Arguments in favour of Global Antirealism

Abstrakt

The aim of the paper is to give an analysis of the main arguments for so called global antirealism which are discussed in contemporary philosophy. As arguments for global antirealism are presented: 1 the fact that conformity of opinion, actual or potential, in all domains of discourse does not exist and thus objectivity must be interpreted as intersubjectivity, 2 the existence of different conceptual schemes which are used to interpret different kinds of data, 3 the replacement of correspondence theory of truth with so called epistemic theory of truth, 3 the verificationist theory of meaning, 5 the possibility of reduction mainly naturalistic of entities of some kind to entities treated as more basic. The end of the paper is devoted to the analysis of relations between contemporary forms of antirealism and forms of old idealism and between forms of global antirealism and forms of domain specific antirealisms.