przypisami, cytataми ze źródeł oraz opracowań, gdzie autor odnosi się do badań takich znawców myśli Tomasza jak: Jacques Maritain, Étienne Gilson, Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, John Finnis czy Charles Journet (żeby wymieść jedynie tych najbardziej znanych). Wywód autora oparty jest na całości pisemnego

dorobku pozostawionego przez Doktora Anielskiego i większości dzieł Arystotelesa. Oprócz tego książka zawiera liczne odwołania do klasycznych dzieł z dziedziny filozofii politycznej, w większości pism antycznych i średniowiecznych, chociaż obecne są również teksty nowożytne. Autor, stosując metodę krytycznej analizy źródeł, uwzględniającej historyczny kontekst powstania źródła lub niejasności dotyczące jego autorstwa (często występujący problem w przypadku antycznych i średniowiecznych pism), zachowuje godną odnotowania rzetelność badawczą; natomiast stosując metodę hermeneutyczną, uzasadnia swoje interpretacje, porównując teksty źródłowe, uwzględniając ich kontekst ideowy i światopoglądowy.

Nie można odmówić autorowi również konsekwencji odnośnie tez i intencji przewodnich pracy, którymi są: 1) chęć wykazania istnienia w pismach Tomasa spójnej, systemowej teorii polityki; 2) istnienie nierozdzielnego związku między Tomaszową polityką a jego antropologią, ontologią, epistemologią i teologią; 3) syntetyczny charakter metapolityki Tomasa, wynikający z przyjęcia podstawowych tez Arystotelesa i ich transformacji w kontekście światopoglądu chrześcijańskiego; 4) położenie akcentu na wspólnotowy wymiar ludzkiego bytowania, przeciwstawione tendencjom skrajnych personalistów do indywidualistycznych interpretacji filozofii Akwinaty; 5) unikalny charakter propozycji Tomasa zarówno wobec jego poprzedników, jak i następców, szczególnie koncepcji nowożytnych i współczesnych. Wszystkie one pojawiają się wprost lub implicite we wszystkich częściach pracy, stanowiąc punkt odniesienia dla autora lub punkt wyjścia dla prowadzonych rozważań i analiz.

Dzieło teologa z Tuluzy nie jest jednak pozbawione dwóch dość istotnych wad. Pierwsza z nich ma charakter bardziej immanentny i techniczny, zdaje się być konsekwencją wyżej wymienionych ambicji stworzenia przekrojowej i przystępnej pracy, wyczerpującej podejmowaną problematykę lub wynikać z chęci uzasadnienia przytoczonych wyżej tez przewodnich. Książka Dagueta zawiera liczne powtórzenia, autoodniesienia, które z lekturą kolejnych rozdziałów stają się dla czytelnika męczące. Daguet zdaje się zbyt wiele razy powracać do swoich głównych twierdzeń, przez co miejscami zaburza klarowność wyводу, tak znakomicie zachowaną w ogólnej strukturze monografii².

Drugą słabością pracy, którą trzeba wspomnieć, są fragmenty, w których autor usiłuje wykazać kontrast między propozycją filozoficzną Tomasa a tendencjami nowożytnej filozofii polityki. Taki kontrast niewątpliwie istnieje i jest on bardzo mocny, ale w książce Dagueta wydaje się być niedostatecznie uzasadniony i te fragmenty są jedynymi słabymi merytorycznie elementami pracy. Przebierają one postać raczej dygresji lub sądów, zdających się wynikać ze światopoglądowego ukształtowania autora. W celu dopełnienia naukowej rzetelności należałoby rozbudować te twierdzenia o argumentację — można się pokusić o stwierdzenie, że w książce brakuje przynajmniej jednego podrozdziału, skupiającego się na przemianach nowożytnych koncepcji metapolitycznych w odniesieniu do opisywanej propozycji klasycznej. Zamiast tego autor ograniczył się raczej do dygresyjnych

² Np. s. 95, 109, 201, 207. Te powtórzenia uwidaczniają się szczególnie w przypadku akcentowania przez autora wspólnotowego wymiaru omawianej tradycji metapolitycznej.

uwag, rozsianych po całej pracy³. Poświęcony temu problemowi fragment wniosków końcowych, zawierający pytania o aktualność filozofii Tomasza współcześnie, jest z pewnością niewystarczający.

Tu powrócę do wyżej postawionego pytania — czy *Mysł polityczna św. Tomasza z Akwinu* pióra Dagueta jest pozycją skierowaną głównie do chrześcijan? I mimo swoich niewątpliwych walorów naukowych, które są widoczne dla znawców dziejów filozofii politycznej, stanowi ona raczej środek popularyzacji nauki Tomasza wśród tych, którzy z racji prezentowanego światopoglądu są dla niej bardziej przychylni? Odpowiedź na to pytanie nie jest prosta, jednak z racji konieczności dokonania ogólnej oceny dzieła pozwolę sobie ją sformułować następująco: książka francuskiego dominikanina jest intencjonalnie skierowana przede wszystkim do chrześcijan, ale jej przydatność nie ogranicza się jedynie do funkcji popularyzatorskiej u wyznawców lub sympatyków chrześcijaństwa. Pomimo wspomnianych wad, zwłaszcza tej drugiej, przez którą książka wydaje się należeć do jakiejś określonej narracji światopoglądowej (w pewnym sensie oczywiście tak jest), jest ona na tyle merytorycznie mocna, bogata w cytaty ze źródeł, okraszona wnikliwymi analizami, że jest propozycją atrakcyjną dla wszystkich, którzy chcą zapoznać się z systemem teorii polityki sformułowanym przez św. Tomasza z Akwinu, jednocześnie zawierającą kompetentne opracowanie (choć rozrzucone po książce i będące „przy okazji” analiz stanowiska Tomasza) filozofii politycznej Arystotelesa. Natomiast nie mam wątpliwości, że dzieło Dagueta, wchodząc do stosunkowo nielicznego zbioru syntetycznych, przekrojowych opracowań „tomizmu politycznego” dostępnych na rynku, będzie w tym zbiorze pozycją ważną, zaś w Polsce⁴ wydaje się dziełem jedynym w swoim rodzaju pod względem maksymalizmu badawczego w dziedzinie filozoficznej i tematyce, którą podejmuje.

³ Np. s. 77, 80–81, 143, 173, 247, 415, 435, 505.

⁴ W kwestii podobnych opracowań dostępnych w języku polskim książka wydaje się nie mieć konkurencji poza pracą A. Machowskiego — *Teologia polityczna św. Tomasza z Akwinu. Antropologiczno-etyczna interpretacja traktatu „De regno”*, Toruń 2011. Jednakże dzieło Machowskiego, chociaż obszernie i zawierające wszystkie fundamentalne wątki Tomaszowej metapolityki, jest w zastosowaniu mniej uniwersalne, bazując na konkretnym piśmie Tomasza.

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

RANDALL E. AUXIER, PRZEMYSŁAW BURSZYKA, <i>Strangers in the Hands of an Angry "I": On the Immediacy of Other Persons</i>	5
PIOTR MACHURA, <i>Moral Topography of Memory, Time Control and Accumulation of Identity</i>	27
VICTORIA ROWE HOLBROOK, <i>Metaphysics of Beauty in Islam</i>	45
ENGIN ERDEM, <i>The Place of God in Metaphysics: A Short Analysis of Ibn Sīnā's Critique of Aristotle</i>	53
ILONA BŁOCIAN, <i>Mnemonic Images in the Early Works of Sigmund Freud</i>	63
MARTA DIXA, <i>The "Cultural Drive" Hypothesis in Explaining the Evolution of the Human Species</i>	71
REVIEWS	93



Wydawnictwo
Uniwersytetu
Wrocławskiego

Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego sp. z o.o.
plac Uniwersytecki 15
50-137 Wrocław
sekretariat@uwur.com.pl

www.wuwr.eu
Facebook/[wydawnictwouwr](https://www.facebook.com/wydawnictwouwr)

