The banality of evil as a problem of moral responsibility in legal discourse

Abstract

The purpose of this article is an attempt to adapt the thesis about the banality of evil to con-siderations on responsibility in law. I intend to accomplish this task in three stages. The first stage is reconstructive. Its purpose is to present the evolution of Hannah Arendt’s views on the sources of evil. Then, referring to the literature on the subject, I will present comments to the thesis about the banality of evil. This constructive task will aim to show two aspects of the banality of evil. The first concerns human attitudes, and the second — the functioning of the law. In the latter step, these approaches will refer to two problems. The first focuses on the attitude of lawyers in the processes of legal interpretation. The second problem concerns the shaping of the concept of responsibility in law. The indicated reference is the central point of consideration for the adaptation task.
In carrying out the research task formulated in this way, I assume that the thesis of the banality of evil is historical. This means that it changes and evolves in socio-institutional practices. I assume the potential usefulness of the claim of evil banality for legal reflection on the law. Positive verifica-tion of this hypothesis sets the argumentation line of the presented article.