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ARTYKUŁY

Tom 11 Nr 4 (2016)

W.V. Quine a francuski konwencjonalizm. Problem analityczności zdań nauki

  • Michał Gmytrasiewicz
Przesłane
13 lutego 2017
Opublikowane
13-02-2017

Abstrakt

W.V. Quine and French conventionalism A problem of analyticity of scientific propositions

The fundamental assumption of logical positivism was the one about analytical/synthetic distinction. It refers to a distinction between two kinds of truths. Synthetic truths are true both because of what they mean and because of the way the world is, whereas analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning alone. It is widely accepted that it was W.V. Quine who attacked this distinction and advocated a form of holism. It is however overlooked by some contemporary readers that ideas presented in Two Dogmas of Empiricism were already discussed among French conventionalists fifty years earlier. Results of these discussions influenced other centres such as the Berlin Circle, the Lvov-Warsaw School, the Vienna Circle and indirectly Quine himself. Despite the initial negative reception the conventionalist philosophy of science had a significant impact on philosophy and methodology in the twentieth century.