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Tom 8 Nr 4 (2013)

Idealizm transcendentalny dziś? Od Kantowskiej metafizyki substancji i czasu w "Krytyce czystego rozumu" do sporu o istnienie świata

  • Tomasz Kąkol
2 stycznia 2014


Transcendental idealism today? From Kantian metaphysics of substance and time in his Critiqueof Pure Reason to the controversy over the existence of the world

In this article I try to undercut two lines of argument for transcendental idealism: Kantian one from his Critique of pure reason and contemporary Marek Rosiak’s phenomenological proposal our daily world is spatiotemporal, yet space and time are extensions, whereas extention is an impossible enity since it either leads to an ontological infinite regress or is a network of relations without their arguments. Kant’s case is examined through analysing his two crucial concepts — substance and time. I point at several inconveniences and unsupported premises e.g. the very restrictive, verificationistic “principle of possible [sensuous] experience” and the flaw in each argument for the conclusion that time is a [pure] form of phenomena, not things in themselves, along with the danger of infinite epistemic regress concerning the status of Kantian theory. As regards Rosiak’s argument, my rejoinder applies to phenomenology in general: from moderate scientific realism motivated by the prognostic success of science I believe in what the science says about space and time, phenomenological-ontological intuitions notwithstanding. In particular, I refer to general relativity to show that its consequences are highly counterintuitive or even nonsensical from the phenomenological point of view.