Analiza empirycznych argumentów na rzecz tezy o zróżnicowaniu kulturowym intuicji epistemicznych

Abstrakt

An analysis of empirical arguments for the thesis on cultural diversity of epistemic intuitions

The founding text for the new current in modern philosophy—experimental philosophy—can be seen in Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich’s “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” 2001. The authors describe in this article a study to prove cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions. On the basis of their results, they argue that since epistemic intuitions seem to serve a crucial role in the use of thought experiments, contemporary philosophical methodology is highly unjustified.
That study has brought about at least three replication attempts Seyedsayamdost 2015; Kim, Yuan 2015; Nagel, San Juan, Mar 2013. None of them confirmed the original results.
The aim of this article is to critically analyze in detail Weinberg, Nichols and Stich’s methodology and the three replications mentioned. Regarding the results of my analysis, I will try to examine what conclusions can be drawn with regard to the outcomes of analized studies. In particular I will refer to far-reaching conclusions about the universality of epistemic intuitions or universality of folk epistemology, which are sometimes—hastily, as I will argue—extrapolated from the results of such kind of studies e.g., Kim, Yuan 2015; Kim Yuan 2016.