O koncepcji związku przyczynowo-skutkowego Hume’a raz jeszcze

Abstrakt

On Hume’s Theory of Cause–Effect Relation Once Again

In the paper I consider two aspects of Hume’s theory of causation which have been rather neglected or have not been developed in details so far. Firstly, I examine resemblance relation between impressions and ideas and its role in cause–effect relation. I conclude that there are two different theories of causation to be found in Hume’s philosophy; one designed to substantiate empiricism principle impressions are causes of ideas, and the other, based on the concept of mind’s habitual reaction on observed similar circumstances. I argue that in the first theory Hume implicitly assumes those elements of the causation theory which he explicitly rejects issuing the second. Secondly, I analyse Hume’s argument pointed against his opponents, which I named “argument from imagination.” According to that argument, we are not justified in claiming that there are necessary relations in the world because we are always able to imagine a chain of events different than the actual one. The same mind faculty, however, is forced by habit to present ideas according to previous experiences which is due to the fact that, according to Hume, there is only one kind of mind’s actions. Thus the “argument from imagination” turns out to be two-edged, both fatal to Hume’s own theory as well as to his adversaries.